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Identity and Agency: Majority and Minority Ethnic Voting in New Democracies
Benjamin P. McClelland
This dissertation examines how ethnic identities are politicized through elections in new
democracies. Using the cases of post-communist Latvia and Bosnia andHerzegovina, I compare
the electoral success of campaigns which appeal to voters on the basis of ethnicity to those do
not. I argue that ethnic parties are most likely in groups for whom two conditions are met.
First, ethnicity must meaningfully differentiate ethnic insiders from outsiders, in such a way
that voters will believe policy benefits will likely result from political representation for the
group. Second, electoral institutions must ensure that the political mobilization of the group will
result in electoral victory. These two conditions create fundamentally different incentives for
ethnic majority groups and ethnic minority groups simply because of differences in group size.
In most democracies with a large minority population, ethnic voting will be more likely among
the majority group than the minority group, unless institutions encourage minority group voting
by lowering barriers to entry. The results demonstrate the qualitatively different ways groups
use ethnic identities as a resource to achieve political objectives, with important implications
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1Introduction
On my first ever visit to the former Yugoslavia, I found myself at a bar in Sarajevo talking to a
fellow patron. He was roughly my age, but we had clearly lived very different lives. He was still
in primary school when the Bosnian War had begun, and he had spent a substantial chunk of
his childhood in a war zone. The experience had filled him with contempt and disgust that had
not abated in the years following the war. He said that the world thought there were three types
of people in Bosnia, but that was wrong. Yes, there were Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs, but there
was also a fourth type: “normal people.” His dream, he said, was to send all the Bosniaks to
Turkey, and the Croats to Croatia, and all the Serbs to Serbia, and then Bosnia could be a great
country, full of “normal” people. Those people, he thought, would probably have a pretty good
time with everyone else gone.
My thought at the time was that this personmust be extremely atypical. People who hang out
in bars in the capital to practice their English with foreigners are hardly a representative sample
of Bosnians. Ethnic divisions are so deeply entrenched in virtually all aspects of Bosnian society
that to imply that the overwhelming majority of Bosnians who strongly identify with one of the
three main ethnic groups are somehow not “normal” can hardly be a popular position. Ethnic
segregation is also the norm in the political life of the country, and parties representing those
three main ethnic groups had been the dominant political players since the end of the civil war.
Out of curiosity, I asked my companion who he planned to vote for in the next election. “The
HDZ,” he answered, giving the Bosnian abbreviation for the Croatian Democratic Union, one
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of those very same ethnic parties. I told him his answer surprised me. Didn’t he know that the
HDZ justified its existence by representing one of those ethnic groups of “not normal” people?
Had he forgotten that the HDZ leadership led the combatants in the civil war that had destroyed
his city and his childhood? Had he heard the party’s candidates on TV, declaring that their goals
were greater autonomy and more rights exclusively for Croats?
Of course he knew all this, much better than I did. But he and his family were Croats, he
said, and Croats were the smallest group in the country. He knew that the other two groups
were electing their own representatives, and if the Croats didn’t take care of themselves, no one
else would. Croats needed jobs and social services, too, and a Croat party was the only way to
provide that. He didn’t see his choice as hypocritical or disingenuous. It was simply what he
had to do, living in a country filled with so many “not normal” people.
This person saw his primary identity in non-ethnic terms, and saw the ethnic division of
society as undesirable. His ethnicity was something he had thought about a lot, but did not regard
positively. He associated ethnicity with violence and childhood trauma, and saw people who
thought of themselves primarily as members of an ethnic community as almost pathological.
Yet when voting he helped to maintain and reinforce those ethnic divisions. He supported a
party that campaigned to help a specific ethnic group even at the expense of others with whom
he felt an affinity. His was a decision to support an ethnic political party even while he found
the very idea of ethnic politics objectionable.
That this person should vote for an ethnic party is surprising to say the least. But in a way, it’s
surprising that anyone votes for an ethnic party. Ethnic identities are the result of inheritance,
not choice. They are arbitrarily assigned at birth, a quirk of history and happenstance, usually
beyond the ability of any individual to change. It’s surprising that people would attach so much
personal significance to something completely beyond their control. Ethnicity seems almost
capricious when compared to other social divisions and identity categories like age, class, or
gender. While a rich voter and a poor voter are readily identifiable by differences in what they
possess, a Croat voter and a Serb voter, for example, are often only accepted as different because
of historical consensus that they are different. Yet ethnicity is hugely consequential for voting
in much of the world. In both developing and developed countries, ethnic divides strongly
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correspond to vote choice. MyBalkan barroom colleague suggests one under-appreciated reason
as to why this may be the case. His decision to support an ethnic party was not the result of the
way he felt about himself or his group, but instead the context in which he found himself and
his perceptions of the likely behavior of others. The practical reasons to support an ethnic party
were so compelling that they overcame the disdain he felt for the ideology of the people was
voting for. He didn’t like it, but he still chose to support an ethnic party.
This dissertation asks why voters in divided societies vote for ethnic parties. To answer
that question, I examine ethnic voting as a conscious and calculated decision to use identity as a
resource to gain tangible benefits from the state. I propose that ethnic voting is most likely when
ethnic mobilization represents a viable path to controlling policy outcomes. To understand why
people choose to vote for someone who claims to represent their ethnic group, we should first
understand what they can expect to get by putting such a person in a position of power, and why
they think that person can deliver on those promises.
Ethnic identities can be a political resource, useful both for voters concerned with creating
favorable state policies, and for would-be politicians concerned about winning office. But not
all ethnic identities are equally useful for pursuing these goals. For some ethnic groups, cam-
paigns built on ethnic identities reliably help voters enact favorable policies and candidates win
elections. For others, ethnic appeals are routinely defeated by ideological campaigns or other
types of parties which seem more appealing. In order to determine why some voters support
ethnically-defined political parties, we have to understand what exactly it is that ethnic voting
offers. To do so, I look at two specific components: the potential benefits to the group of ethnic
representation, and the likelihood that such group mobilization will result in electoral victory.
These conditions do not exist for all groups equally. In fact, they do not even exist for all
groups within the same country. The incentives to support ethnic parties can vary enormously
between groups even within the same country operating under the same rules. Specifically, the
distinction between majority and minority groups is enormously important. Contrary to many
expectations, this dissertation argues that ethnic majority groups are most likely to win elec-
tions by campaigning on ethnic appeals, not minority groups. Democratic elections rely on the
principal of majority rule, and in most cases ethnic majority groups are more likely to win by
3
politicizing ethnicity than minority groups. Ethnic minority groups can and do successfully
campaign on ethnic issues, but this is most likely to happen in institutional contexts where mi-
nority groups enjoy the benefits of being majorities through segregation into their own discrete
units.
Ethnic voting is not governed by the same rules among minority and majority group mem-
bers, because the strategic calculations facing the two groups are fundamentally different. Ma-
jority groups may have the greatest likelihood of winning political office through ethnic voting,
but usually have the least to gain through ethnic representation. For minority groups, the sit-
uation is reversed: they may have the most to gain through being represented in government,
but will also have the hardest time winning office because of their reduced numbers. To explain
ethnic voting, it is important not only to acknowledge this trade-off between the motive and the
means to elect ethnic representatives, but also to understand how electoral rules and political
institutions can change the balance between these two often contradictory forces. In the chap-
ters that follow, I seek to explain the phenomenon of ethnic voting, drawing special attention to
countries divided between majority and minority ethnic groups.
1.1 Why Study Ethnic Voting?
In much of the world ethnicity is an important predictor of voting choice. Horowitz’s (1985)
“ethnic census” voting, under which voting behavior perfectly corresponds to ethnic identities
such that election returns resemble census data, is the norm in much of the world. Empirical
studies have documented widespread ethnic voting patterns in much of the world including
Africa,1 Eastern Europe,2 South Asia,3and the long-standing democracies of Western Europe
and North America.4
This pattern raises normative concerns about ethnicity subverting democratic accountability.
The tendency to support coethnics may be so strong as to overwhelm voters’ capacity to assess
candidates’ competence or policy positions. The normative value of democracy rests on the way
1See Nugent (2001), Bratton & Kimenyi (2008), Eifert, Miguel & Posner (2010), Ferree (2006).
2See Birnir (2007).
3See Aspinall (2011).
4See Barreto, Segura & Woods (2004), Hill, Moreno & Cue (2001)
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in which it facilitates positive outcomes through voters’ willingness to “throw the bums out.” If
politicians can rely on voters’ support by virtue of their ethnicity, they may be more likely to
engage in—and get away with—all manner of corruption, venality, and idiocy.
This has led some to conclude that democracy may simply be more difficult in ethnically
diverse societies. More diverse countries tend to be backwards economically,5 more prone to
conflict,6 and more poorly governed7 than more homogeneous countries. For some, this intu-
ition is confirmed by a cursory glance at the quality of life around the world: Nordic European
countries like Denmark and Norway which routinely rank highest on quality of life indicators
are noticeably ethnically and culturally homogeneous, while those countries plagued by poverty
and perennial warfare like Uganda and Afghanistan are among the most ethnically diverse in
the world. Increasing diversity in the developed world due to migration has spurned a populist
and at times anti-democratic backlash, further supporting this suspicion in the eyes of many
observers. The inevitable conclusion is pessimism about the prospects for democracy in the
world of the twenty-first century. As much of the developing world is highly ethnically diverse,
and the developing world is increasing in its heterogeneity, democracy may very well be headed
towards a period of global stagnation or decline.
But before accepting such a bleak conclusion, we should look more closely at the mecha-
nisms which link ethnic diversity to political outcomes. The causal chain through which diver-
sity affects democracy is held together by the decisions of individual societal actors. Identities
are not actors or actions in and of themselves, but rather characteristics that influence outcomes
by the ways they structure the context and the background conditions under which actors make
decisions. Political and economic outcomes are the accumulated results of decisions made by
atomized citizens each acting in what they perceived to be their own best interests. If diversity
does make it harder for democracy to survive, it will operate—and thus should be observable–
through the decisions of political actors.
In this dissertation I concentrate on ethnic voting. The ability of citizens to choose their
leaders is the most important characteristic of democracy, and the election of leaders is the first
5See Easterly & Levine (1997) and Alesina, Baqir & Easterly (1999).
6See Fearon & Laitin (2003), and Montalvo & Reynal-Querol (2005).
7See La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1999).
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step in any democratic policy-making. To understand how democracy can function in ethnically
diverse societies, I explore how voting decisions are made under conditions of ethnic diversity.
Election results are the product of interactive decision making made by two groups of actors:
voters and politicians. When ethnic identities are politicized, it is because both sets of actors
have chosen to politicize them. In other words, when ethnicity is politically relevant, it is because
elites have chosen to mobilize voters on the basis of ethnic identities, and voters have chosen to
support candidates who do so.
What is necessary then is a theory which links ethnicity and voting through the mechanism
of human agency. Why do politicians choose to campaign on ethnic platforms? What strategies
are available to politicians who choose to politicize ethnicity, and why do voters support can-
didates who choose to do so? In asking this question, I hope not only to further our collective
understanding of elections, democracy, and political development, but also to explore the role
of ethnicity and identity in the human experience. Questioning the link between individual-level
ethnic identities and group-level political mobilization ultimately speaks to fundamental issues
regarding the role of the individual in society, and how an individual’s experience is integrated
into a societal whole. This dissertation thus seeks not only to explain political outcomes and
understand the prospects of democratic governance in diverse societies, but contribute to the
understanding of the human condition and the relationship between individuals and the societal
and political communities in which we find ourselves.
1.2 A Theory of Ethnicity as a Political Asset
This dissertation argues that ethnicity should be understood as a political resource possessed
both by voters who want to receive tangible benefits from the state, and by politicians who want
to win office. Ethnic voting is most likely when the value of this resources is high for both sets
of people: voters want ethnic representation in the state because individuals stand to gain when
state resources are redistributed along ethnic lines and politicians can use ethnic identities as a
way to win political office. This is not the case in all circumstances, however. To understand
the value of ethnic representation to these two sets of people, it is important to understand how
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ethnic identities inform voting decisions.
1.2.1 Ethnicity as Informational
An ethnic identity is an individual identity based on personal attributes associated with decent.
Ethnic identities are both highly visible, and difficult to change.8 These characteristics make
ethnic identities useful as a heuristic device. During an electoral campaign, a politician must
reach out to potential voters, and persuade those voters that they should vote for her over her
rivals. Since campaigning is ultimately about persuasion, mobilization, and coordination, the
way in which the visibility of ethnic identities present information about candidates to voters
may represent a politically useful way for building linkages between would-be leaders and their
possible constituents.
One potential stream of information conveyed by ethnicity is the identification of common-
ality. By its very nature, identity establishes the personal characteristics that make one either
distinct from or similar to others around her. It is the intellectual, philosophical, and cognitive
tool that humans use to distinguish self versus other, sameness versus change, and unity versus
diversity (Lagasse 2017). All identity categories ranging from the profound (religion, sexu-
ality, race) to the frivolous (Arsenal supporter, birdwatcher, Star Wars fan) help to fulfill this
function, but ethnic identities are unique. Since ethnic markers are highly visible and difficult
to change, they are extremely useful for the immediate and efficient identification of in-groups
and out-groups. For many ethnic groups, ethnicity is communicated almost immediately by ap-
pearance, language, accent, dress, or mannerism. Voters making voting decisions in a limited
information environment can readily gauge which candidates are members of their own ethnic
group, sorting options into ethnic insiders and outsiders.
Just as ethnicity can be useful to voters for deriving information on candidates, it can also be
useful to candidates in deriving information about voters. Public opinions on specific political
issues may change fairly drastically in the short term, and be difficult to assess with certainty.
Ideology and partisanship are rarely visually observable, and can require costly information
gathering for politicians seeking to appeal to constituents on those grounds. Ethnic identities,
8This definition borrows heavily from Chandra (2004). For a full discussion of the definitions of identities used
in this dissertation, see Chapter 2.
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on the other hand, remain relatively constant in the short- and medium-term, and are often easily
observable with minimal effort. How dominant a specific group is within a specific area is usu-
ally easily assessed and slow to change, and candidates can gauge potential ethnic backgrounds
of voting communities fairly easily. In this way, ethnic identity is one of the easier forms of
information for would be-leaders to obtain about their potential supporters.
The fact that ethnic identities can be useful for both politicians and voters makes them im-
portant in building linkages between the two. Voters care about electing leaders who will enact
policies that will benefit them. They seek to identify politicians who share their interests and
priorities, and cast their votes in a way that will help elect those leaders. By relying on ethnic
cues, voters can at the very least identify which candidates share their descent-based character-
istics, and which do not. Politicians, on the other hand, care about getting elected. Democracy
is a system of majority rule—the biggest political faction is usually the one that wins. When
deciding which electoral group to target, a politician ultimately wants to win over a constituency
that is big enough to win office. Ethnic identities help voters gauge the relative size of ethnic
communities, and identify potential winners and likely losers before campaigning.
But simply because ethnicity conveys information doesn’t mean it always facilitates ethnic
voting. Since ethnicity does not directly measure competence, policy position, or intentions,
voters may observe ethnicity but ultimately deem other indicators of candidate quality more
important. Likewise, politicians may use ethnic identities to determine that even full mobiliza-
tion of an ethnic community is not likely to produce a big enough base of support to win office.
In either of these cases, voters and politicians may be using the information conveyed by ethnic
cues to decide not to vote along ethnic lines. Ethnic identities serve an information role, and
are therefore not deterministic over individual actions. Whether the information conveyed by
ethnicity encourages or discourages voting along ethnic lines depends on the circumstances of
the group and the context in which they find themselves. Since this will vary by country, and
even by group within the same country, some ethnic identities may be better at mobilizing voters
than others.
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1.2.2 Ethnic Identity as a Political Resource
The word “election” comes from the Latin word for “choice.” While this usually refers to the
choice of voters over who will represent them in office, politicians also make choices during
electoral campaigns. Politicians get to choose how they present themselves to voters, and what
aspects of their own personal brand they will emphasize. Not all labels are equally valuable:
most candidates want to be associated in the minds of voters with terms like “honest,” “compe-
tent,” “fair,” etc. Most candidates also want to avoid toxic labels that voters find unappealing:
“philanderer,” “tax cheat,” or “problem drinker.”
Many labels politicians campaign on appeal only to a subset of the electorate, and are not
valued equally by society as a whole. In the classic interpretation of democracy, electoral com-
petition stabilizes around a set of symmetrical identity categories in the sense that one party
campaigns on one platform, while another campaigns on its opposite. These are the archetypal
social cleavages around which elections have historically been structured in the western world:
rural versus urban, religious versus secular, and capital versus labor (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).
Neither a voter nor a politician can be in both categories at once. If voters are presented with
a politician claiming to represent the interests of the rural class and a politician claiming to
represent the urban classes, presumably the choice for voters is clear: rural voters support the
rural party and urban voters support the urban party.
Ethnic categories are different. Ethnic markers, as opposed to ideological or valence cate-
gories, cannot be changed, and often cannot be easily hidden. A politician can claim to be for
the working class when she is in fact motivated by corporate greed (i.e., an appeal to voters of
a “laborer” identity when the true identity is “capitalist”), and such a claim may still be plausi-
ble to many voters. Such a façade is harder to present with regard to ethnic identities, as such
identities are usually readily apparent through dress, name and custom. But the trade-off for
this reliability is a lack of specificity. Ethnic identities in and of themselves do not necessarily
provide information on the way in which a politician will direct the policies of the state. A
politician claiming the identity of “liberal,” for instance, is basing the individual identity on a
set of values that have direct implications on how she feels the state should govern. When this
politician makes such an appeal to voters, there are two possible outcomes: either this politician
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is lying, or she will endeavor to enact policies that support the free market, property rights, and
limited government intervention once elected.
For certain groups, ethnic representation is a reliable way to obtain real policy benefits from
the state. Having a candidate who claims to support coethnics—even independent of ideology,
competence, or other candidate quality—is still a highly desirable trait. In this sense, the identity
itself is a valuable resource. It helps voters get what they want from the state, and it helps
politicians mobilize those voters to win office. The identity is a resource that helps actors pursue
their interests.
To understand when voters support ethnic appeals over other appeals, it is important to
understand which ethnic identities make for the most appealing bases of electoral mobilization.
When the expected returns of ethnic representation are high, the value of that identity is high,
just as when the utility of ethnic voting is low, the value of that identity is low. If the usefulness
of a specific ethnic identity is of a very low value, then a politician campaigning on that basis
is likely to be defeated by a rival competing on some other political identity category, be it
ideological, regional, or something else. If that value is high, then ethnic appeals are most
likely to be supported by voters even when challenged by other identity appeals.
There are two factors which affect the likelihood of ethnic voting. The first is the nature of
the benefits that would likely flow to the group members from ethnic representation. The second
is the likelihood of victory of that group in an election.
The reasons that individuals may prefer to have themselves represented on the basis of their
ethnic identity fall into three categories. First of all, coethnic representation has certain intrinsic
benefits. Individuals who have a strong group attachment may feel a sense of validation and in-
creased self-esteem from seeing members of their own group in power. The prestige that comes
with elected office may be viewed positively as an indication of the quality or respect due to
the entire group, and voters may think that electing a coethnic to office is worthwhile simply
because of the intrinsic psychological benefits that come with victory. Secondly, since ethnic
identities correspond to descent-based attributes, they may be correlated with other descent-
based characteristics that have immediate bearing on policy preferences. Since these character-
istics include religion, language, or cultural practices, ethnicity may strongly predict common
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interest in policies that protect the ability of ethnic communities to pass down their way of life.
Finally, ethnicity could serve as the basis of between-group redistribution and policies of ethnic
favoritism. In situations where the state may be in a position to discriminate in the provision
of state services or redistribute wealth, having a coethnic in power may be valuable even inde-
pendent of their stated policy beliefs or competence as a public official, simply because ethnic
favoritism will result in state largesse finding its way to the voters. In any of these situations,
voting for someone on the basis of ethnicity is a rational decision. It is not necessarily the case
that a strong sense of attachment to an ethnic identity is encouraging a thoughtless reflexive
decision to support a candidate on the basis of ethnicity, but instead that voters are consciously
choosing to support in light of real and tangible pay-offs they receive by doing so.
Even if there are reasons why voters may desire political representation for their ethnic
group, there is no guarantee that they can have it. For an ethnic identity to be valuable as a means
of attaining office, the group has to be able to win elections. The most important determinants
here are the size of the group and the electoral context. Take, as an example, a very small group
representing one-tenth of the population. In amajoritarian winner-take-all election, this group is
hardly likely to win. Even assuming that every member of the group decides to vote for the same
candidate–an unlikely scenario given the challenges of group coordination and heterogeneous
preferences–one-tenth of the vote share is usually not enough to win political power through
democratic contestation. Group size is thus directly related to the usefulness of group identities
in obtaining political power, because demographics place a ceiling on the influence a group can
have.9 A group representing sixty percent of the total population would not have this problem,
since they are already a clear majority. While this same constraint exists for all political actors,
ethnic identities differ from other bases of mobilization because of visibility and permanence.
Political entrepreneurs generally know in advance what the electoral rules are, and how big a
potential ethnic constituency is. As such, they can generally know in advance which groups are
9That’s not to say that the group is powerless. There are several scenarios in which a very small group can wield
oversized influence. Other, larger groups could face more serious coordination dilemmas and split the vote amongst
themselves, allowing a more organized and unified smaller group to win. Or small groups can act as important
“king makers” in coalition politics, determining who actually is able to form a government. These situations are
far from common, though, and when they do occur it is more often due to the actions of those taken outside the
group rather than in it. The fact remains that democratic elections make it harder for smaller groups to become
politically powerful. If these situations obtain, it is due to factors outside the control of those in the group itself.
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likely to be able to win, and which groups aren’t. If a group is large enough, then the value of
that ethnicity is much higher than if it is small.
This theoretical framework allows us to think about ethnic voting in a way that returns a
degree of agency to voters and political elites in ethnically divided societies. Decades of con-
structivist scholarship have convincingly demonstrated that ethnic identities can be socially con-
structed and politically malleable, evolving and either gaining or losing political significance
over time. Yet these are generally thought to be the result of long-term structural changes: the
product of changes in economic production, colonial policies, or intellectual and cultural move-
ments spanning decades. By looking specifically at the short-term gains when faced with a
discrete decision–who to vote for– we can understand the way that individual identity reper-
toires influence voters’ short-term decision making and structure political outcomes. Voters are
unlikely to support identity-driven platforms that offer them little in return, keeping with the
constructivist insight that ethnic identities do not take on political significance simply by virtue
of their existence. By the same token, political elites are unlikely to base their campaigns on
platforms that will deliver few benefits to their constituents and make it easier for competitors
to offer more.
This means that not all ethnic identities are equally useful as political tools, and the degree to
which we should expect voters to respond to ethnic appeals is a function of these two explanatory
concepts. There are many reasons groups could vary in the degree of benefits they could derive
from state policy, and their likelihood to win office in electoral contestation. One of the most
important ways is simple demographics–specifically, the group’s status as either the majority or
the minority group.
1.2.3 Majority and Minority Group Dynamics
The discussion above suggests that ethnic voting should not be equally common in societies
divided between a demographically dominant ethnic majority group, and a numerically smaller
ethnic minority group. This is mainly because while both the benefits of ethnic representation
and the likelihood of winning office are partially determined by group size, the two factors push
in different directions for different groups. Ethnic majority groups are likely to have the largest
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chance of winning office through ethnic voting, but the least to gain if they win. For ethnic
minority groups, the situation is the opposite: they would likely benefit the most from ethnic
representation, but have the least chance of winning.
Take, for instance, a voter who is a member of the dominant ethnic group in a country
with near universal ethnic homogeneity—as is the case for almost all voters in nearly ethnically
uniform countries like South Korea, Swaziland, or Tunisia. In these cases, electing a coethnic
is basically guaranteed. Voters can be highly confident that their ethnic group is large enough
that ethnic mobilization is guaranteed to produce a winning candidate, as virtually all voters
have the same ethnic identity. The degree to which ethnic identities broadcast relative group
strength is so high, that ethnic voting is clearly a viable path to victory. Yet in this scenario,
ethnic identities are likely to have little to no overlap with material interest. Since everyone is
the same, ethnic identities serve no useful basis for redistribution. For a candidate to campaign
on a platform of ethnic identity is essentially to appeal to everyone, and such an appeal is likely
easily defeated by a more narrowly defined policy appeal on the basis of ideology, region, class,
etc. Thus for a voter in this situation, the probability of winning under ethnic mobilization is
extremely high, but the benefits of explicitly ethnic representation are virtually nil.
This is a very different situation from that of a member of a majority ethnic group in a
more ethnically diverse society, as is the case with white voters in the United States, or Malays
in Malaysia. Voters in these groups know that they constitute a substantial majority of the
population, and that ethnic mobilization is therefore likely to be a viable path to victory. But as
opposed to the dominant group members in the purely homogeneous society, these voters have
more to gain by ethnic representation. Since there are minority ethnic group members, these
groups would be able to gain by taxing ethnic outsiders and then redistributing to coethnics.
They may be able to exclude ethnic minorities from labor competition through discriminatory
laws that advantage the ethnic majority group, or grant their own cultural practices or language
privileged positions against those of the minority community. Under these conditions, the value
of ethnic representation has gone up. Voters in this category should be more likely to support
ethnic appeals from politicians than those in the purely homogeneous context, because they have
more to gain by ethnic representation. The choice between an ethnic appeal and an appeal to
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some other cleavage is nowmore complicated, because an appeal on class, region, or ideological
lines is likely to cross-cut the ethnic divide, and include members of the ethnic out-group. These
voters have a high likelihood of winning elections, and also have more to gain from ethnic
representation than they would if they lived in completely homogeneous country. Ethnic voting
is therefore more likely for these majority-group voters in diverse countries.
For minority groups such as Hungarians in Romania, Arabs in Israel, or Ma¯ori in New
Zealand, the overlap between interest and ethnicity is likely to be highest. As a small group,
installing themselves in power and then taxing ethnic outsiders to redistribute benefits to them-
selves would result in a massive windfall for group members. Beyond material gains, these
groups are also likely vulnerable to expropriation, discrimination, or irrelevance at the hands
of numerical majorities. Informally, they may find it difficult to perpetuate cultural practices
or speak minority languages in an environment where absorption and assimilation into larger
groups is practically expedient. Their languages and ways of life may be legally threatened by
the policies of a democratically elected parliament dominated by a majority group either hostile
or indifferent to needs of the minority. Given their propensity to be overwhelmed by simple
numerical domination, they have the most to gain from state action. Thus the benefits of ethnic
representation are likely to be extremely high. But because they are numerically small, these
groups face very high barriers to entry for political power. Even if they are able to mobilize the
entire group behind a single candidate in a display of ethnic solidarity and voting unity, their
overall vote share will be capped by their share of the population. Their low likelihood of ac-
tually winning office offsets the potential benefits to be gained, resulting in a low likelihood of
ethnic voting.
Majority and minority groups thus face different challenges and incentives: majority groups
have a high probability of winning, but a low overall payoff under ethnic voting. Minority
groups have a low probably of winning, but much to gain under ethnic voting. As group size
increases, so does the likelihood of winning elections. But at the same time, increasing the size
of the group decreases the pay-off of ethnic representation. This suggests that both very large
majority groups and very small minority groups have relatively low incentives to support ethnic
platforms, albeit for very different reasons.
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Starting from a framework that ethnic voting behavior is best understood using the two
dimensions of commonality of interest and likelihood of victory, this dissertation argues that
group status as either a majority or a minority group is one of the most important determinants
of individuals’ likely support for ethnically-delineated party platforms. This is not to say that
there are not other reasons that ethnic groups could vary on these two dimensions. A group’s
commonality of interest can change due to between-group inequality, historical animosity, or
a group’s idiosyncratic understanding of its own identity and history. Likewise, the likelihood
of winning for a group can vary enormously based on institutional circumstances in which the
group finds itself. Proportional electoral systems, bicameralism, decentralization, federalism,
regional autonomy, and territorial districting are all common institutional features of ethnically
divided countries, often implemented with the expressed purpose of facilitating political rep-
resentation of diverse identity groups. Nevertheless, I argue that all of these factors which
influence ethnic voting behavior operate through these two dimensions of interest and viabil-
ity. Majority/minority status exerts a strong influence on these dimensions which is of extreme
importance in understanding the relationship between identity and elections.
1.3 Contribution to Existing Research
This dissertation seeks to explain why and how people make the decisions which turn ethnic
cleavages in society into political cleavages in parliament. This issue is not only one of scholarly
interest, but also one of great normative and policy importance.
Ethnic diversity can be highly destabilizing and problematic for democratic governance.
How to mitigate these problems has been one of the most contentious issues in political science
in recent decades. Much of the disagreement is the result on the respective assumptions made
by the various camps on the reasons people decide to vote their ethnicity. The now decades-
old debate between consociationalists10 and centripetalists11 in many ways revolves around this
question. Consociatlionists assume that ethnic diversity presents a problem for democracy be-
cause the tendency to vote one’s communal interests is so strong as to be essentially insur-
10See Lijphart (1977), McGarry & O’Leary (2006), and Nordlinger (1972).
11See Horowitz (1985) and Reilly (2001).
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mountable, and thus conclude that institutions should be purposefully designed to facilitate the
representation of those communal identities in order to make democratic governance possible.
Centripetalists, on the other hand, argue that institutions can be designed to foster inter-ethnic
coalitions that downplay the ethnic cleavage in favor of broader civic political bases of mobi-
lization. Encouraging people to vote along non-sectarian lines creates larger political bases of
support more conducive to stability and public goods provision, making a multiethnic democ-
racy possible. The main difference between these two camps is in the strength they assume
identity has over individual behavior. Consociationalists believe that identities are stronger than
institutions –and that if institutions are not designed to empower those identity communities,
the most likely result is a revolt against those same institutions. Centripetalists believe that if
institutions disadvantage identity representation, voters will find some other basis on which to
mobilize. I suggest that the way to resolve this debate is to refocus on individual incentives.
Identities and institution are not deterministic, but they are highly influential in the way they
shape individuals’ prospects and decision making.
Moreover, this approach allows us to understand how institutions affect the relationship be-
tween groups, not just the impact on the state as a whole. While many policy practitioners and
academics have debated whether federalism, decentralization, and communal autonomy have
made states more or less likely, this dissertation proposes that the true impact of those institu-
tional innovations is on the group level, not the state level, andmay have vastly divergent impacts
on the degree to which ethnic groups are likely to respond to ethnic electoral appeals. Take,
for instance, two of the most common aspects of consociational institutional design: propor-
tional representation and territorial autonomy. Proportional representation is usually justified
on the grounds that it lowers barriers to entry for smaller groups, facilitating their entry into
the institutions of political decision making. In terms of the theory advanced here, proportional
representation does nothing to change the degree of commonality of interest, and has little im-
pact on the electoral viability of majority ethnic groups—as the majority, they can already be
reasonably assured of a victory under virtually any electoral system. But it drastically increases
the electoral viability for small minority groups. Switching from a majoritarian electoral sys-
tem to a PR system will therefore increase the likelihood of ethnic voting for minority groups
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but do nothing among majority groups by altering the electoral viability dimension. Territorial
autonomy, on the other hand, operates on the dimension of interest. Taking a national-level
minority and decentralizing them to become a majority group in a subnational unit drastically
alters the voting calculations for voters. If groups are granted control over local schools, police
forces, distribution of public funds, etc., then identity no longer serves as a meaningful basis
of redistribution. Decentralization may actually decrease the commonality of interest of the
minority group by increasing within-group competition, and lower the attractiveness of ethnic
appeals. Viewed within the theoretical framework advanced here, it becomes clear that two of
the most common policy prescriptions for divided societies–proportional electoral systems and
decentralized governance–may actually push voters in opposite directions. Disaggregating the
effects of these institutions along the two dimensions proposed here helps to resolve one of the
recurring frustrations of applied institutional design: that institutional change is a blunt instru-
ment, and the results of changes are often difficult to predict without disaggregating all the ways
they alter incentives.
The framework proposed here may also help explain why ethnic voting is so resilient in
so much of the world. Frustrated international observers have noted that patterns of ethnic
voting persist despite obviously damaging consequences. Blatantly corrupt, incompetent, and—
in some countries—even criminal candidates win the support of constituents, for whom the only
possible qualification can be coethnicity. Experimental studies which seek to provide voters
with new information on the complete incompetence of their candidates has met with mixed
and limited results, falling on deaf ears in many circumstances. The theory outlined in this
dissertation suggests that while there is an informational component to ethnicity, ultimately
ethnic voting persists because it is likely to deliver greater benefits to voters than mobilization
along some other social cleavage. If this is the case, then new information about candidate
quality or policy consequences is unlikely to sway voters to some other political option. Changes
in demographic status or in the institutional environment in which elections take place, however,
are more likely to alter voters’ and politicians’ calculation, and could result in drastic changes
in voting behavior, even in the short-term. As such changes are relatively rare at the national
level in most countries, the enduring persistence of ethnic voting should hardly be surprising.
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By understanding ethnic identity as a resource which may be more or less valuable, and then
disaggregating that resource into its two constituent parts, this dissertation seeks to avoid two
of the biggest methodological pitfalls in studying ethnicity and identity politics: observational
equivalency and spurious correlation. Since every human being has traits that could by some
definition be referred to as “ethnic,” ethnicity is omnipresent in all forms of political action.
A correlation between ethnic identity and voting could be due to any number of factors. Eth-
nicity is highly correlated with other factors that could be related to political interest. Ethnic
groups often cluster geographically, suggesting that they may share policy preferences caused
by regional interests. Ethnicity may also correspond to other hereditary traits which may be
passed down through generations such as class, professional training, property, or position in
social hierarchy. Ethnic groups may share common cultural or religious practices, and protect-
ing those practices and ensuring their continuation may require protection or support from the
state and society. In any of these cases, the link between ethnicity and voting behavior would be
entirely epiphenomenal, driven by issues that are closely related to ethnicity, but not actually a
result of ethnicity per se. By establishing research designs that give voters the option of voting
for ethnic parties and for parties that define themselves along other cleavages, this dissertation
seeks to tease out when ethnicity drives voting behavior, and when it is spuriously correlated
with something else.
Moreover, the theory provides a way to reconcile competing notions of nationalism and vot-
ing behavior that don’t always line up the same way in majority and minority communities.
Throughout the developed world, ethno-nationalist voting has been on the rise. Perhaps the
most prominent example has been the more frequent expressions of white nationalism in the
United States accompanying the election of Donald Trump to the Presidency, but such senti-
ments have also been seen among major European parties. Much of the literature on ethnic
politics has focused on the vulnerabilities of minority ethnic groups, the threats to democratic
legitimacy engendered by longstanding grievances in minority communities, and the potential
for destabilizing secessionist movements led along ethno-cultural lines.12 Explanations of eth-
nic political mobilization based on grievances among a dominated minority community make it
12See the seminal contribution of Gurr (1970) and the voluminous research produced by the Minorities at Risk
project (Asal, Pate & Wilkenfeld 2008).
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harder to explain why ethnic voting may be increasing among numerically dominated majority
groups. After all, how can it be that a numerically dominant group could be disadvantaged in a
democracy under a system of majority rules? The theory proposed here suggests that because
majority groups always have the greatest likelihood of winning in electoral contests, they may,
all else equal, have a greater incentive to support ethnic appeals made by politicians than minor-
ity group members. As societies diversify—as has been the case in both Western Europe and
the United States—it is in the majority group where we should expect to see increased ethnic
voting. This is because as minority groups become larger, the benefits of ethnic representation
to majority groups increases. Implementing policies that redistribute resources from minor-
ity groups to majority groups now increases the pay-off to those voters in the majority group.
The theory here helps explain why “ethnic grievances” may counterintuitively be more effective
tools of electoral mobilization, and therefore more prominent, among ethnic majority groups
who already dominate most aspects of society.
Lastly, the approach outlined in this dissertation seeks to incorporate human agency into
the relationship between identity and voting behavior. To paraphrase Marx, people may make
their own identities, but they do not make them as they please. It has long been acknowledged
that identity repertoires in the individual can be expansive, with identities that overlap, contra-
dict, or operate independent of each other. Proving an identity exists, even that an identity is
strong within a given community, is not always sufficient to explain why that identity takes on
political salience. This dissertation argues that when identities become politically salient, it is
the result of choices. These choices are made by both voters and politicians in response to the
circumstances in which they find themselves. Much of the literature has argued that ethnicity is
a type of social cleavage around which political actors can mobilize, and that ethnicity adds to
a menu of potential options for political mobilization along with class, region, etc. This line of
reasoning has led to a fruitful research agenda, but largely ignores what it is about ethnicity that
becomes so important in many places in the world. This “black box” is especially perplexing
given that ethnic identities are relatively arbitrary and by their nature would seem to have little
relevance to politics and the organization of the state. This dissertation approaches this problem
by analyzing what it is, exactly, that voters might expect to get when they vote their ethnic iden-
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tity. It starts from the premise that when voters respond to an appeal for votes made on ethnic
grounds, they are effectively declaring that they have chosen ethnicity as the best possible of
all the avenues available to them. Examining when voters respond to ethnic appeals over other
appeals more fully appreciates the way that voters behave in the real world, and may provide
some insight into how we can expect electoral democracies to manage relationships between
groups.
1.4 Plan of this Dissertation
This dissertation starts by outlining a theory of ethnic voting, which explains when the value
of ethnic representation is at its highest. This theory makes predictions of divergent behavior
between ethnic majority groups and minority groups even within the same country, which I
then test through an analysis of two ethnically divided societies: Bosnia and Herzegovina and
Latvia. In the Bosnian case, an analysis of split-ticket voting within a single electoral contest
shows that individual voters respond to ethnic cues entirely differently depending on demo-
graphic circumstances. In the Latvian case, an analysis of voting results over time shows that
politicians respond to the incentives created by this individual-level behavior by emphasizing
ethnic identities only in some circumstances, subject to majority or minority status. The two
cases in combination are used to support the main argument of this dissertation: that group
identities can provide different benefits to different populations, and that these incentives are
crucial to understanding how ethnic divisions affect voting behavior and elections.
To examine when ethnic appeals are most successful, this dissertation employs a mixed-
methods approach in both countries. First, I use ethnographic methods to identify exactly how
parties and candidates use ethnic identification when campaigning to voters. First examining
the historical roots of the ethnic divisions in both countries, I then identify how political en-
trepreneurs employ ethnic rhetoric, historical allusion, and divisive symbols in order to convey
their own ethnic identities and their intentions to favor coethnics if elected. This is used to
produce a qualitative data set, which is then mapped to quantitative voting data to facilitate an
analysis of when ethnic parties are likely to succeed, and when they are likely to fail.
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This dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter develops the theoretical discus-
sion begun here in greater detail. Chapter 3 discusses the empirical strategy and the design
of the research project, explaining the mixed-methods approach employed in testing the the-
ory. I then turn to the Bosnian case to demonstrate individual-level reactions to the incentives
described by the theory. Chapter 4 is an ethnographic description of ethnic politics in Bosnia,
outlining how ethnic labels are used in contemporary Bosnian politics. It also describes the data
set which is used in the primarily quantitative analysis of Bosnian voting behavior presented in
Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I turn to Latvia, discussing both the history of Latvian interethnic
relations, and providing an overview of how Latvian politicians rely on ethnic messaging in
their electoral campaigns. The analysis presented in Chapter 7 shows that Latvian politicians
adapt over time as predicted, tailoring their political messages differently depending on whether
their message is likely to appeal to majority or minority group members. Chapter 8 provides
concluding remarks.
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2A Theory of Group Size and Ethnic Voting
In this chapter, I outline a theory of how incentives for supporting ethnic parties can vary with
the interaction of group demographic status and electoral institutions. I argue that ethnic voting
is most likely among those voters whose ethnic identities are able to fulfill two equally important
functions. The first is that ethnic representation must provide an outcome that voters are likely
to desire. An ethnic group collectively wielding the power of the state must be able to pass
or administer state policies in a way that provides some advantage to group members, making
ethnic representation worthwhile. The second is that the ethnic identity must be instrumentally
useful in solving coordination dilemmas and mobilizing voters in order to gain access to the
institutions of power. Organizing along ethnic lines must be a reliable path to winning elections,
making ethnic representation a viable possibility in the minds of voters.
This chapter makes four important points. The first is that these two dimensions for benefit-
ing and coordinating ethnic group members vary independent of each other. A voter may find
that her ethnic identity is very closely correlated to policies or state actions that could benefit
her directly, but that her ethnic group has virtually no chance of electing group representatives.
It is equally possible for a voter to find themselves in the position of easily electing an ethnic
champion to office, but also see that ethnic representation would be of little use. The second
point is that these two dimensions are directly influenced by group size, but in different ways.
All else equal, the larger a group is, the higher degree of usefulness the group identity has in
winning elections, but the lower the degree of benefits to doing so. Thirdly, because of the way
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in which group size influences these two dimensions, majority and minority groups will have
fundamentally different assessments of what voting for an ethnic party gets them, and their will-
ingness to vote for ethnic parties will diverge. Finally, political institutions dramatically alter
these calculations by setting the political boundaries which establish majority and minority sta-
tus, and the rules under which the groups must interact. Understanding ethnic voting requires
an appreciation of the differences between majority and minority groups, and the ways that
institutions can mitigate or exacerbate these tendencies.
This chapter proceeds as follows. First, I define the terms used in this dissertation. Secondly,
I outline differ from other bases of citizen-party linkages. Third, I outline a theory of how
these two separate dimensions—the benefits of ethnic representation and the ease of winning
office after mobilizing along ethnic lines—vary with group size and produce different strategic
calculations between majority and minority groups. In section four, I outline the observable
implications of the theory, and testable predictions of ethnic voting derived from this theoretical
outline. In the fifth section, I give examples of the theory in practice, using visual depictions,
and examples drawn from real-life voting behavior. The final section concludes.
2.1 Definitions
2.1.1 Identity
For the purposes of this dissertation, an identity is any category that can be used to classify or
describe an individual.
This definition is not universally accepted throughout the literature. Under this definition,
identity is a discrete and bounded unit, rather than an all-encompassing abstract idea. Indi-
viduals do not have a single “identity” which guides their actions or sense of self, but instead
are composed of an enormous catalog of identities. Following Chandra (2012b) and Fearon
(1999b), identity here is categorical.1 These categories include the politically relevant identi-
ties that form the mainstay of identity politics and cultural studies (e.g., “immigrant,” “gay,”
“Evangelical Christian,” etc.), but they also include other categories that define one’s role in
1See also Barth (1969), Laitin (1998).
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society and day-to-day activities, such as professional identities (“lawyer,” “teacher,” “doctor”)
and interpersonal identities (“mother,” “husband”) which help categorize individuals into dif-
ferent groups based on societal expectations. Identities can also stem from values orientations
or preferences over the way things should be (“libertarian,” “vegan”). Identities even include
the trivial (“morning person,” or “Mets fan”). Under this definition, an identity is any discrete
category that can be used to describe a person. In this way, identities are the tools used by hu-
man minds to resolve the problem of establishing the boundaries between self and others, and
determine the proper relations between individuals and the social world in which they operate.2
This definition differs from others in both academic and popular usage, in that no identity
is assumed to be of primary intrinsic importance, and makes no a priori distinction about the
relevance of ethnic identity. This is somewhat at odds with a recent trend in academic schol-
arship of paying closer attention to the social relevance of particular identity categories.3 This
research has fruitfully expanded on our understanding of the ways in which identity categories
structure human behavior, but is not appropriate for this study. The goal of this dissertation is
to explain the value of ethnic identities to voters and politicians over other identities like parti-
sanship, ideology, or class. To make assumptions or decisions about which identities are most
politically relevant risks tautology. The definition used here more fully appreciates the fact that
individuals often have complicated identity repertoires which may be more or less relevant to
their political preferences and decision-making.
This definition has the added benefit of allowing for individuals to be composed not of a sin-
gular “identity,” but a plurality of “identities,” which more closely tracks with the ways most in-
dividuals view themselves. People usually understand themselves through a repertoire of broad
categories that apply to other individuals in society and create communities of similarity: terms
like “graduate student,” “social scientist,” “American,” “midwesterner,” “man,” “caucasian,”
“foodie,” etc. These categories are not mutually exclusive, and many of them operate within
nested relationships. For example, “midwesterner,” as used here is a subset of “American.”
2For psychological interpretations on the problem of identifying self and the relation between self and society,
see Cooley (1922), Mead (1934), Jenkins (1996), Jenkins (2000), Barth (1969) and Tajfel (1982).
3See Posner (2004a) who makes the case that ethnic cleavages should be assessed in light of their relevance
to historical and social context within countries, or Cederman, Wimmer & Min (2010) who argue that research
should take into account whether or not an identity category is represented by a political organization.
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The “American” identity reflects commonality with other Americans, whereas “midwestern”
differentiates between Americans.
Employing a definition that allows for individuals to be composed by the combination and
interaction of multiple identities also takes into consideration that the combination of identities
can themselves be strong identities. Drawing on set theoretic terms, Crenshaw’s (1991) concept
of intersectionality and the fruitful literature that it inspired4 provides a strong reason to believe
not only that individuals view themselves in terms of multiple identity categories, but that the
interactive combination of those identities can have strong correlations to people’s life expe-
rience. While intersectional scholars have often highlighted the ways in which intersectional
identities can reinforce social discrimination and exploitative systems of privilege and oppres-
sion, the same definitions of identities have been employed by other scholars to identify ways
in which societal diversity may be managed by democratic institutions. Stepan, Linz & Yadav
(2011) stress the importance of “multiple but complementary sociocultural identities,” around
which democratic states can form. In their analysis, state institutions and policies can either
stabilize or antagonize inter-group relations based on the identity categories they privilege. The
most stabilizing identity must usually be built around the state itself, not ethnic, linguistic, or
religious identities. Using their example to show how nested identities are important to under-
standing political outcomes, Canada can emerge as a successful robustly multinational society
by privileging the civic identity of “Canadian” which is universal throughout the country, over
“Anglophone” or “Francophone,” which is more divisive.5
While the definition used in this dissertation does not preclude strong links between identity
and circumstances, or between identity and behavior, it is not required by the definition itself.
In this way, the conceptualization of identity differs strongly from other influential studies in
the field. White (1992, p. 6) defines identity as “...any source of action not explicable from
biophysical regularities, and to which observers can attribute meaning....” Under this definition,
identities only exist if they are somehow linked to action. It is not possible to have an irrelevant
identity, since identity only exists according to this definition if it is the source of an observable
4For discussion of how positivist political science can benefit from methodologies based on the intersection of
discrete identity categories and intersectional approaches, see Hancock (2007), and Dhamoon (2011).
5On the distinction between civic and ethnic identities, see Brubaker et al. (1999).
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action. It is also not possible to have an identity to which individuals attach enormous personal
importance, but little social or political importance. The definition employed here operates
independent not only of action, but also of sentiment. Wimmer (2013) differs frommy definition
in stressing that identity communities must be not only categorical, but also behavioral, based on
some notion of homophily, or preference for in-group member welfare over out-group member
welfare. Clearly this is the case in many identity communities around the world, as evidence by
the global ubiquity of ethnic favoritism, racial discrimination, and strong patterns of endogamy.
But in the definition used here, preferences for like group members in social interactions are
not a necessary requisite of identity. An identity may be accompanied by strong preferences for
interactions with in-group members (as is frequently the case with ethnic, religious, linguistic,
or cultural identities), or not (as is the case with professional, interest, and physical-attribute
identities), and still be considered an identity all the same.
My definition differs in that identity is purely descriptive, and can exist independent of action
of emotional attachment. In fact, most of the identities which belong to an individual are mean-
ingless for studies of social phenomenon and political behavior. Few political scientists would
be interested in identity categories of “left-handed,” “allergic to peanuts,” or “able to drive a
stick shift,” but these would nonetheless count as identities under my definition. A tolerance
for irrelevance is necessary for a study such as this. To understand when an identity becomes
politically relevant, we must employ a definition that does not assume relevance at the outset.
2.1.2 Ethnicity
Definition of Ethnicity
In this dissertation, ethnicity is defined as an identity based on attributes associated with descent.
Under this definition, which borrows from Chandra (2004), “ethnicity” is a subset of “iden-
tity.” All ethnicities are identities, but not all identities are ethnicities. Ethnicity is but one of
a very large number of identity categories that an individual can have, and is in no way more
or less important to a person’s behavior, values, or political preferences than any other identity.
But because ethnic identities are defined by descent, they are not readily changeable by any hu-
man agency. Whereas many identity categories the result of human choices, ethnicity is largely
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the result of history and circumstance surrounding an individual’s birth—one can make choices
that lead to becoming an “accountant,” a “college graduate,” or a “marathon runner,” but one is
born “Sicilian,” “Arab,” or “Japanese.”
This is somewhat at odds with the traditional usage of “ethnic” and “ethnicity,” which in
common English parlance dates back to the middle ages. As Hutchinson & Smith (1996)
point out, for most of the twentieth century in the United States, the term “ethnics” referred
to Catholic, Jewish, or Slavic peoples who were recent immigrants to the US relative to the
longer-established Anglo-British community. This is similar to the medieval usage of “ethnic,”
which reflected the Biblical Greek usage of the term ethnos to refer to non-Abrahamic pagans.
The definition here tries to clarify the concept by removing from it any sort of meaning derived
from normative value attachments or inter-group power dynamics. Under this definition the
British-descended Americans had no less of an ethnic identity than more recent immigrant ar-
rivals. Likewise, the definition seeks to strip any prerequisite for a specific type of behavior and
employ a minimum standard. This differs from Handelman (1977), which requires regular in-
teraction with in-group members; Schermerhorn (1978, p. 12), who requires that ethnic groups
have a similar culture and define themselves through it; or Smith (1986, ch. 2), who requires
a sense of solidarity and an attachment to a geographic homeland. These are all very com-
mon phenomenon associated with ethnic identities, but the definition of “ethnicity” employed
here any of them as a matter of definition. This minimalist definition is more appropriate for
the present study, as it allows us to examine the link between ethnicity and political behavior
without assuming that such a link exists ab initio.
Definition of Ethnic Voting and Ethnic Party
An ethnic party is defined as a party which claims to represent people of a certain ethnicity.
Ethnic voting is defined as voting for an ethnic party.
Under this definition, ethnic voting is something that an individual does regardless of the ac-
tions of other group members. This differs from other studies of ethnic voting, which rely on the
degree to which an ethnic group votes together as a bloc.6 This approach has produced an impor-
6See Bratton, Mattes & Gyimah-Boadi (2005), Dunning & Harrison (2010), and Ishiyama (2012) for recent ex-
amples from Africa; Birnir (2007), Teney, Jacobs, Rea & Delwit (2010), and Heath, Fisher, Sanders & Sobolewska
27
tant and useful literature analyzing the variation in contexts where ethnicity is a strong predictor
of vote choice. Nevertheless, the approach imposes some strong scope conditions, and allows
for studies only in those contexts where ethnicity is already assumed to be a salient political
cleavage on which political parties could mobilize voters. Such an approach may overstate the
degree to which it is the ethnic cleavage driving voting behavior, instead of geographic or insti-
tutional factors. In countries where ethnic groups are divided into different geographical areas,
different ethnic groups may find themselves living in extremely homogeneous electoral districts
with equally homogeneous choices on their ballots despite living in a very diverse country. The
fact that many voters are supporting coethnics could be the result of a calculated decision on the
part of voters in response to their own political preferences and the options available, or it could
be epiphenomenal to ethnicity entirely. In the United States, all people from North Dakota vote
for other people from North Dakota. This is not because “North Dakotan” is the most salient
individual identity, but because in the US electoral system it is impossible to vote for a con-
gressman who is not from one’s own state. Looking only at voting cohesion as an indicator of
ethnic voting risks attributing importance to identities which may be epiphenomenal.
The definition of ethnic party employed in this dissertation relies instead on a party claims to
do, and how it defines itself. This also differs from several prominent studies, notably Horowitz
(1985), who defines ethnic parties as parties which derive most of their support from a single
ethnic group. My definition is closer to Kitschelt (2001) and Chandra (2011) which are based on
a party’s self-identification with a particular ethnic community. There are several benefits to this
approach. Definitions of ethnic party which rely on voter support base effectively preclude the
possibility of a “failed” ethnic party—all of the ethnic parties under Horowitz’s definition are
inherently successful because they are defined by already having supporters. This definition is
better suited for a study of the effects of successful ethnic parties versus other types of political
parties, but ill equipped to examine why some ethnic parties succeed in winning office and
others do not. In a similar vein, defining parties as ethnic based on how they present themselves
to voters not only allows for an incorporation of human agency into a discussion of ethnic voting,
but disaggregates the agency of voters and of political elites. Basing an analysis on definitions
(2011) from Europe; and Huber & Suryanarayan (2016) for South Asia.
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which allow for parties to propose ethnically defined platforms, but nevertheless fail to mobilize
voters and win support based on that platform, allows us to better appreciate the individual
factors and the mechanism by which ethnic identities influence vote choice.
2.2 Linking Ethnicity and Voting
Under the definitions above, people are composed of multiple overlapping and complimentary
identities, with ethnicity comprising only a small fraction of an enormous network of identities
that make up an individual. Why then is it that in so many contexts, appeals to ethnic identities
dominate over other appeals to other identities? I argue that ethnic identities are useful to both
politicians and voters in ways that other identities are not.
Elections pose several challenges for both voters and politicians. Candidates want to get
elected. Voters want to elect candidates who will enact favorable policies. Both sides are con-
fronted with informational asymmetries and scarcities, as well as coordination problems. In
certain cases, ethnic identities can help resolve these issues, helping a candidate win her con-
test, and a voter obtain a favorable outcome. Ethnic political parties are most likely to do well
when ethnic identities are most useful in resolving these problems. In this section, I argue that
ethnic appeals are likely to be made successfully in those contexts where they hold the greatest
capacity to resolve these problems.
2.2.1 Ethnicity and the Challenges of Elections
On election day, voters are presented with a list of candidates, and can choose who to support.
This process is not a simple one. To make an informed decision, voters first need to know what
candidates and parties are will implement what policies, and how each plans to govern. Then,
they need to figure out how to cast their votes in a way that is most likely to bring about the best
possible outcome. Even in countries with consolidated democracies, effective impartial media,
and developed political parties, the processes of information-gathering and decision-making
can be difficult. In developing or recently democratized countries, these challenges can be even
greater, given the high costs of accurate information and the difficulty in predicting electoral
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outcomes in rapidly-changing political contexts.
Candidates for office face similar obstacles. First, they need to develop proposals and cam-
paign messages that will persuade voters to support their candidacy and elect them to office.
Given the difficulty in assessing voter preferences this is not always easy. Moreover, they need
to communicate these proposals and positions to voters in effective and believable ways. For the
same reasons voters have trouble obtaining information, candidates have trouble disseminating
it. Even if candidates have the luxury of developed party outreach capabilities or media outlets
they can use to broadcast their positions, voters may not be in a position to receive or believe
that information. In all of these circumstances, ethnicity can be a useful resource for both can-
didates and voters. Given the relative fixity of ethnic identities, and the ways in which ethnicity
is easily observable, ethnic identities can be employed by candidates to persuade voters, and by
voters to choose leaders.
Obtaining information on voting decisions is difficult (Lupia, McCubbins, Arthur et al.
1998). In multiparty elections, voters may be faced with a large number of candidates or par-
ties, with few resources to differentiate them. Especially in new democracies or in situations
of high electoral volatility, voters may have no reliable information available on how a specific
party would run the country if elected. When candidates are not well known, voters cannot
rely on reputation or past performance. Where parties are newly formed, their ideological po-
sitions may not be firmly established (Tavits 2008). These problems are not unique to new
democracies, though, as even in advanced post-industrial states assessing the consequences of
specific policies is complicated. Moreover, most voters have weak incentives to invest the time
and resources needed to educate themselves on their voting decisions (Downs 1957, Riker &
Ordeshook 1968, Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes 1980[1960], Popkin & Popkin 1994,
Martinelli 2006). Even further compounding the issues is that candidates in almost all contexts
may have strong incentives to misrepresent their own interests, hiding potentially corrupt mo-
tives behind rhetoric of public service. Filtering the competent from the corrupt is difficult to do
without observing politician behavior, which requires not only further investment from voters
in obtaining information, but also clarity of responsibility in retrospective assessments (Manin,
Przeworski & Stokes 1999, Maravall 2005, Tavits 2007, Chang, Golden & Hill 2010). Because
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of these challenges, it is not always easy for voters to decide who they want in office.
Votersmust not only decidewhich parties or candidateswouldmake the best leaders, but also
consider social choice and collective action challenges produced by the way votes are counted
and translated into political representation (McKelvey &Ordeshook 1972, Cox 1984). Electoral
outcomes are the result of the choices of all citizens as well, meaning that an individual voter
needs to think not only about how her own vote choice affects the outcome, but how it is likely to
affect the outcome given the choices of all other candidates. One of the most significant impli-
cations of this is the possibility of vote-wasting. For voters concerned about ultimate outcomes,
voting for a most-preferred candidate may not always the best course of action. Voting for a
second-choice candidate when a first-choice is not viable may actually be more likely to tip the
election in favor of that candidate and prevent a less-desired outcome. The risk level depends
on the preferences and calculation of other voters which are not always immediately obvious,
and the risk of coordination failure in voting can be quite high, and voters’ best possible course
of action may actually be to vote for a party whose stated position is not necessarily closest to
their true preference. If a voter’s most preferred candidate or party has absolutely no hope of
winning an election, but their second choice is a viable candidate in a tight race, that voter may
increase their likelihood of casting the decisive vote in favor of a more preferred candidate by
voting strategically.
These are all complicated decisions, and make voting a potentially onerous process for vot-
ers. Political parties and candidates who want to win elections can therefore better their chances
by helping to resolve these issues for voters. The best strategy is to convince voters both that
electing them is a positive outcome that will benefit the voters, and that they will not be wasting
their vote by doing so.
While voters get to choose who they will support, parties and candidates get to decide what
platform they will present to voters. Their objective is to propose a platform and cultivate an
image that voters will find appealing. They can emphasize economic issues, stress cultural
issues, link themselves to a specific charismatic leader, etc. To win, this platform must have a
broad enough appeal that it can persuade a group of voters large enough to carry the party to
victory. Even after deciding on their positions, parties need to communicate this information
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to voters. In nearly all modern political systems, the number of citizens is large enough that
candidates cannot interact with each potential voter individually, and somust rely onmassmedia
or the party outreach capabilities. This imposes costs and difficulties on the parties and the
candidates, especially in developing or recently democratized countries where mass media and
party infrastructure may be underdeveloped.
Ethnicity may be helpful in resolving some of these informational and communicational
problems between voters and leaders. First of all, ethnic identities can be used to convey a
commonality between voters and politicians, and therefore presumably common policy inter-
est. For voters who struggle to differentiate one would-be leader from another in the absence
of reliable information, this may be a helpful heuristic. Absent any other information on candi-
date preferences, priorities, or competences, voting for a coethnic may be a good option since
shared ethnicity creates the possibility of shared interest through the mechanism of common de-
scent (Ferree 2006, Birnir 2007). For voters wanting to elect leaders who share their priorities,
ethnicity may be a useful for proxy for how a candidate is likely to behave once elected.
Secondly, information on ethnic identities can be transmitted more credibly and efficiently
than other candidate characteristics. Ethnic markers are often present even in a candidate’s
name, and signals conveying ethnic information can be displayed by the candidate in speech,
mannerism, dress, or cultural practice. In this way, it can be much easier for a candidate to
convey to voters their ethnic identity than it is to provide a nuanced understanding of their policy
position. The fixity of ethnic identities also helps overcome potential moral hazard problems
caused by informational asymmetry. Because ethnicity is fixed and unchanging, voters need
not worry about “bait and switch” tactics, where candidates may promise one policy, but enact
another once in office. Once a candidate has established her ethnic identity to the voters, voters
need not be concerned that the candidate will change when elected. A commitment to help
coethnics is fairly credible, since the candidate would herself benefit from such policies. In
other words, it is impossible to “flip-flop” on a position based on one’s ethnic identity, since
such an identity cannot change easily.
The visibility of ethnicity also helps to predict how other people may vote, helping to re-
solve collective action problems and coordination dilemmas. Since ethnic identities are just as
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highly visible among voters as they are among candidates, politicians can also easily observe
potential supporters’ ethnicities. Politicians can therefore use demography as a proxy for how
well-received an appeal to a specific ethnic group is likely to be. An appeal to support a specific
group and provide them with preferential treatment may not be universally acceptable among
the beneficiaries themselves (as their sincere preference may align more closely with class, ide-
ological, cultural, or some other cleavage), but it is guaranteed that no one outside the group
will find this argument persuasive. In other words, an appeal to favor group A at the expense of
group B may not be acceptable to all A’s, but it will never be acceptable to anyone in group B.
Politicians can therefore assess the ceiling on the support for a specific ethnocentric position by
gauging the population ratios of their would-be constituencies. For this reason Chandra (2004)
argues that ethnic parties succeed on the basis of “ethnic head counts”—making ethnic appeals
to voters only in constituencies only where the ethnic group is large enough to win an election.
Ethnic distinctions can therefore convey valuable information to voters, and distinguish be-
tween insiders and outsiders—all reasons why ethnic identities might be useful as the basis of
linkages between voters and candidates. But just because ethnic identities provide some value
in the electoral process does not mean that people will always choose to vote for candidates
exclusively on the basis of ethnicity. It is entirely possible that voters or candidates could have
reasons to disapprove of the limited information provided by common ethnicity, determining
they have better prospects by mobilizing along some other cleavage or identity. Voters may
decide that ethnic labels are actually not useful at all in conveying commonality, or may have
access to more accurate information on candidate quality or positions. They may believe that
their ethnic identity has nothing to do with their political interests, and find coethnicity unper-
suasive grounds for voting. It is even possible that individuals believe the representation of their
own ethnic group in the organs of political power could be disadvantageous to themselves, and
prefer not to have a coethnic in power. If voters do not see a link between their identities and
their political preferences—in other words, if how they want the state to govern is completely
unrelated to their ethnicity—then ethnicity is not a resource useful in pursuit of interest. Like-
wise, if politicians see that voters are not persuaded by ethnic appeals they have no reason to
campaign on them. This could also be the case if there are simply not enough voters to mobilize
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to win office. For those politicians, ethnicity is not useful to winning office, and of little value.
Politically speaking, some ethnic identities aremore useful than others. Not all ethnic groups
will find it a good idea to mobilize along ethnic lines because such mobilization simply does
nothing for them. This may be because the best-case scenario of ethnic electoral mobilization—
the take-over of the state by ethnic champions—would do nothing to advance the interests of
the individuals involved. It may also be the case that ethnic mobilization is not likely to be
successful, resulting in coordination failure and vote wasting. But for some groups, ethnic mo-
bilization is likely to lead to success, and provide a substantial policy pay-off. Seizing state
power in democratic elections through electoral mobilization is both possible and efficacious.
Acknowledging the various degree of usefulness of ethnic mobilization is key to understanding
when groups mobilize along ethnic lines and when they don’t. If ethnic mobilization is likely to
result in benefits for voters and office for ethnic elites, then everyone has an incentive to politi-
cize ethnic cleavages. Ethnic appeals will win out over non-ethnic appeals, and group ethnic
representation is most likely. If ethnic mobilization is unlikely to result in benefits for voters and
office for ethnic elites, then the ethnic identity has no value, and non-ethnic appeals will come
to dominate.
Understanding when voters are most likely to support an ethnic appeal and when candi-
dates are most likely to make them requires us to think systematically about when ethnicity is
a useful mobilizing tool and when it is not. I argue that it is important to distinguish between
two separate functions for which ethnic identities can be instrumentally helpful: setting policies
advantageous to individual voters, and mobilizing groups of voters large enough to win elec-
tions. While the literature has often conflated these two, they are separate dimensions, and can
vary independently of each other. Ethnic voting is most likely for those voters who see both
conditions met.
2.2.2 The Benefits of Ethnic Representation
What, specifically, do voters have to gain from electing leaders who explicitly identify as repre-
sentatives of an ethnic group? Literature across the social sciences suggests that there are three
separate strands of benefits to be gained by ethnic political representation: intrinsic psycholog-
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ical rewards, the provision of club goods through policy enactment, and patronage. All three
of these benefits are directly correlated with demography, and thus contribute to the differences
between majority and minority groups. The smaller the group, the more likely they are to ben-
efit from electing ethnic champions. Minority group members therefore stand to benefit more
from ethnic representation than majorities.
Perhaps the most straightforward benefit is the emotional benefit that comes from seeing a
coethnic in office. As outlined by social identity theory (Tajfel 1978), and self-categorization
theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher &Wetherell 1987), individuals understand their own role
in the world and the value they offer to society through their membership in larger groups. This
link is partially instrumental, but it is also emotional, as individuals may derive their own sense
of self-esteem and self-worth from the overall perceived prestige and worthiness of the group
to which they belong. In psychology, this affective commitment—or emotional attachment to
groups—has been shown to produce a willingness to incur individual costs in order to maintain
the strength of the group (Allen & Meyer 1990). Political representation is one of the most
prestigious honors a group can hold, and the power that comes with holding elected office can
produce a strong sense of pride. For Horowitz (1985) this sense of self-worth is especially
important in ethnically divided societies where divisions may exist between “backwards” and
“advanced” groups. A lack of representation for one group in state power may raise concerns
of disenfranchisement, and discrimination; but it is also personally disheartening, as group
members feel that their group exclusion reflects a lack of their own worthiness or capability. In
voting for a party that campaigns on a platform of representing a single ethnic group, voters may
be seeking the validation that comes from empowering one of their own, accessing the “psychic
benefits” associated with group representation.
But politics is not all symbolic, and voting is not all emotional. Modern states do important
things, implementing policies that have enormous impact on society and the material well-being
of individuals. It may therefore be the case that the benefits of ethnic representation can come
from common interests shared within ethnic communities. Since ethnicity is by definition asso-
ciated with descent, it is correlated with other individual characteristics that are also associated
with descent. Since most people speak the same language as their parents, linguistic divides
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often correspond with descent, and therefore may also be highly correlated with ethnic identity.
The same is true with other social behaviors and ideas that are passed down from one generation
to the next, including religious beliefs and cultural practices. Voting for a party which claims to
represent a specific ethnic group therefore means voting for someone who has a similar back-
ground and presumably similar preferences with regards to these issues. In modern, industrial-
ized economies, states also have strong incentives to foster linguistic and cultural homogeneity
throughout their territories (Weber 1976, Gellner 1983). Which language is chosen as the offi-
cial language of the state determines which group of people must incur the additional costs of
learning new languages and those who have the privilege of speaking their native tongue. In
addition to the loss of prestige and cultural validation associated with speaking a subaltern lan-
guage, those who do not incur these costs and develop their language skills risk social exclusion,
political disenfranchisement, and economic deprivation (Csergő 2007, Liu 2015, Stepan 2015).
Ethnic representation is therefore an instrumental tool to avoid the homogenizing policies that
would force assimilation and adaptation on a group.
Ethnic representation can also provide direct material rewards to voters in the form of pa-
tronage. Fearon (1999a) argues that ethnicity is an extremely useful basis for the distribution of
political patronage and clientelistic benefits. Since ethnic markers are not easily changed, they
eliminate the common problem of monitoring in clientelistic democracies, and facilitate the
identification and maintenance of minimum winning coalitions. In campaigning on promises
of representing a specific ethnic group, especially in the so-called “patronage democracies”
where the state primarily redistributes services and benefits to political supporters in exchange
for votes (Chandra 2004), parties can imply that voters should support them by virtue of their
ethnic identity because they will favor coethnics once in office. The motivation to support an
ethnic party is not based on a cultural precept or any idea about what it means to be a member of
a certain group, it is simply about favoring coethnics at the expense of other groups. Ethnicity
is valuable because it serves as a reliable basis for differentiating “insiders” and “outsiders”—or
winners from losers. The only real policy to speak of is to redistribute away from one group
and towards another at every possible opportunity.
There are therefore three different genres of benefits that could be had by electing an ethnic
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champion to office: psychological, policy, and redistributional. Which benefits voters value
most, or why a politician might focus on offering one over the other is an important question,
but beyond the scope of this dissertation. But all three share one important commonality: the
value to an individual voter of each type of benefit is higher for small groups than it is for large
groups. All of these benefits increase as group size decreases. All else equal, a small group will
receive more of each of the three different types of benefits described than a large one.
On psychological benefits, there are two explanations why this is the case: one rooted in
human nature, the other in mathematics. Psychologically speaking, smaller groups are more
likely to hold greater meaning and import for their members than larger groups. Brewer (1991)
has shown that those identities which become the strongest are those which bond individuals
to others in the same category while at the same time distinguishing the self from others. The
“ideal” identity in this regard—i.e., the one to which an individual is most likely to develop
the strongest personal attachment and sense of worth—is one that differentiates an individual
from the largest possible group of people while associating with a small but still viable commu-
nity. This is closely related to the mathematical relationship between group size and electoral
prospects. If, for example, political leaders were chosen at random instead of through elec-
tions, then the odds of a person from a specific ethnic group being chosen would be the same as
their proportion of the population. If a single group represents 90% of the population, then that
group has a 90% chance of having one of their own members chosen. This makes being elected
a much less likely event—and therefore much more meaningful—for groups which represent a
very small segment of the population. As an example, note the historically important moments
when members of numerically small (and usually historically disadvantaged) groups become
head of state: Barack Obama as the first black President of the United States, K. R. Narayanan
as the first Dalit President of India, or Leo Varadkar as the first LGBT Taoiseach of Ireland.
The elections of these leaders are often seen as pivotal or inspirational moments, i.e., those that
provide the greatest psychic benefits.
On policy matters, small groups also benefit more from ethnic representation than large
groups. Smaller groups have more to lose, and are more likely to be targeted, while larger
groups are more likely to dominate the political and economic sectors. At best, a simple pre-
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disposition to employ coethnics due to social networks or physical proximity could put smaller
ethnic groups at a serious disadvantage. At worst, ethnocentrism or racism could encourage
open discrimination and hostility between ethnic groups. In a situation with fewer potential tar-
gets and more potential threats, smaller ethnic groups are more likely to suffer than larger. If
there is a homogenizing pressure in society, as is frequently associated with industrialization,
globalization, and other forms of economic development, the languages and cultural practices
which are most likely to dominate are those of the largest ethnic groups. A party intending to
protect ethnic group interests can actually do a lot to alleviate these concerns if elected to office.7
They can implement state policies designed to protect minority languages from assimilationist
trends.8 Ethnic parties can also implement anti-discrimination policies, legally protecting their
ethnic constituency or ensuring their access to state jobs and resources, giving the community
the increased strength of state assistance to level the playing field in relation to larger groups
and prevent assimilation.
Smaller groups also benefit more from between-group redistribution than larger groups,
even if only bymathematics. As an over-simplified example, imagine a situation where everyone
pays a certain percentage of their income into a general government fund, and the government
then redistributes resources on the basis of identity. If the resources are redistributed only to a
single group, then the payoff to each individual is larger if the group is smaller: the pie is simply
divided into fewer pieces. The most lucrative between-group redistribution would be when a
very small group is able to tax a very large group and distribute resources to its members. A
situation where majorities are taxed to pay minorities is relatively rare in truly democratic gov-
ernments on any large scale.9 In democratic regimes, the more likely outcome is the dominance
7See Gurr (2000) for a theoretical overview and specific case studies of minority communities’ elevated risk of
assimilation, and discrimination.
8See Flores (2008) for documentation of such programs in Latin America. In Bolivia, for example, the Ministry
of Education subsidizes newspaper supplements in the Aymara and Quechua indigenous languages spoken by
14.6% and 21.2% of the country, respectively. Whereas such a policy is hardly necessary for Spanish-language
media, state intervention produces media that these ethnic communities would most likely not have access to if left
to the free market given the relatively small demand in light of the size and the poverty of the intended audience.
9Since majority rule is generally the guiding principle of democratic governance, this type of extremely re-
gressive redistribution is usually only associated with authoritarian regimes, such as the government of Saddam
Hussein which disproportionately favored Sunni Muslims (only 30% of the country) at the expense of majority
Shi’a, or the regressive apartheid regime of South Africa, under which white citizens—never more than 20% of
the population—controlled the bulk of state resources. Such extremely regressive group-based policies can result
in massive windfalls for beneficiaries, sustained by the repression of everyone else.
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of a minimum winning coalition (Riker 1962, Fearon 1999a, Posner 2004b) which redistributes
resources to its own members. Each additional member beyond that required to win elections
ultimately reduces the pay-offs to each individual member, a result of the logic that smaller
groups benefit more than larger ones.
Regardless of the specific type of benefit voters gain by ethnic representation, it is always
more beneficial for smaller groups to be represented on the basis of ethnicity than larger groups.
Voters from smaller groups derive a greater sense of validation and psychic benefits from seeing
coethnics in office than larger groups. Those voters in smaller groups also are more likely to
benefit from public policy goods like linguistic and cultural protection than larger groups, since
larger groups are more easily able to defend their communal interests and practices on their own
without state intervention. And voters in smaller groups are able to gain more from excludable
targeted redistribution than larger groups, since the net benefit per voter is larger by virtue of
dividing resources among a smaller number of citizens. All of this suggests that all else equal,
minority ethnic group voters will potentially havemore to gain by electing ethnic representatives
than majority group voters.
2.2.3 Ethnicity as Coordination Device
Usually, the winner in an election is the one who got the most votes. As a system of majority
rule, democracy favors larger groups, and bigger political factions win out over smaller ones.
Throughout history the identities which are usually most important are those with substantial
numbers of people, e.g., large-scale societal classifications like “protestants,” “workers” or “land
owners.” Small groups are generally irrelevant, as political viability is linked to group size in a
democracy.
Size is a necessary but not sufficient condition for electoral victory. A group must also
be at least minimally coordinated. Voting is fraught with risks of coordination failure. Voters
may, among other things, “waste” their vote by supporting a losing candidate when voting for a
second-choice candidate may be more likely to change the outcome of the election and produce
a more desired outcome. Formal models of electoral outcomes have shown that where the
probability of being the deciding vote in favor of a second-choice vote is sufficiently large, the
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probability of being the deciding vote in favor of a first choice candidate is sufficiently small,
and the difference in utility between electing a first choice and a second choice candidate is
sufficiently narrow, then voters have a strong incentive to strategically vote for a second-place
candidate (McKelvey & Ordeshook 1972). Scholars of strategic voting have pointed out that
this type of collective action can be fraught with difficulties, and that not all groups may be
equally equipped to resolve them (Aldrich 1993, Cox 1997).
Voters need to ascertain the likelihood of their preferred candidate winning. If this is low,
then they must also ascertain which options are most viable, in order to identify how to cast a
strategic ballot. Ethnicity can help with this, because ethnic attributes are often highly visible
and generally unchanging. Gauging the viability of ethnic group representation is easier than
measuring the potential popularity of policy positions. Whereas it is not particularly easy to
assess whether someone supports a more ideologically moderate or extremist candidate without
polling them directly, the willingness of someone to support an appeal to a specific ethnic group
is more readily obvious. An appeal to use the power of the state to the benefit of a specific group
will not be very popular with voters who do not belong to that group. Demographics set the
upper limit to how far an appeal on the basis of ethnicity can go: an appeal to group solidarity and
superiority may not resonate with all in-group members, but it is clear that it will not resonate
with any out-group members.
All else equal, the coordinative capacity of ethnicity in voting is highest for large groups. In
a democracy, the larger number of voters almost always wins. Increasing group size results in
a larger group of voters who may respond to the appeal, increasing the electoral viability of the
ethnic group. Larger groups are more likely to be perceived as strong electoral contenders than
smaller groups. If, for example, a voter sincerely prefers to have her ethnic identity explicitly
represented in parliament, and she is a member of an overwhelming majority, then she knows
that this group winning office is a plausible outcome. She may not know exactly how many
of her coethnic voters also prefer ethnic representation instead of representation along class,
ideology, or some other social cleavage, but she knows that there are at least enough voters who
could respond to an ethnic appeal to carry the group into office. A voter with similar preferences
in the minority group, however, faces a different calculation. The total number of voters likely
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to respond to an ethnic appeal is ultimately capped by the size of the group. If that group is very
small, then the likelihood of an ethnic party being politically viable is much lower.
It is a mistake to argue that big groups win and small groups lose every time in a democracy,
and it is inaccurate to say that all minority groups face insurmountable obstacles in every situ-
ation. The relationship between a group’s size and its political viability varies greatly with the
institutional context in which the group finds itself. As a voluminous and fruitful literature on
institutional design has shown,10 electoral rules have an enormous influence on which groups
are and are not politically viable. The biggest determinant of group size is district magnitude.
Duverger’s law famously holds that majoritarian, first-past the post systems tend to result in
two-party systems (Duverger 1962). Under a single-member district plurality voting rule, only
a single candidate can be elected from each district, so candidates with small bases of support
are completely unable to win election. Mathematically, the system usually favors the largest
vote getter disproportionately, since a candidate will always receive 100% of the seats (i.e.,
one), and therefore 100% of the political authority, despite receiving only a majority or in some
cases a plurality of the vote. This tendency changes the strategic incentives of both voters and
elites. Elites, mindful of the fact that only the largest faction in a district can win any politi-
cal power, will tend to concentrate into either the dominant party or a single opposition, since
doing so maximizes the chances of election. Voters, in turn, will likely limit the range of vot-
ing choices to the top two parties or candidates, aware that voting for a small faction is most
likely to result in a “wasted” vote with little to no chance of swaying the election. Under propor-
tional electoral systems, on the other hand, the calculations are quite different. Since legislative
seats—and therefore, political power—are awarded in proportion to the votes received, smaller
parties have a chance to win power in proportion to their support they receive among voters.
Despite this fact, the differences in group size impact the risk of calculation are important
regardless of the electoral system. Even in the most permissive and proportional of electoral
contexts, larger groups have an easier time gaining access to office than smaller groups. In a
highly proportional system with a very low threshold, the risk for both large and small groups
may be so small as to be more or less inconsequential, but we can nevertheless say that there
10See Duverger (1954), Rae (1967), Sartori (1976), Taagepera & Shugart (1989), Lijphart (1994), and Stoll
(2013).
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is a difference between the groups. It is possible, for example, for a group comprising 60% of
the population of an electorate to split into 12 equal-sized groups, and still come in above a 5%
electoral threshold. A minority population that is only 10% of the population can only split
into two. In other words, a voter who wants ethnic representation in a majority group requires
a lower degree of uniformity of preferences among her coethnics than a comparable voter in a
minority group.
The decision-making calculus of voters when deciding to support an ethnic party thus con-
sists of two interactive components: an assessment of the benefits that would accrue to them
under a system of ethnic representation, and an assessment of how likely such representation is
to obtain. The two dynamics vary not only independently of each other, but with opposite rela-
tionships to group size. The benefits of ethnic representation increase as group size decreases,
whereas the ease of installing ethnic parties in power increases as group size increases. These
dynamics suggest that the decision of whether or not to support an ethnic party plays out very
different between majority and minority ethnic groups, simply by virtue of their differences in
their relative share of the population.
2.3 Institutions and Group Status
For ethnic voting to be most appealing, ethnic parties must offer benefits that voters want, and
it must be feasible for them to win elections. Because these two explanatory concepts are di-
rectly correlated with group size, majority groups and minority groups face different incentives
to support ethnic parties. Majority groups have an easier time electing ethnic parties, but rela-
tively little to gain from the ethnic representation they provide. Ethnic minority groups would
have much to gain through ethnic representation, but face much greater difficulties in electing
ethnic parties. But “majority” and “minority” are relative terms. Whether one is a majority
or minority group member depends not only on absolute group size, but also on the borders
drawn around ethnic communities by administrative and electoral institutions. This interaction
between demography and institutional context can alter the relationship between majority and
minority groups, and dramatically change the calculations of individual voters.
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In many contexts, the administrative unit which enacts policies and the unit which elects
leaders are not the same: policies are usually enacted by the state, and leaders are chosen by
electoral districts. The distinction matters, because in almost all countries, institutions and de-
mographics interact to ensure that the ethnic make-up in the state as a whole and in the electoral
district are drastically different. In a perfectly unitary country composed of a single electoral
district, state and electoral district are the same. Yet practically speaking, very few countries fall
into this category.11 In many countries, ethnic groups which find themselves as state-level mi-
nority groups are geographically concentrated so that they constitute majorities within specific
areas (Lublin 2014).
Where electoral districts are delineated geographically, small groups that are disproportion-
ately concentrated within districts will have a much higher ability to clear electoral hurdles than
those groups which are dispersed equally across electoral districts. This may be the case due to
concentration in some kind of historic homeland—as is the case with the Welsh in the UK—
or urban migration patterns—as is the case with black voters in US cities like Detroit.12 In
these cases, national-level minority groups make up an overwhelming majority in the districts
in which they live. These groups may thus be guaranteed representation through ethnic voting
since they easily exceed all practical barriers to entry.
An ethnic group’s political viability can also be changed intentionally for ethnic groups
by institutional designers hoping to empower minorities or facilitate group representation. In
many countries, electoral districts are drawn around historically relevant regional boundaries,
which often coincide with ethnic groups’ traditional homelands. The border between Flanders
and Wallonia is written into Belgian electoral law, dividing the country into districts where
Dutch-speakers make up the majority and French-speakers make up the majority, with relatively
few bilingual districts. This ensures that most voters—regardless of ethnic identification—find
11Tomy knowledge, the only countries that meet this perfect overlap in lower house elections are Israel, Moldova,
TheNetherlands, Paraguay, Serbia, Slovakia, and Timor-Leste, andmany of those use different electoral systems for
upper house or presidential elections. Kyrgyzstan is composed of a single electoral district, but also contains special
seats reserved for ethnic minority populations. It is therefore extremely rare for the demographic characteristics of
electoral districts to perfectly match the demographics of the state as a whole. See Bormann & Golder (2013) and
Bird (2014).
12The 2010 US census revealed the city of Detroit to be 84% African-American, while the state of Michigan
as a whole was 79% white, making Detroit a majority black enclave in an majority white state. Illustrative of the
ways in which local-level demographics can impact the viability of ethnic representation, all but one of Detroit’s
mayors since 1974 have been African-American, while every governor in Michigan’s history has been white.
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themselves living in a district where their ethnic group is a viable political bloc, despite French-
speakers comprising a national-level minority. Nigerian electoral law requires that electoral
districts be drawn in a way the respects “cultural affinity,” resulting in ethnic groups divided
into districts where they each comprise a local majority. In both the Belgian and Nigerian cases,
electoral laws are designed to give each ethnic group greater chances or representation and lower
risk of coordination failure than they would have otherwise had in a majoritarian election where
all groups voted together.
In the most extreme cases, ethnic groups are guaranteed representation by explicit legal pro-
tections and mandates. Lebanon is the archetypal example of ethnic quotas in electoral politics:
the constitution requires that president be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni
Muslim, and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi’a Muslim. Other countries include explicit
guarantees or ethnic representation, including New Zealand, which sets a minimum quota for
ethnic Ma¯ori candidates in parliament; and India, which provides guaranteed representation for
a list of traditionally underrepresented caste and tribal groups. Bird (2014), drawing on Vukelic
(2012), estimates that 28 countries currently have explicit legal protections guaranteeing rep-
resentation for specific groups in the lower house of parliament, with many more relying on
implicit systems like ethnic gerrymandering to ensure minority groups representation. These
institutions are specifically designed to make minority representation possible. By guarantee-
ing a certain level of representation to a specific group, they effectively eliminate the barriers
to entry for small groups. Whereas in a purely majoritarian election, a very small group has
no chance of being elected, these institutional innovations segregate minority groups onto an
ethnically-segregated ballot, essentially turning a national-level minority group into a majority
group within their own electoral unit. This arrangement changes the viability of ethnic repre-
sentation from being very low to very high.
These institutional configurations change the incentives for voters to support ethnic parties.
Voters must assess both the benefits they are likely to receive from electing ethnic parties to
power, and the likelihood of victory for those parties. While both of these are directly related
to demography, they change based on the group’s position within the institutional environment.
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Table 2.1: Two Components of Ethnic Voting
is determined at the level at which leaders are elected. Ethnic voting should be most likely
among those voters who have high values on both dimensions. Ethnic minority groups are
most likely to support ethnic parties when they are very small, but geographically concentrated
within electoral districts where they are guaranteed to win elections if they mobilize around a
single party or candidate. Ethnic majority group are most likely to support ethnic parties when
they are faced with a large minority group that is geographically concentrated into their own
ethnic enclaves. The general outline of the theoretical components determining ethnic voting
are outlined on Table 2.1.
2.4 Visualizing the Theory
Incentives for ethnic voting therefore vary based on demographics and institutions, and majority
and minority group voters face fundamentally different incentives and strategy concerns when
deciding whether or not to support an ethnic party. In this section, I present a more intuitively
understood approach by showing how the dynamics outlined above would impact voters in more
relatable situations. First, I illustrated this argument using the abstract example of an election
in a very small, diverse society. I think show how the incentives to support an ethnic party vary
based on group status using the real-world example of ethnic Albanian voting in a variety of
contexts.
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2.4.1 Ethnic Voting Decisions in a Very Small Polity
Imagine the polity as seen in Figure 2.1. It is ethnically divided between two ethnic groups,
indicated here by the colors blue and yellow. Suppose there is an election for a single legislator,
and three parties are running. One is an ethnic party from the yellows. It advocates for yellow
supremacy, supports the yellows to the exclusion of the blues, and proposes that the state should
show preferential treatment towards yellows. Another party is an ethnic party from the blues. It
takes the exact same positions as the yellow ethnic party, but in favor of its own coethnic blues
to the exclusion of yellows. The final party is non-ethnic. It believes that ethnicity should not
be the basis of state policy, and instead advocates for some other basis of legitimacy.
Obviously, this over-simplified example ignores the enormous complexity of real-life party
systems and elections. “Non-ethnicity” is not a party platform or proposal as much as it is the
absence of one, and thus would probably not exist as an actual campaign platform in the real
world. Nevertheless, in this extremely limited example we can already say something about
likely outcomes and voting behavior using the framework outlined above. Take for example,
our voters labeled as 퐴 and 퐵 in the Figure. We know that 퐴 is a yellow, and that yellows
are the majority group in this polity. We can immediately see that she will not support the
blue supremacist party. That party, if elected, would relegate her to second-class citizen status,
rejecting her identity and culture, and taxing her to fund programs that would disproportionately
benefit the blues. Her choice is therefore between the non-ethnic party, and the ethnic party
representing her own group. The inverse is true for 퐵. He is a blue, and therefore has no
incentive to support the yellow ethnic party for the same reasons.
Let us examine the benefits of ethnic representation to both of these people. From this it is
clear that 퐵 has much to gain from the election of the blue ethnic party. He is in a minority that
comprises only 27 of the population, and thus his group’s victory would be extremely prestigious.
He would also be the recipient of a fairly large windfall if the state decided to tax yellows to
redistribute to blues, since 7 people would be paying in, but only 2 people would be collecting
the benefits. The rewards to 퐴 from the election of the yellow ethnic party is much more mod-
est. Her group outnumbers the blues more than two-to-one, so even if the non-ethnic party is












Figure 2.3: Greater Diversity Increases Benefits from Yellow Party
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numbers alone. A redistribution policy taxing blues to pay yellows reaps an extremely modest
benefit: with 2 citizens paying in but 5 citizens collecting, the spoils are spread too thin to really
count for much of anything. Admittedly, without knowing anything about the citizens beyond
their ethnicity, or other facts about the parties running, we cannot say for certain whether these
benefits would be more or less preferable to our two voters than what the non-ethnic party has
to offer. We can nevertheless say that the benefits of ethnic representation to 퐵 are higher than
they are for 퐴.
The ease of access to office, though, is exactly the opposite, in that it is much higher for
퐴 than for 퐵. While 퐵 may have the most to gain from ethnic representation, it is entirely
impossible for him to achieve. Even if his fellow blue coethnic supports the blue ethnic party,
he knows for certain that no one in the ethnic majority will support the minority ethnic group’s
party, and since they outnumber him it is impossible for the blue ethnic party to win. Even if
the yellow voting bloc splits their vote perfectly between their ethnic party and the non-ethnic
party, one of those parties is guaranteed to have at least three votes, outnumbering the maximum
two votes that the blues can muster. In this instance, 퐵 has a very strong incentive to support
the non-ethnic party. The two blue votes supporting the non-ethnic party may be enough to tip
the scales in favor of the non-ethnic party over the yellow ethnic party, which ultimately would
be a good thing for both blue group voters, avoiding ethnic appropriation from the yellows. For
퐵, voting for an ethnic party is a dangerous choice that is ultimately detrimental to his own
interests.
퐴, however, has the luxury of voting for whoever she truly prefers. Either the yellow ethnic
party or the non-ethnic party is guaranteed to win this election, and even without knowing the
true preferences of her coethnics, her chances of casting the pivotal vote in this extremely small
polity are quite high. She need not worry about accidentally allowing the blue ethnic party
to win, since this outcome is impossible in this situation, so is free to vote for either party.
Again, we cannot say exactly which party she should vote for without going into more specific
and idiosyncratic details about her situation, her preferences, or the nature of the competing
parties. But we can still compare the relative group-level incentives in this scenario. Voters in
the minority group have zero incentive to support an ethnic party, whereas voters in the majority
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have a moderate incentive to support ethnic parties. Ethnic voting in this situation is therefore
more likely among the members of the majority than the minority.
Now examine the scenario in Figure 2.2. Instead of electing a single legislator, the polity is
going to elect a parliament of two legislators, from two separate electoral districts. The popula-
tion of the country is the same, but the institutional rules governing the election have changed.
Since the demographics of the entire polity are the same, the benefits of ethnic representation
are the same as they were before: very high for our minority blue voter 퐵, but more moderate
for our majority yellow voter 퐴. But the likelihood of each ethnic group winning has changed.
For 퐴, the situation is almost the same. She now finds herself in an ethnically homogeneous
district. She knows that no one in her district will vote for the blue ethnic party, and so is free to
vote her true preference just as she was before. But for 퐵, the game has changed substantially.
Since the minority blues are now a district-level majority, the blue ethnic party has suddenly
become viable in a way that it wasn’t before. If his fellow coethnic votes for the ethnic party,
then it is possible for the ethnic blue party to take the district. The likelihood of victory has gone
from impossible to relatively high, causing a drastic increase in his willingness to support the
ethnic blue party. The change to the institutional rules has done nothing to alter his motivation
for supporting an ethnic party, but it has made the viability much greater, and overall increased
his willingness to vote for the ethnic party. In fact, in this case, 퐵’s incentives to support an
ethnic party may be higher than 퐴’s, since ethnic representation is now viable for both voters,
but so much more lucrative for the minority group member than the majority group member.
Note that the institutional change has not altered 퐴’s incentives, but it has altered 퐶’s. Even
though퐴 and퐶 share an ethnic identity, their incentives are the same in Figure 2.1, but divergent
in Figure 2.2. In Figure 2.2, 퐶 now lives in an ethnic enclave of blues. He remains a state-level
majority group member, but is now a district-level minority. Even if he has a true preference
for the yellow ethnic party, he knows that neither of the other two citizens of the district will
support that party, making victory impossible.13 퐶 essentially finds himself in the same position
as 퐵 in Figure 2.1. Even if he truly prefers a yellow ethnic party candidate, such an outcome is
13Technically, a three-way tie is possible in this scenario. In order to retain parsimony, the implications of this are
ignored, as such an outcome is likely only in the extremely over-simplified example presented here. The important
insight for the theory from this example is that in the majority-blue district, a blue ethnic party victory is possible,
as is a non-ethnic party victory, but a yellow ethnic party victory is not.
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impossible due to the high barriers of entry in that district, and so his best strategy is to support
the non-ethnic party in hopes of casting a pivotal vote if the two blue citizens split the vote
between non-ethnic and blue ethnic.
Let us make one more change, this time to demographics, as reflected in Figure 2.3. Here,
the two-district legislature is still in effect, but neither district is purely homogeneous. The
yellows are still a majority, but their dominance has declined somewhat, in that they are now 47
of the population instead of 57 . For 퐴, this demographic change only increases the likelihood of
ethnic voting. She is still a majority of the polity as a whole, she is still a majority in her district,
but by swapping one of her coethnics for an ethnic outsider, ethnic redistribution has become
more lucrative. There is now one more ethnic outsider whose resources could be appropriated,
and one less coethnic to share spoils with, increasing her individual gains. The two groups
are also now approaching parity, and yellow’s status may not be as guaranteed as it once was.
This demographic change has only increased her own willingness to support an ethnic party
by changing the benefits of ethnic representation, while maintaining ethnic representation as a
viable outcome.
In this overly-simplistic example it is not possible to say definitively who will support an
ethnic party and who will not. But it is possible to gauge the relative attractiveness of ethnic
voting in each case. Each individual voter’s incentives to support an ethnic party vary due to their
demographic circumstances within both their district and the polity as a whole. Because of these
incentives, even voters of the same ethnic group can find themselves in varying circumstances
based on their local demographics. Majority and minority group status can dramatically change
the predictions of support for an ethnic party.
2.4.2 Ethnic Voting in Reality: Albanians and the Albanian Diaspora
The examples using the abstract figures above show how a voter’s relative preference for being
represented by an ethnic party can change based on the demographic circumstances in which
they find themselves. This abstract example ignores much of the complex realities of social and
political life in the real world. But a theory of ethnic voting that appreciates both the potential
pay-offs of ethnic representation and the ease of wining if mobilizing along ethnic lines also
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helps to understand the variation in support for ethnic parties in much of the world today. Take,
by way of example, the ethnic Albanian community. The greatest concentration of ethnic Al-
banians is, unsurprisingly, in Albania, where they constitute roughly 98% of the population. A
close second is Kosovo, where they comprise 90% of the population. A large ethnic Albanian
diaspora spreads throughout Eastern and Central Europe, with substantial ethnic Albanian mi-
nority communities residing in NorthMacedonia (25% of the population), andMontenegro (5%
of the population), as well as smaller numbers in Italy, Romania, Turkey, Greece, and Croatia,
with overseas enclaves in the United States and Canada. Albanian ethnic and national identity is
extremely strong, both within Albania and Kosovo, and throughout the international Albanian
diaspora.14 Yet independent of the strength of that identity, the incentives to vote for an ethnic
party vary widely depending on context.
Imagine an Albanian voter living in Tirana, the capital of Albania proper. Here she finds
herself part of an almost completely homogeneous population. There is hardly any minority
group to speak of in the country. All leaders are virtually guaranteed to be ethnic Albanians
by mathematics. In this situation, successful ethnic mobilization is guaranteed to lead to politi-
cal representation. The population is almost entirely Albanian, so it is entirely possible for the
group to clear any formal or informal threshold to winning electoral office if mobilized success-
fully. But the benefits of ethnic representation are very low in this case. Albanian interests are
hegemonic; all candidates and voters are likely to share the same ethnic identity, so they share
the same ethnic interests. There is no large group of ethnic outsiders from whom voters may
need protection, nor is there an outgroup to target for the reallocation of resources. Non-ethnic
distinctions are much more relevant in this case, since those will likely be much less uniform
throughout the country, and a voter would likely have much more to gain by redistributing from
rich to poor for example, or from lowland areas to highland areas, than they would on ethnic
labels. The theory predicts that these relatively low levels of benefits to be had through ethnic
voting will lead to some other identity or social cleavage being chosen as the basis of political
competition, as voters are mobilized by class, ideology, or region. This is, in fact, what has
happened in Albania, as the primary political cleavage in recent elections has been between
14See Koinova (2013) and the Special Issue: Albanian Migration and New Transnationalisms (2003) in Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies.
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Socialists and Liberal Democrats. Regional and linguistic identities are somewhat strong pre-
dictors of voting behaviors in Albania, but neither party explicitly campaigns on a doctrine of
ethnic identification, or a promise to benefit ethnic Albanians within the state specifically.
Now, consider an ethnic Albanian voter living 150 miles away in Pristina, Kosovo. Kosovo
is still overwhelmingly ethnic Albanian, as Albanians represent 90% of the population, but there
is now a sizable group of ethnic minorities. Unlike Albania, Kosovo spent much of the twentieth
century as a part of Yugoslavia, and the first several years of the twenty-first century as a part
of Serbia, and many of its ethnic minority citizens are Serbs and other ethnic Slavs. Serbs are
guaranteed a minimum level of political representation, and ethnic Serb voters are segregated
into a separate ballot to cast votes for their own leaders.15 In this situation, ethnic Albanian
parties still face no immediately obvious barriers to winning an election. Albanians are still
an overwhelming majority of the country, and any politician who mobilized even a fraction of
the ethnic Albanian majority would be ensured to gain some representation in parliament. The
difference is that the benefits of ethnic representation have gone up. As the minority community
here is larger, ethnic Albanians face a slightly larger threat from ethnic outsiders. Ethnic mi-
norities are also an extremely sensitive issue in Kosovo, given the still-recent history of violent
conflict during an ethnic civil war in the late 1990’s between Serbs and Albanians. International
factors exacerbate this domestic tension, as the Republic of Serbia maintains territorial claims
on Kosovo, refuses to acknowledge its declaration of independence, and advocates internation-
ally for the cause of ethnic Serbs within Kosovo. Many voters may therefore be more susceptible
to a political platform which promises to neutralize threats— real or perceived—to the majority
Albanians by ethnic minority groups. In fact, despite their common ethnic identity, a typical
voter in Kosovo and a typical voter in Albania will likely show drastic differences in their sup-
port for ethnic parties. In a study of Albanian political parties and elections, Barbullushi (2016)
shows that ethnic and ethnonational appeals to voters are far more common in Kosovo than
15Some studies suggest that Serbs are also more likely to suffer economic deprivation than Albanians in Kosovo,
putting them in the position of a vulnerable minority (Bhaumik, Gang & Yun 2006). While the Serbs are not the
focus of this example, the theory does also help understand Serb voting behavior in Kosovo. As a vulnerable mi-
nority group representing a small segment of the population, they have much to gain through ethnic representation.
As the beneficiaries of guaranteed representation, they also have very low barriers to entry. The theory therefore
predicts high ethnic voting, which is exactly what happens. In both the 2014 and 2017 elections in Kosovo, nine
out of ten reserved Serb seats were won by the Serb List party, an ethnic Serb interest party.
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they are in Albania. Reflecting the international environment, parties in Kosovo are much more
likely to see sovereignty for ethnic Albanian people as a central component of their platform. It
should be noted that a direct comparison between Albania and Kosovo in this regard may not be
appropriate, as it is virtually impossible to disentangle domestic ethnic issues from international
ones in the Kosovar context, but not in the Albanian: Albania has a much longer history of inde-
pendence and sovereignty, whereas Kosovo was a former Yugoslav province. Nevertheless, the
comparison illustrates how shared ethnicity does not always correspond to shared incentives to
support an ethnic party.
Now consider the situation in Tetovo, 60 miles from Pristina across the North Macedonian
border. Here, an Albanian voter lives in a city that is almost three-quarters Albanian. Just as in
Albania or Kosovo, Albanian is the main language heard on the street, and the Albanian double-
headed eagle is seen far more frequently than the North Macedonian sun. Our voter is still part
of a majority group within her electoral district—one of six in North Macedonia—with Tetovo
falling in the same region as other ethnic Albanian enclaves like Bogovinje, Debar, Gostivar,
Kičevo, and Vrapčište—all of which are majority Albanian. From the language spoken in the
city it is obvious that Albanians are a local majority, and there is little concern that voting for a
party that explicitly identifies as a champion of ethnic interests is a wasted vote. Nevertheless,
the voter knows that she is in North Macedonia, a majority ethnic Macedonian country, and
that there are substantial numbers of ethnic Macedonian voters who will probably not support a
party claiming to represent the ethnic Albanian community. In this environment, the risk of vote
wasting, or supporting an ethnic candidate who cannot win has changed little from the voters in
Pristina and Tirana. What has changed dramatically is the benefits the voter is likely to receive
from ethnic representation. Turning on the TV, she sees that most channels are broadcast in
Macedonian—a Slavic language completely unintelligible from Albanian. She sees that while
government services at the local level may be available in Albanian, services provided by the
central government are more often in a foreign language. All but one of the state universities
teach courses only in Macedonian and English, meaning that she must now learn another lan-
guage if she wants to receive a higher education. Our voter now has serious, tangible grievances
that result from her position as an ethnic minority. When a political party promises to represent
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ethnic Albanian issues, it is clear what those are: language rights, access to state services, and
representation in potentially hostile environment dominated by ethnic outsiders. If a candidate
promises to deliver to ethnic Albanians their fair share of the country’s wealth, our voter now
knows that redistributing resources from ethnic Macedonians to ethnic Albanians could result
in some very real financial benefits for her and her fellow Albanians. Ethnicity may even be
the dominant political issue in her mind when casting her vote, far more important than policy
issues concerning class or other identities. This expectation is borne out by the facts in North
Macedonia. The political divide between ethnic Albanians and ethnicMacedonians is extremely
pronounced. Cross-ethnic voting is rare, as ethnic Albanian candidates campaign exclusively to
ethnic Albanian audiences, while ethnic Macedonian candidates largely ignore Albanian vot-
ers. There is intense intra-ethnic conflict within the Albanian community, but parties mainly
compete over who can best represent Albanian interests in opposition to the dominant ethnic
Macedonians, making exclusively ethnic appeals to potential constituents.
Now consider an ethnic Albanian voter thousands of miles away in the United States, where
she finds herself in one of the very few Albanian enclaves in New York, Boston, or Los An-
geles. Here she is unlikely to hear Albanian if she leaves her immediate neighborhood, and
finding Albanian language media or cultural activities is no small task, if possible at all. While
government services may be available in languages other than English, it is more likely to be
in Spanish or Chinese than Albanian, making it clear to her that not only is she a minority, but
she is one of the smallest and most demographically inconsequential minority communities.
The benefits of having ethnic representation in this situation are even higher than for the voter
in Macedonia. Since there is very little ethnic Albanian community to speak of, she can rely
less on those in her immediate neighborhood for assistance and support. If a politician were
to promise benefits directly to ethnic Albanians in the area, she would likely stand to benefit
enormously, since few rivals would compete for benefits. Since there are so few ethnic Alba-
nians in the area, setting aside even a fraction of one percent of government budgets to ethnic
Albanian concerns would likely represent a huge windfall benefiting Albanians voter directly. A
program designed to redistribute money from all tax payers to ethnic Albanians, say in the form
of an ethnic Albanian scholarship fund, or Albanian homebuyers loan program, would have an
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enormous funding base of non-Albanians to draw on and very few ethnic Albanians eligible.
In this the potential benefits of ethnic representation are the highest of all scenarios reviewed
here. However, any politician campaigning on ethnic Albanian issues has such a small voter
base to draw from, that their campaign is likely doomed to failure if they campaign exclusively
on Albanian interests. Excluding voters of other ethnicities to appeal to only ethnic Albanians
is political suicide, since such a proposal is hardly likely to attract support from more than a
very small number of voters. The barriers to entry to office in this context are insurmountable,
as the proportion of the population that would support these appeals is so small compared to
other ethnic groups.16
In all of the situations outlined above the degree to which Albanian identity is linked to po-
litical interests has changed because of differences in the demographic circumstances in which
voters find themselves. Incentives to vote for an ethnic champion vary in each of the four ex-
amples because of changes in what she stands to gain from such representation, and the degree
to which such representation is plausibly attainable. “Albanian” as a political identity has sig-
nificance not because of the voters’ level of personal attachment, but because of the broader
demographic and institutional context in which the individual voter finds themselves.
2.5 Conclusion
Elections are collective events where large numbers of individuals separately make decisions
that determine what will happen to the group as a whole. Individual identities are clearly impor-
tant to understanding those decisions, but it is no less important to acknowledge that the context
in which those identities exist exert enormous influence over voting decisions. Voters do not
think only of themselves and their own identities when voting, but also the differences between
16This is not just a hypothetical situation. In 2012, Mark Gjonaj, born in the Bronx to Montenegrin Albanian
immigrants, ran for the New York State Assembly against incumbent Naomi Rivera. Touting his ties to the neigh-
borhood where he grew up (and Rivera’s ongoing corruption investigations), Gjonaj won the election in part due
to the support of Albanian-Americans living near Pelham Parkway and Allerton Avenue, one of North America’s
densest Albanian diaspora enclaves. Gjonaj was not shy about his family’s immigrant roots, and was happy to
court support from his coethnic neighbors, but never explicitly promised that benefits would flow exclusively to
ethnic Albanians in his district; his official platform focused mostly on job creation and public health programs for
senior citizens. Gjonaj was nevertheless invited to Tirana and awarded the Order of the Honor of the Nation—The
Republic of Albania’s highest non-military honor—for being the first ethnic Albanian elected to public office in
the United States. See Beekman (2012), Naomi Rivera Defeated Soundly in Assembly Primary By Hard-Working
Challenger (2012) and Goldstein (2015).
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themselves and others. They consider how their group position may constrain them or enable
them, and then act accordingly. To understand how ethnic identities map onto preferences for
ethnic political representation, we should acknowledge not just individual ethnic attachments,
but also the relationships between groups, as influenced by relative group size.
I have argued in this chapter that group size is an important variable in understanding the
role of ethnic identities in voting decisions. This is not to say that group size is the only thing that
matters. Clearly there are many other relevant factors that might influence a voter’s willingness
to support an ethnic party. But group size is nevertheless important because it directly influences
two separate dimensions which are central to making decisions on who to vote for: the potential
policy gains of electing leaders who promise to champion ethnic causes, and the relative ease of
actually installing such leaders in positions of power. Using this framework, I have argued that
ethnic minority group members and ethnic majority group members have fundamentally differ-
ent strategic calculations. Majority group members would easily win office if they efficiently
mobilized their coethnic citizens, but would actually have relatively little to gain from doing so.
Minority group members would stand to benefit enormously from their group controlling the
state, but such an outcome is much more difficult because of the barriers to electoral victory
for smaller groups. This argument suggests that ethnic voting among majority group members
and ethnic voting among minority group members are actually different things, responding to
different incentives and circumstances. As such, we should expect to observe different patterns
of ethnic voting among majority and minority communities—a prediction I test empirically in
Chapters 5 and 7.
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3Research Design
In the previous chapter, I outlined a theory of how ethnic voting may vary based on local demo-
graphic and institutional context. In this chapter, I outline the research design used in the rest
of the dissertation to empirically test this theory. I survey the challenges the theory presents for
empirical testing, and present a research design strategy intended to produce falsifiable predic-
tions and test them.
This dissertation relies on a mixed-methods strategy exploring two separate cases: Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and Latvia. Qualitatively, I rely on ethnographic methods which survey the
history of the ethnic divisions in these countries to identify the origins of the ethnic divides
and the ways in which ethnic groups differentiate themselves from others in each case. Then,
I explore how political actors use those differentiating aspects as part of their political strate-
gies to attract supporters and win elections. From this, I generate a qualitative data set, coding
candidates and political parties in both countries based on what type of appeal they make to
voters, and whether they present themselves as representatives of a specific ethnic group or not.
That data set is then matched to quantitative voting data for a statistical analysis to determine
when ethnic appeals are successful and when they are not. These findings are tested against
the predictions of the theory providing an opportunity for falsification. The two countries were
chosen because of the opportunities they provide to examine voter- and elite-level implications
of the theory. In Bosnia, the research design holds elite strategies constant, varying the insti-
tutional and demographic factors. Exploiting the fact that Bosnian voters may find themselves
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in a majority group and in a minority group in a single election (depending on which level of
government they are electing), I show that ethnic voting strategies systematically vary based
on group demographic status. In Latvia, the research design exploits variation over time, hold-
ing institutions and demography constant. I show that political elites seeking office adapt their
campaign strategies based on group status. Majority-group candidates become more likely to
campaign under ethnic party labels, emphasizing their ethnic identities and appealing to voters
on ethnic platforms. Minority-group candidates, on the other hand, becomemore likely to stress
non-ethnic issues while campaigning.
The first section of this chapter outlines the practical challenges to testing the theory outlined
in Chapter 2. I also discuss the specific challenges of making causal claims based on a theory
which relies primarily on structural, historical, and large-scale social context variables, and how
I respond to those challenges. The second section explains how I respond to those concerns,
and surveys the broad approach of this dissertation. It provides an outline of the empirical data
collection and the mixed-methods approach employed in the empirical chapters that follow. This
chapter is intended only to provide a broad overview, and to aide in interpreting the results of
the dissertation and incorporating them into broader a literature which may rely on different
methodological and epistemological approaches. More concrete details are also contained in
the empirical chapters themselves.
3.1 Challenges and Approaches to Empirical Verification
The main argument in this dissertation is that people are most likely to support ethnic parties
when ethnic representation promises to produce outcomes that voters want, and when mobiliz-
ing coethnics will feasibly result in electoral victory. The dependent variable is ethnic voting;
the independent variables are group size and electoral institutions. The mechanisms linking the
independent variable and the dependent variables are the assessments of political actors regard-
ing the benefits of electing an ethnic party, and the likelihood of being able to do so. In order
to convincingly demonstrate the validity of this argument, it is necessary to generate falsifiable
predictions that can serve to confirm or refute the theory. In this particular study there are sev-
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eral potential pitfalls that must be addressed directly. The first is concept formation, ensuring
that the theoretical concepts are clear, and that the empirical strategy coherently links observa-
tion to the concepts being studied. The second is reliable and valid measurement. Voting is a
notoriously blunt instrument, wherein citizens synthesize many complicated issues and calcu-
lations into a single, observable action. Ethnic voting is characterized by voting for a party or
candidate making a specific type of appeal. Measuring this is not always easy, and special care
should be paid to ensuring that measures are valid. Finally, there is the issue of what kind of
scientific claims can be made when the explanatory variables are largely structural. The inde-
pendent variables in this study are the products of identities and institutions that in many cases
are themselves the products of historical forces not readily altered by individual human agency.
Research designs which rely on randomization and intervention to make strong causal claims
are difficult in such a context.
Shiveley (1980, p. 30) cautions that relying on everyday language can undermine rigorous
scientific analysis, as daily usage frequently collapses multiple phenomena into a single concept.
This is especially true of the dependent variable in this study, and previous studies have defined
ethnic voting in a variety of ways. Ethnic voting could be understood as a vote for a party which
claims to represent an ethnic group (Chandra 2011). It could also be observed when members
of an ethnic group all vote together (Huber 2012), or when a party obtains all of its voting
support from a single ethnic group (Horowitz 1985). In each of these conceptualizations, it is
clear that there is an important relationship between ethnicity and voting, but they are neverthe-
less three distinct outcomes, possibly resulting from different causes and explained by different
mechanisms. Likewise, the foundational concept of ethnicity is also defined in various ways in
different studies. Some have defined ethnicity with regards to language, race, religion, birth-
place, physiognomy, or other identity categories. These are all plausible conceptual foundations
for ideas of ethnicity, but each definition would require a different measurement strategy, and
different indicators of ethnic identity.
Even with a theory based on cleanly defined concepts of the independent and dependent
variables, measures on this topic are likely to be noisy. The theory outlined in Chapter 2 makes
a series of predictions about the likelihood of majority group members and minority members
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to support an ethnic party. It does not, however, claim to be an exhaustive theory of all voting
behavior, as the claims are ultimately relative. It suggests that under certain conditions, ethnic
voting is more likely than it would be otherwise. It does not claim that demographics and insti-
tutions are the only factors that matter in voting behavior. While I expect that the explanatory
variables will produce observable differences between different types of groups, I do not dis-
count the importance of ideology, class, candidate quality, and the many other important factors
which could operate at the level of countries, parties, candidates, ethnic groups, and individual
voters. As a result, observed voting behaviors are certain to vary for reasons not included in
the main explanatory variables. Relegating these other factors to the error term of a statistical
analysis could make precise estimations of correlation difficult. A research design which seeks
to test the impact of demographics on ethnic voting should therefore acknowledge the impor-
tance of all other factors outside the theory, while nevertheless allowing for tests of the proposed
mechanisms.
One concern is that the independent variables are endogenous to an enormous number of
potentially unobserved or unmeasured variables. Demographics are never randomized. Where
people live, which ethnic group they identify with, and the size of their ethnic community is
usually the result of complex historical factors. Since birthrates are correlated with economic
status, the size of the group could in some instances be a proxy for economic variables which
may actually be the cause of the observed correlation between demographic status and electoral
results. Majority or minority group status is also usually the result of structural conditions or
historical processes which may also have an impact on observed voting behavior. In the two
cases analyzed here, this concern is especially pronounced, as ethnic diversity in Central and
Eastern Europe is often the result of historical events and trends which are themselves worthy
of serious study in their own right. In the former Soviet Union, the presence of minority group
populations is the result of migration from the Russian metropole to periphery republics. Mem-
bers of ethnic minority groups may therefore share certain traits, as they are the descendants
of economic migrants who were settled in their current location by state policies designed to
further the political aims of Soviet communism.
In this case there is reason for concern about reverse causation. Electoral institutions which
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shape relationship between groups are usually instated by political leaders who are in power.
It could therefore be that ethnic voting puts in place a specific kind of political leader, who
then implements a specific type of institution. If this is the case, then the voting behavior is the
cause of the institutions, not the other way around. Demographic status may also be subject to
reverse causation. If majority group members elect coethnic politicians on a platform of ethnic
supremacy and coethnic favoritism, then those leaders may enact policies adversely affecting
the minority population. If these policies encourage emigration, facilitate assimilation, reduce
birthrates, or increase mortality, then the population of the minority group is likely to decline
as a result of the electoral choices made by voters. Demography could therefore be the result of
politics.
As the present study uses observational data to test hypotheses, it is not possible to com-
pletely dismiss these concerns. The research design was structured as to hold constant the sur-
rounding circumstances and unobserved variation asmuch as possible. In an experimental study,
the dependent variables would be randomly assigned, with all unobserved causal factors equally
distributed between treatment and control groups. Instead of aiming for a purely randomized
controlled experiment, instead I focus on research designs which hold those other potentially
unobserved causal factors constant. In Bosnia, I analyze split-ticket voting in the context of a
single election and compare differences between voting at one level to voting at another. The
long-term historical and structural variables are therefore held constant, since we observe voters
casting two separate ballots, inmost cases literally seconds apart from each other. In Latvia, I ex-
amine the same political candidates and their propensity to change platforms between elections.
This design again holds the individuals constant, and operates on a short enough time table that
the long-term structural factors are held close to constant between observations. This does not
meet the “gold standard” of causal identification, but it nevertheless takes these extremely valid
concerns over omitted variable bias seriously.1
These caveats should guide the interpretation of the findings. But it should also be noted
that the relationship between the independent and dependent variables of this dissertation may
not always be amenable to study using perfect causally-identified methods. Even given unlim-
1For a more in-depth discussion of the research design and its applicability to the two cases, see Chapters 5 and
7.
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ited resources, a randomized controlled trial which could convincingly confirm or disprove the
theory in a broadly generalizable way would be extremely difficult. Such a study would take a
large group of people, randomly assign the social contexts in which they found themselves, and
then observe the way they voted. This would be extraordinarily difficult, as group size and in-
stitutional rules are extremely difficult to manipulate in a laboratory setting. In real life, people
know their ethnic identity and their relative group size because such things are communicated
over time in day-to-day life, and credibly carrying these nuances and intuitions in test subjects is
difficult in the artificial environment of a controlled laboratory. People understand their group’s
position in society because of history and experience, and such intuitive understandings are not
readily changeable in the short-term. But these things are important to study precisely because
they are complicated, multi-faceted social elements.
In this way, this dissertation responds to Huber’s (2017) concern that research driven exclu-
sively by causal identification may bias the discipline away from studying questions “where the
central explanatory variables are broad features of the social, political, or institutional context
(Huber 2017, p. 104).” Ethnic identity may indeed be endogenous to political outcomes, which
presents a potential problem for this study and others like it. But that endogenous relationship is
also why it is crucial to study voting and social context together, since that relationship is so vi-
tally important to normatively important outcomes like democratic representation and political
stability. These questions are important to ask, and should not be ignored because establishing
causal relationships is difficult. Rather, it falls to the researcher to be mindful of the risks of
endogeneity as a challenge to convincing research designs.
To better understand this tension, consider two separate “hard” sciences: medicine and as-
tronomy. Medicine is fundamentally concerned with things that are smaller than humans. Its
objects of inquiry are organs, biological processes, viruses, injuries, etc. These are all things
that are either constitutive of human beings, or that interact with human beings. Astronomy,
on the other hand, examines objects that are bigger than humans. Astronomers study the planet
we live on, the forces which govern the motion of the stars, and the physical make-up of the
universe. Driven by the needs of their subject, these disciplines have adopted drastically differ-
ent approaches to advancing human knowledge. Political science as a discipline is situated in
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between these two approaches. When we turn our attention to an individual’s ideology, prefer-
ence, or behavior, we examine at things that are smaller than human beings. When we look at
political parties, institutions, social groups, states, or international organizations, we examine
things that are larger than human beings. Both medical and astronomical researchers have the
luxury of studying things that are either smaller or larger than human beings. Political scientists,
on the other hand, study both, and must learn from both of these approaches.
Research designs driven by causal identification usually adopt the same methodological ap-
proach and epistemological position as medical researchers, wherein the gold standard is the
double-blind randomized controlled trial. In the perfect RCT, the treatment is perfectly ran-
domized within a population under study, such that subjects can be differentiated only by the
presence of the treatment condition. As the only difference between the two groups is the treat-
ment, any difference in average outcomes between the two groups can be causally attributed to
the treatment. The double-blind nature of the study ensures objectivity by removing the imme-
diate observer from the calculation entirely. Theoretically, since even the researcher performing
the study does not know who is in which group, it is not possible to influence the outcome by
intentional or unintentional interference.
RCTs are important to medical research for good reason. First, they perform a crucial role
by helping doctors and medical practitioners make vitally important treatment decisions on a
day-to-day basis. These professionals need to know how likely a specific treatment is to have
the desired effect, and whether that effect is likely to be superior to the effects of other potential
treatments. Moreover, the double-blind RCT design helps eliminate biased results as a result of
researcher subjectivity and potential conflict of interest. RCTs first gained in prominence in the
United States in the 1950’s with the increase in mass production of pharmaceuticals intended
for public consumption (Bothwell, Greene, Podolsky & Jones 2016). The biggest critique of
RCT methodology at that time has since come to be seen as one of its strongest assets: it di-
minishes the importance of testimony and first-hand experience by experts and practitioners in
favor of arbitrary and ostensibly universal findings which could be replicated by any researcher
performing the same procedure under the same conditions. This feature is especially appealing
in political science, where the subjects under inquiry are by definition, political. Even the most
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disciplined and objective social science researcher is likely to have personal interests and pref-
erences over many objects of study. RCT methods avoid such bias, as a properly executed RCT
would eliminate the possibility of interference from researchers’ personal agendas and allow for
more reliable claims to objective scientific facts. But RCTs by nature rely on intervention: the
randomized administration of a specific treatment or not. In political science this is achievable
in many contexts, but not others. Just like medical researchers, it is easiest when we study things
that are smaller than human beings: individual-level decisions, information, or characteristics.
But political scientists also care about variables that are not easily changed by direct human
intervention. Societal-level characteristics, institutional environments, historically determined
political realities, and slow-moving structural changes are also crucially important to political
phenomenon, but are for the most part beyond the control of any single individual. Rather
than ignoring these important variables which are less amenable to causally-identified research
designs, we should instead adopt tools and approaches more akin to astronomy than medicine.
Studying the motion of heavenly bodies and the basic physical properties of the universe is
not something that can be done by intervention, since such an intervention is beyond human
capacity. Moreover, even if humanity were capable of staging random treatments, doing so
in many cases would defeat the purpose. As the goal of research in astronomy, cosmology,
and astrophysics is to understand the way that the universe exists as is, intervention would be
pointless. A counterfactual in the form of how the universe would exist if it were not our universe
is a pointless question, since that universe would not be the real universe in which we live.
In place of the RCT, the gold standard in astronomy is the perpetually developing rela-
tionship between theory and observation (Bradt 2004). Observations produce questions, and
theories are developed to answer those questions. New falsifiable implications of those theo-
ries are then generated, and new observations are made that either confirm the implications and
strengthen the theory, or reject them and require new theorizing. Progress is often made in as-
tronomy through the development of new technologies that increase the observational capacity
of researchers. The practice often requires careful consideration of the researcher’s own status
as observer, and integration of that observational position into the research design itself. One
of the most important discoveries of early modern astronomy—that the earth revolved around
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the sun—was only made possible when theoreticians specifically articulated how the limited
vantage point of the earth would influence the range of observations that were possible. The
geocentric theory of the universe would be extremely easily disproved if the solar system could
be observed from a great distance for a long period of time, but such observations are difficult
even today. There is no experimental methodology requiring a treatment and control group that
would facilitate this discussion. Instead, it was made possible through creative theorizing pro-
ducing create falsifiable hypotheses, integrated with awareness of the limits of observational
techniques.
This is not to say that even within the two paradigmatic disciplines the two approaches are
mutually exclusive. Astronomers conduct experiments which are useful in testing the micro-
level implications of theories explaining macro-level phenomenon. A recent example or this
would be the manipulation of particle motion to confirm of the existence of the Higgs boson as
a way to strengthen the more general theory of the Standard Model of Particle Physics (CERN
2014). Similarly, medical researchers rely on observational studies of macro-level phenomenon
to confirm theories of individual-level disease transmission, such as John Snow’s discovery that
cholera was transmitted by waterborne pathogens based on observations of neighborhood-level
spread (Freedman 2008).
Ethnic voting can be studied advantageously using either approach, since there are both
micro- and macro-level factors that are important to understanding the way ethnic identities
impact voting decisions. For researchers most interested in persuasion, turnout, or preference
formation, the medical paradigm is appropriate, and many scholars have fruitfully studied such
things using RCTs. In this dissertation, however, I ammost interested in how societal-level diver-
sity shapes system-level outcomes. While individual-level decision-making is the mechanism
that I argue links identity and electoral outcomes, in this study I am most interested in observ-
ing large-scale outcomes directly. As such, I adopt the perspective more akin to astronomy, and
design a research approach which acknowledges the potential weaknesses and limitations in
an observational approach, and compensates for those potential shortcomings by implementing
strategies which minimizes potential erroneous conclusions.
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3.2 Features of this Design
In order to ensure conceptual clarity and a clear match between concepts and measurement,
this dissertation follows Chandra (2012b, chap. 2) and employs minimalist definitions of the
subjects under study. In defining ethnicity as an identity based on attributes associated with
descent, and ethnic voting as voting for a party which claims to represent an ethnic group, the
definitions contain as few components as possible. These standards exclude extra characteris-
tics which other scholars have sometimes employed, such as attachment to a specific homeland,
common culture, or sense of shared fate. For this study, which rests on mechanisms linked to
individual’s assessments, these extra factors could introduce other possibly mechanisms, and
complicate hypothesis testing. Instead, these minimal definitions are derived from political ac-
tors’ descriptions of themselves and the world around them, producing a clearer match between
the hypothesized mechanism, the concepts, and the measurement. If an identity attribute is un-
derstood to be associated with descent, then I accept it as an ethnic identity. If a party claims
to represent a specific ethnic group, I code them as an ethnic party. By accepting the actors’
interpretations and claims of their own identity and political goals, I limit the need to impose
my own standards when conducting the analysis.
The empirical strategy to test the theory is fundamentally probabilistic. I argue that ethnic
voting is likely for some groups in some contexts, but not others. This is a ceteris paribus claim
that variation in demographic variables should be correlatedwith variation in ethnic voting hold-
ing all else equal. This is not to claim that ideology, culture, history, or individual preference do
not matter. These are obviously important for voting and election outcomes. In using statistical
methods which are non-deterministic, I differ from some other studies of political development
and ethnic mobilization which see group-level characteristics and social context as important.2
In these studies, the ethnic-group or party is the unit of analysis, and hypotheses are tested using
qualitative methods based on Boolean algebra. To produce statistically significant estimations
which also allow for deviation from general tendencies, I rely on large-푛 datasets, with units
of analysis much smaller than the group or party as a whole (King, Keohane & Verba 1994).
2See Gherghina & Jiglau (2011), Bochsler (2011), and Cebotari & Vink (2013), for deterministic approaches
to ethnic politics.
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina, I use the electoral precinct as the unit of analysis, resulting in a
data set of over 6,000 observations. In Latvia, I use the candidate-year as the unit of analysis,
which produces more than 8,000 observations. In both cases, data was collected and managed
using automated web scraping technology for analysis using linear and logistic regression. In
this analysis, many important factors are admittedly relegated to the error term, but the large
sample sizes used in this study facilitate the precise estimation of effects for hypothesis testing.
While the argument has important implications for cross-national comparisons, this study
focuses on within-country variation. In this way, the dissertation differs from many prominent
observational studies on ethnic voting and electoral institutions.3 Cross-country analyses are
important for studies which see institutions as important explanatory variables. Since electoral
institutions are country-level phenomenon, variation exists only at the country-level. However,
this dissertation argues that institutions and demographics affect ethnic groups in different ways
even within the same country. In order to test this argument, I rely on two separate case studies
to examine the implications of my theory of ethnic voting. The theory predicts that ethnic mi-
nority voters and ethnic majority voters will respond to ethnic appeals differently because of the
varying incentives each group has to demand ethnic representation. In the first set of chapters
focused on the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I demonstrate how these incentives influence
voters. Through a study of split-ticket voting in a single election, I show that voters are willing
to support ethnic and non-ethnic parties even on the same ballot in ways that comport with the
predictions of the theory. In the case of Latvia, I show that these effects are strong enough that
they shape the over-time trajectory of the development of the party system. The first study exam-
ines voter-level implications of the theory; the second looks at the elite-level implications. Both
compare the majority- and minority-group actors within a single country, rather than examine
cross-national variation in political outcomes. This within-country approach is helpful because
it holds many country-level factors constant. This historical relationship between groups, for
example, may vary greatly between countries, affecting the types of political demands voters
are likely to make of their political leaders.
The two cases mentioned above were chosen for important theoretical and practical rea-
3See Rae (1967), Ordeshook & Shvetsova (1994), Neto & Cox (1997), Sisk & Reynolds (1998), Montalvo &
Reynal-Querol (2005), Clark & Golder (2006), Huber (2012), and Li (2018).
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sons. First, they share some important similarities. They are both ethnically diverse democra-
cies. They are also both highly proportional, parliamentary electoral systems with high electoral
thresholds. Ethnicity is politicized in both countries, with ethnic identities highly salient in elec-
tions and in day-to-day life. Both countries also have extremely fluid party systems, and both
recently democratized after a period under a communist authoritarian regime which actively
suppressed ethnic political organization. Both countries had their first democratic elections in
the 1990’s as communism collapsed, and both had to create multi-party democracy mostly from
scratch. Both have seen a relatively high degree of electoral volatility in the post-communist pe-
riod, with new parties forming frequently. As a result, there are few constraints imposed by party
system “freezing.”4 Within this highly fluid and volatile party system, voters are given viable
options of both ethnic and non-ethnic parties. Reflecting both countries’ ethnic divisions and
their respective communist pasts, would-be leaders attempt to mobilize voters in both countries
on ethnic and non-ethnic platforms, giving voters a real choice between ethnic and non-ethnic
representation.
The biggest differences between the two cases are in institutional complexity and legacies of
violence. While both countries transitioned from communist authoritarian states to democratic
regimes in the 1990’s, Bosnia was unable to do so without first going through an extremely
violent civil war. This war not only took an enormous human toll with more than a hundred
thousand deaths and over two million displaced people, but destroyed much of the country’s
economic base and left a lasting distrust between ethnic groups. Latvia, on the other hand, saw
enormous tension between ethnic groups, as well as very serious concerns of institutional dis-
crimination and contentious debates over historical legacies of communism, but avoided large-
scale ethnic violence. As a result, Latvia’s economic and political development has greatly sur-
passed Bosnia’s. Latvia has joined the European Union and the Eurozone, whereas Bosnia’s
membership application has been stalled by political corruption and inefficiency. Latvia is
ranked as “Free” by Freedom House, while Bosnia remains “Partly Free,” and Latvia’s GDP
per capita is more than twice Bosnia’s.
More importantly, the nature of their relative transitions created enormous differences in the
4See Lipset & Rokkan (1967) and Mair (1998).
68
two countries’ institutional environments. In the wake of the Bosnian civil war, international
mediation and peace talks guided the writing of a new constitution that would govern post-war
Bosnia. This constitution may very well be “the world’s most complicated system of govern-
ment (Nardelli, Dzidic & Jukic 2014).” It is decentralized into an asymmetrical arrangement
of ethno-federal entities, with territorial delineation and electoral quotas at various levels of
government designed to create ethnically-homogeneous self-ruling units. Bosnia’s institutional
complexity is a result of international negotiators trying to build consensus among three sepa-
rate wartime factions. Latvia’s constitution, on the other hand is a straightforward example of
an extremely proportional and centralized parliamentary system. Whereas Bosnia’s constitution
was engineered, Latvia’s was resurrected. When Latvia voted declared independence from the
Soviet Union, they also voted that the communist government had been an illegally imposed
occupation of Russia over Latvian territory. They therefore returned to the constitution that had
been in effect in 1940 when the USSR took control of the country.
Bosnia’s constitution provides an opportunity to hold political issues, group identities, and
political parties constant while providing variation in the institutional and demographic vari-
ables crucial to the workings of the theory. This unique institutional environment facilitates a
study which has important implications for how ethnicity influences voting behavior in other
countries of the world. By looking at how voters split their tickets between ethnic and non-
ethnic parties in a single election, we can directly observe how voters in an ethnically divided
society respond to changes in social context. Likewise, Latvia’s historical circumstances pro-
vide plausible exogeneity in institutional environment. As discussed above, the potential for
reverse causality is high in studies which argue that institutions have explanatory power over
political behavior. Yet Latvia’s leaders chose to impose a constitution that was written before
waves of migration made Latvia the ethnically diverse country it is today. The research design
in the analyses that follow do not attempt to compensate for these idiosyncratic institutions, but
instead employ them in ways designed to derive more generalizable conclusions.
On a personal note, the choice of these two countries also maximize my own strengths and
capabilities as a researcher. Over the course of my research and education, I have spent sub-
stantial periods of time in post-communist Europe—not only Bosnia and Latvia, but also North
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Macedonia, Bulgaria, Russia, and Hungary. I am fluent in Russian, which has enabled me to
develop a working competency in reading several other Slavic languages, including Bosnian,
Serbian, Croatian, Macedonian, and Bulgarian. Over the course of this project, I also devel-
oped a basic level of reading competence in Latvian, a non-Slavic Baltic language separate and
distinct from the others. I have conducted dozens of formal, structured interviews with political
elites in these two countries, ranging frommayoral and city council candidates in smaller towns,
to political party strategists, to state bureaucrats, to the chief executive’s office. I have also ben-
efited from friendship, collaboration, and hundreds of informal conversations with everyday
citizens, students, and local scholars from the region. While the countries and ethnic commu-
nities remain distinct from each other, there is a degree of commonality throughout the region,
stemming from shared post-communist heritage, regional historical experience, and common
culture. This unique experience has enabled me to gain some cultural fluency with the politics
and political discourse of the region, while also maintaining objectivity and distance.
3.2.1 Data Sources
This dissertation is a mixed-methods project, incorporating qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches into a single study. I rely on two distinct data sources. One is quantitative voting
data obtained directly from the state election administrative agencies in the two countries under
study. These data were acquired using automated web-scraping technology, in order to obtain
results at a level of analysis (precinct-level in the case of Bosnia, and candidate-level in the
case of Latvia) which makes large-푛 studies possible. These figures are official election returns,
and constitute the raw data used to analyze trends, patterns, and systematic variation in voting
behavior.
The second data source are the appeals that candidates make to voters, which is used to
classify parties and candidates as ethnic or non-ethnic in nature. My measures of party eth-
nic identification rely on my own readings of materials made available to voters by the parties
themselves. Unlike voting data, this is somewhat more subjective. In coding parties and the
appeals that they make to voters, I rely on the criteria derived from the definition of an ethnic
party outlined in Chapter 2. The standard employed is whether or not a reasonably intelligent
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voter could infer from the information that the party has made available that this party purports
to represent a specific ethnic group. If that answer is yes, then I code the party as ethnic, and
identify which group the party claims to represent.
This approach may be somewhat controversial. The most serious concern is that a research
design that relies on a researcher’s interpretations of the likely impact a claim will have on
its audience may suffer from concerns over measurement validity and reliability. Equally well-
informed and competent researchers could reasonably disagree over how a party should be coded
when presented with the same data. Moreover, there are a variety of different ways that parties
could communicate their positions to voters. As I show in Chapter 4 and 6, political actors in
the two countries under study often communicate their ethnic affiliation using not only overt
ethnocentric rhetoric, but historical allusions and visual cues, which may not always be obvious
to outside observers.
Despite these concerns, I argue that such an approach is ideal in this case. First of all, the
theory outlined in Chapter 2 is premised on the idea that both political elites and voters have
some degree of agency in their instrumental uses of ethnicity. While they cannot define their own
ethnicity or readily change it (since ethnic identities are those associated with decent), they can
decide whether to accentuate those identities or downplay them; to organize along ethnic lines
or some other social cleavage; or to ignore their own identities completely. The ways in which
actors use those identities will be inevitably linked to the nature of those identities themselves
as well as the other identities present in society. As much as possible, the measurement used
to classify appeals as ethnic should be guided by the political actors themselves, and how those
actors see the world around them. While it may be difficult to measure directly what a party
intends to convey to voters, or how citizens understand the information given to them, it is
important for the research design to take into this account, rather than imposing overly strict
standards divorced from the lived experience of the actors themselves.
Moreover, this approach which applies interpretative methods to the words and actions of
political entrepreneurs to produce qualitative measures of ethnic mobilization is simply bet-
ter suited to this research project than the other alternatives. One of these possible alternative
measurement strategies would be to rely on expert surveys for codings of which parties are eth-
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nic or not. Expert surveys on political party positioning and messaging have been enormously
valuable in producing important findings on political responsiveness, coalition formation, and
electoral outcomes. Expert survey data also is available for many countries in the region already
through extremely valuable resources such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker, De Vries,
Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Marks, Polk, Rovny, Steenbergen & Vachudova 2015, Polk, Rovny,
Bakker, Edwards, Hooghe, Jolly, Koedam, Kostelka, Marks, Schumacher et al. 2017), and the
Ethnonationalism in Party Competition dataset (Szöcsik & Zuber 2015). As Benoit & Laver
(2006, p. 3) argue, “The great virtue of an expert survey is that it sets out to summarize the
judgments of the consensus of experts on the matters at issue, and moreover to do so in a sys-
tematic way.” This is indeed an advantage of expert surveys, but it is a liability for this project.
In the two countries under study, extremely volatile party systems make establishing consensus
difficult. Parties which contest elections but then lose, or new parties which do not have long
established reputations may be difficult for experts to place exactly on the political spectrum. In
the 2007 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, experts were asked to evaluate the positions of nine polit-
ical parties, despite the fact that the ballot officially contained nineteen political parties. While
it is true that twelve of those nineteen political parties failed to win any seats in parliament that
year, those twelve parties together took nearly 11% of the total vote in that election. Three of the
parties which did win seats in that election did so with less than 10% of the vote, suggesting that
those “wasted” votes taken together represent a politically substantial chunk of the electorate.
The theory outlined in Chapter 2 also makes predictions about the types of parties that are likely
to lose elections. Excluding parties on the grounds of irrelevance discards data which could be
used to falsify the theory. I argue that parties that make ethnic appeals to groups that have little
to gain by ethnic representation or are likely to win elections are the least likely to attract large
levels of voter support. Excluding from the data set those parties which fail to attract voter sup-
port (and are therefore unlikely to leave a lasting impression in the minds of experts) therefore
makes it impossible to empirically observe an important component of the theory. There is an
additional complication in these consensus-driven expert surveys for studying small countries
like Latvia and Bosnia: a dearth of experts. Hooghe, Bakker, Brigevich, De Vries, Edwards,
Marks, Rovny, Steenbergen & Vachudova (2010) report that in the 2002 and 2006 Chapel Hill
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Expert Survey, Latvia only barely met the standard of having at least four survey experts for
inclusion in the final data set.5 Such issues are disproportionately likely to affect smaller, less
frequently studied countries like those in this dissertation.
A second existing data set that could be used is the Manifesto Project Dataset from the Man-
ifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR)(Volkens, Lehmann, Matthieß, Merz,
Regel &Weßels 2017). MARPOR’s data has been enormously useful to scholars tracking party
positioning and issue salience over time. MARPOR scholars apply a line-by-line coding stan-
dard to the manifestos, party platforms, and pre-campaign policy positions released by political
parties themselves to measure systematically which issues parties discuss, and which policy
positions they adopt. MARPOR data is especially well-suited to comparative cross-national
studies, focused on variation over time and between countries. The standardized coding scheme
facilitates the comparison of party competition along a variety of axes, separating positions on
foreign policy, redistribution, social values, political institutions, and other ideological positions
into separate categories. However, there are two reasons not to rely on the MARPOR data for
this specific project. The first is coverage. Echoing concerns with expert surveys listed above,
MARPOR data does not cover the whole range of options available to voters in the countries
under study. In Latvia, the MARPOR data is again limited to those parties which win political
office, excluding the not insubstantial number of votes that went to those parties that failed to
clear the hurdles to political representation. In Bosnia, the MARPOR data is limited to 25 par-
ties who ran between 2006-2014. As this project requires data on those parties which may be
politically relevant only at the local level but not the state level, or even those that are not rele-
vant at any level, codings are needed for more than 100 parties in Bosnia’s extremely fragmented
political system.
Secondly, the focus on cross-national comparison of the MARPOR data represents more of
a liability than an asset for within-country analysis. The MARPOR data is specifically designed
to focus on commonalities across countries to facilitate comparative studies. For example, in
Germany, France, and Britain, nationalist parties that insist on a return to traditional values and
make appeals to voters on the basis of patriotism and nationalism could be coded as “Tradi-
5Neighboring Estonia did not meet this qualification in 2002, and won the dubious distinction of being the only
country dropped from the data set for lack of experts.
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tional Morality: Positive”, and “National Way of Life: Positive”. A party in one of those same
countries that argues for a multicultural citizenship, civic nationalism, and representation for
ethnic minority groups could be coded as “Multiculturalism General: Positive” and “Under-
privileged Minority Groups”. This assumes that support for a national way of life is essentially
the same in Germany as it is in France, which for comparative cross-national studies is sen-
sible. Measuring the level of support for French nationalism in Germany is largely pointless,
while comparing German nationalism in Germany to French nationalism in France can produce
important insights.
That is not the case in this study. In the theory outlined earlier, ethnic appeals are important
for two reasons: first, they establish that the political party or candidate will disproportionately
redistribute benefits on the basis of ethnicity as opposed to some other social cleavage—i.e.,
ethnicity over class, region, ideology, etc. Secondly, they identify which group will benefit,
and which will not. Classifying parties as nationalist or multicultural captures variation on
the first dimension, but not the other. This is important in a country divided between multiple
ethnic groups. In the context of the former Yugoslavia, for example, Croat national parties, Serb
national Parties, and Bosniak national parties can all be understood to share some commonality
in the nature of their ethnic and nationalist appeals to voters. But it is not just the nationalist
appeal that matters: it matters which group that appeal is being made to. This variation is not
only important because inter-group conflict may be the defining feature of political contestation,
but also because this variation is essential to confirming or rejecting the theory.
As an example, consider the National Alliance in Latvia, which is regarded by many
journalistic and academic sources as one of Europe’s far-right populist parties. It is a vo-
cal anti-immigrant, anti-Islam, anti-LGBT, ethnic nationalist party (Mudde 2014, Martyn-
Hemphill 2016b, Zakharov & Law 2017). The MARPOR coding, though, includes several
determinations of “Multiculturalism: Positive,” the same code assigned to Harmony, a party
which dominates Latvia’s ethnic minority interests. The source of the confusion is that the
National Alliance technically makes ethnic appeals to other ethnic groups in its pre-election
program. Specifically, they promise that “[w]e will strengthen the role of the Latvian language,
especially in the media and in commerce. We will ensure the preservation of the Livonian lan-
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guage, the Latgalian culture, and the various dialects of Latvian.” As I discuss in the historical
review in Chapter 6, this is actually an exclusionary appeal based on familiar interpretations of
Latvian history. Livonian is, practically speaking, a dead language, its last native speaker hav-
ing died in 2013 at the age of 103 (Charter 2013). Livonians are an indigenous people native to
the northwest coast of modern Latvian territory, and thus the preservation of the Livonian lan-
guage is a largely academic and cultural exercise in preserving Latvia’s ancient and pre-Soviet
history. Likewise, Latgalian is considered by many scholars to be a historical antecedent of
the modern standardized Latvian dialect. It is mutually intelligible with Latvian, and spoken
sometimes in the Latgale region—a region with a very high concentration of ethnic Russians.
While the support for the Livonian and Latgalian languages may technically be an appeal to a
form of multiculturalism, it almost certainly would not be perceived as a tolerant and welcoming
stance to the ethnic Russians who are unlikely to speak either of those languages, and who form
the majority in many areas of Latgale. Likewise, when For Human Rights in a United Latvia,
a Russian interest party, proposes that more university instruction be conducted in Russian in
order to facilitate Russian employment opportunities, such an appeal is also technically a form
of “multiculturalism.” Yet it is likely to be perceived as a direct challenge to ethnic Latvian
nationalists, who view Latvian as an endangered language that must be preserved by state au-
thority. ForHRUL’s advocacy of the Russian language (not a general form of multilingualism,
but specifically Russian-speaking universities) is clearly a targeted message that Russians will
benefit from their policies if they are elected. Likewise, the National Alliance’s appeal to Lat-
vians, Livonians, and Latgallians—in other words, everyone but Russians—is an ethnic appeal
to non-Russian groups. The definitions used in this dissertation and the theoretical predictions
being tested require a data set that measures this variation with specific attention to local context.
I therefore follow Protsyk & Garaz’s (2013) appeal to employ novel codings by specialists
with regional knowledge, and to treat ethnicity as a separate axis of political competition. This
approach builds on the general approach of the MARPOR dataset—i.e., that manifestos and
campaign materials released by parties can be used to measure party positions—but generates
codings with standards reflective of the specific goals of this research project (Budge 2003). I
employ a data set broader than the MARPOR data, examining all political parties registered
75
on the ballot in the countries understudy rather than only those that win office, and specifically
employ the definitions of ethnicity, ethnic party, and ethnic voting outlined earlier (Zulianello
2014).
3.2.2 Mixed Methods
This is a mixed methods project, combining qualitative ethnographic and interpretive methods
with quantitative analysis. However, this is not a mixed-methods project in the sense of using
multiple methods to confirm a single hypothesis (Collier & Elman 2008). In these traditionally-
understood methods of “triangulation” (Denzin 2009), quantitative methods such as surveys or
analyses of voting data are used to confirm or reject hypotheses, and then qualitative methods
such as interviews or text analyses are used to document individual-level phenomena which
further confirm and illustrate the broader findings. An example of this would be to use survey
data to document which types of people support which types of parties, and then to interview
individual voters to confirm that they themselves understand their voting behavior in ways con-
sistent with the mechanisms outlined in the theory. For this particular study, this approach could
take the form of using survey data to confirm that ethnic minorities are less likely to support
ethnic parties when they are less likely to win elections, and then confirming through interviews
that voters based their voting decisions in ways predicted by the theory. In this sense, seeing
qualitative evidence that voters considered both the benefits of ethnic representation and the
likelihood of actually achieving it in their voting decisions would serve as a “hoop test” that
increased confidence in the theorized mechanism driving behavior confirmed by the statistical
analyses. If, however, voters provided some other rationale for their voting behavior, then we
might infer that the theorized mechanism is incorrect, and that omitted variable bias is driving
the results of the quantitative study (Mahoney 2012). This approach would also be consistent
with a mixed-methods Bayesian approach which sees quantitative and qualitative analyses as in-
dependent observations which can help alter expectations on the relationship between variables
of interest (Humphreys & Jacobs 2015).
Instead, my approach seeks to integrate interpretivist methods into the quantitative analysis.
Drawing on the insight of Wedeen (2002), this dissertation agrees that “[i]deas, beliefs, val-
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ues, ‘preferences,’ and decisions are always embedded in a social world, which is constituted
through humans’ linguistic, institutional, and practical relations with others (Wedeen 2010).”
In other words, to understand when voters choose to support ethnic parties, it is important
to understand how the voters themselves understand that choice, and how the entire range of
choices between parties and candidates is presented to them. This is important not only for
constructing a narrative explaining the general patterns observed (Bates, Greif, Levi, Rosen-
thal & Weingast 1998, Laitin 2006), but should also guide the quantitative analysis as well.
The goal of the analyses in the chapters that follow is to produce a quantitative analysis of vote
choice that is informed by the interpretations of the choices available to voters. In this sense, the
classification of parties used in the analysis is guided by a fundamentally different motivation
from comparative studies like the MARPOR. Rather than consolidating data based on univer-
sal coding standards that allows for cross-national comparison, this data used here is unique to
each individual country under study, employing standards that incorporate the country’s unique
historical, social, and political context. This is not to limit the conclusions of the study only
to the countries in question. Instead, it takes seriously particularities of local context to make
general conclusions. Ethnicity and ethnic voting as defined in chapter 2 are phenomena which
exist throughout the world. This research design employs a measurement strategy which seeks
to fully appreciate local nuance in order to understand universal phenomena.
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4Ethnic Politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In chapter 2, I outlined a theory of how group status could be an important determinant of voting
behavior in ethnically divided societies. In this and the next chapter, I focus on the observable
implications of the theory in a specific case: Bosnia and Herzegovina.1 Bosnia is an impor-
tant case for a its unique historical, demographic, political, and institutional circumstances. In
many ways it is an extreme case of ethnic division. It has a recent history of ethnic violence,
having fought a brutal ethnic civil war characterized by genocide and ethnic cleansing. The
lasting wounds of this conflict are still evident today, with distrust of ethnic outsiders and ethnic
polarization pervasive throughout much of Bosnian society. Today, ethnic conflict has made
Bosnia a poster child for paralysis and political dysfunction brought on by polarization (Bahtić-
Kunrath 2011, Less 2016), preventing even the most basic state services from being provided to
citizens (Bilefsky 2013, Deets &McClelland 2018) and stifling Bosnian economic development
(Goldstein & Davies 2015). Bosnia in many ways represents a “worst-case scenario,” highlight-
ing the most serious difficulties of democratic governance in an ethnically divided society.
Even in this extreme environment, Bosnia shows enormous variation in the way political
actors employ ethnic labels in mobilizing voters to win elections. Throughout history, ethnicity
in Bosnia has taken on varying levels of salience, ranging from virtual irrelevance to crucial
importance. Having been ruled by communists for the latter half of the twentieth century, most
Bosnian citizens living today grew up under a system that ostensibly claimed that ethnic di-
visions were bourgeois illusions employed by aristocrats to divide and oppress the people of
1Hereafter referred to as “Bosnia.”
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Yugoslavia. Those same citizens lived through the breakdown of Yugoslav communism and
a devastating civil war where large numbers of people died as a consequence of ethnic iden-
tities they were born into and powerless to change. These citizens have seen political leaders
take a variety of public positions on the role of ethnicity in public life: from ethnicity as the
most fundamental social distinction guiding all political activity, to ethnicity as distraction and
impediment to a just society.
For this reason, Bosnia is an important research opportunity to study ethnic voting. Eth-
nic divisions are pronounced and highly relevant to day-to-day life. Yet ethnic voting is hardly
hegemonic, and ethnic parties routinely compete with parties that reject ethnic affiliation as a
way of building linkages with voters. In this chapter, I outline the various ways ethnicity has
been politicized in Bosnia. I first explore the historical background of Bosnia, describing the
nature of the ethnic divisions within the country and how they have evolved. I then describe
the relationship between ethnic diversity in Bosnia and its political institutions, outlining how
Bosnian democracy emerged largely in response to ethnic conflict. I then provide an overview
of how contemporary Bosnian political actors—principally the leadership of political parties—
utilize and invest in their own ethnic identities to win elections in this particular social and insti-
tutional environment. Finally, I argue that the relationship between Bosnian political parties and
ethnic identities should be understood using a three-part classification system. This primarily
qualitative and ethnographic chapter seeks to describe the important distinctions between the
various strategies used by political elites to mobilize voters and win elections. These descrip-
tive classifications provide the basis of the data set used in the quantitative analysis in the next
chapter.
4.1 Historical Background
Bosnia today is a country divided between three main ethnic groups: Serbs, Croats, and Bosni-
aks. Official estimates put Bosniaks at a bare majority of the country: 50.11% of the population
by the official 2013 census.2 Serbs are the second largest group, at 30.78%, and Croats are the
2The 2013 census in Bosnia—the first since the end of the civil war which undoubtedly caused massive de-
mographic shifts—was highly politicized, and its results remain hotly contested. See Perry (2013), Armakolas &
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smallest at 14.6%. Popular conceptions and stereotypes hold that these three groups have long
been in conflict against each other. This interpretation—not uncommon even among Bosni-
ans today—grossly oversimplifies the nature of the differences between the groups, relies on
erroneous essentialist assumptions, and ignores enormous variation in the nature of the three
identities over time. While the distinction between the three ethnicities does have its origins
in religious and cultural differences between people of the Balkan Peninsula dating back hun-
dreds of years, these identities have changed dramatically throughout history, usually the result
of political entrepreneurs responding to strategic incentives generated by political and social
circumstances. In fact, the three groups share a common ethnic ancestor, speak a common
language, and have been incorporated into political communities that transcend ethnic barriers
numerous times throughout history.
All three groups are Slavic, a subset of the same larger ethno-linguistic family that includes
Russians, Poles, Czechs, and others. Bosnia’s primary ethnic groups are known as South Slavs,
having a common ancestor in the Slavic peoples who moved into the Balkan Peninsula during
the sixth and seventh centuries C.E. (Dvornik 1962). This common root is still evident in the
languages spoken by Balkan Slavic populations. Croatian, Bosnian, Serbian, and Montenegrin
have been determined by many linguists to be dialects of the same language, even if politi-
cally many politicians and citizens throughout the region maintain they are linguistically dis-
tinct (Milekic 2017). This mutual intelligibility extends to other south Slavic dialects, including
Slovenian, Bulgarian, and Macedonian, all of which share the same common linguistic ances-
tor. The languages are not intelligible with Albanian, Greek, Romanian, or Turkish—languages
which emerge from distinct non-Slavic communities who arrived in the Balkans at different his-
torical periods. Croatian and Bosnian are written in the Latin alphabet while Serbian is written
in the Cyrillic, but all three are mutually intelligible when spoken.3
Maksimovic (2014), Bieber (2013), Pasic (2013) and Toe (2016).
3Despite the mutual intelligibility of the languages, language is often used as a proxy for ethnicity and culture,
and linguistic differences are politically significant. As an example of both themutual intelligibility of the languages
and the political importance of the minute differences between them, consider the packages of cigarettes sold in
shops in Sarajevo. Labeling laws required that health warnings be printed on every pack of cigarettes, and one
of the most common warnings is “Smoking Kills.” The phrase is literally exactly the same in Bosnian, Croatian,
and Serbian, but in order to avoid the appearance of ethnic favoritism, the phrase is printed three times on each
box. Such redundancy is extremely common in product packaging and public signage in Bosnia today. See Is
Serbo-Croatian a language? (2017).
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Velikonja (2003) notes that the earliest recorded forms of differentiation within South Slav
peoples are on accounts sorted by religious and geographic categories. In the early middle
ages “Bosnia” was a territorial designation, defining a mountainous region between Rome and
Constantinople. These two imperial capitals led the conversion efforts of the Bosnian Slavs,
proselytizing their respective forms of Christianity: Catholicism from the Romans to the west,
and Orthodoxy from the Byzantines to the east. The religious divide is still visible in the Balkans
today: Croats, Slovenes and Czechs are historically Catholic; Serbs, Macedonians, and Bulgar-
ians are historically Orthodox. The medieval division of the Balkan Slavic populations into
groups based on their affinity to either Eastern or Western Rome also explains why contem-
porary Serbian and Croatian—though mutually intelligible languages—are written in different
alphabets. Having famously translated the Bible and the liturgy into the Slavonic language using
what would become the Cyrillic alphabet for missionary work among the South Slavs, Byzan-
tine missionaries Saints Cyril and Methodius were forced to flee the Slavic lands by German
clergy committed to the “trilingual theory” that only Greek, Latin, and Hebrew languages were
appropriate for religious rites (Velikonja 2003, p.23). While western religious leaders insisted
on Latin as the language (and alphabet) of the church, eastern Orthodox leaders had no such
qualms, and Cyrillic came to dominate the areas in the Eastern half of the Balkans. Mylonas ar-
gues that this historical division is crucial to understanding how the South Slavic people came to
see themselves as different despite a common ethnic ancestor and shared language: the identities
are intersectional defined by a combination of writing system, religion, and territorial location
(Mylonas 2003, Chapter 1).
Bosniak identity emerges much later in history, again as a result of Bosnia’s relationship
to larger imperial powers. By 1463, ten years after his conquest of Constantinople and the
destruction of Byzantium, Mehmet the Conqueror had subdued the region and founded Sarajevo
as an Ottoman provincial capital. Bosnia was then placed under the Ottoman Millet system, a
pluralistic legalism that guaranteed political autonomy and protection for some communities
based on their religion. This policy made the religious distinction that had long been present
in the Balkans a legal one, institutionalized by Ottoman administration (Bringa 1993). While
legally protecting Christianity, Ottoman administration also encouraged conversion to Islam.
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Administrators often showed favoritism towards other adherents of their faith, and conversion to
Islam could help obtain advantageous treatment. Ottoman military conscription also facilitated
the conversion of many Slavs to Islam, both by taking young children from their parents and
raising them asMuslims, and by allowing provincial families to exempt themselves from service
by adopting a new faith. Velikonja (2003, Chapter 4) argues that for most Slavic Christians,
conversion to Islam should be understood as a matter of convenience and expediency.
The distinction between the three ethnic groups therefore have their most relevant origins
in religious distinctions of the middle ages and early modern era. But it is important not to
underestimate the degree of social commonality between the groups. The three groups share
a common Slavic ancestry, and mostly speak the same language. Given the remoteness of the
region, the relative lack of clerical religious administration, and the relatively frequency of con-
tact between the three groups, many historians have argued that religious beliefs and practices
were often highly fluid and changeable for most of Ottoman Bosnian history. People in this
period routinely absorbed traditions from all three religions into their daily lives, possibly igno-
rant of the theological origins of the ceremonies they practiced or the holidays they celebrated
(Donia 2000).4 The identity divides in pre-modern Bosnia were in many ways cross-cutting:
as the most prominent example, Bosnian Muslims had the same religion as the Ottoman Turks,
but linguistically, ethnically, and culturally were closer to Croat Catholics and Serb Orthodox
Christians.
The identification along religious lines persisted through Bosnia’s incorporation into
Austria-Hungary, into the era of the monarchical Yugoslav kingdom, and through World War I.
Mirroring the way Ottoman policy had institutionalized religious distinctions, Yugoslav com-
munists also enshrined ethnic and religious divisions in its policies of state administration. Yu-
goslavia in the immediate post-war period was dominated by the mainly Serb Partisan faction
4Niškanović (1978) documents a clear example of how traditions of religious coexistence had persisted into
modern times. In his fieldwork accounts, he narrates participating in a religious celebration on August 2, when all
three main Bosnian religions religion celebrate the feast of the Prophet Elijah. Despite the different significance
the three faiths place on the prophet, the religious celebrations often start out separately, but come together over
the course of the day as the respective parties become larger and less orderly. Even today there is a Bosnian saying,
“Ilija in the morning, and Alija in the afternoon” (“Do podne Ilija, popodne Alija”), referring to how the saint
would be called by his Christian name before noon, but by his Muslim name later in the day, presumably as a result
of festivities celebrating the same prophet but pronouncing his name differently converging in public places. See
HadžiMuhamedović (2018), and Aura (2018).
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who had prevailed in World War II over Croat and Muslim factions allied with the Third Reich.
These Partisans maintained ties to the Soviet Union and Russian communists, and were highly
influenced by Stalin’s approach to “The National Question,” which allowed for ethnic and na-
tional identities to serve as the basis of allocation and administration under a multi-national but
still Marxist communist empire. Building on this model, the Partisan leadership in Belgrade
designed a communist Yugoslavia as a union of separately administered homelands of various
national groups composing a single state under a single communist party. The criterion for status
as a constituent republic was therefore the presence of a national group. Slovenia, Croatia, and
Serbia were obvious choices, with strong senses of ethnic and national identity, but the Yugoslav
communists went even further than that to take what some saw as the surprising choice to ac-
knowledge Montenegro and Macedonia (Carmichael 2015). Bosnian identities, however, were
more problematic. Many Marxists saw Bosnia’s only unique identity community as primarily
religious in nature—the result of ignorant Serb or Croat peasants long ago duped into adopting
a foreign religious belief. Slavic Muslims were therefore initially seen as the remnant of capi-
talist Ottoman imperialism—anathema to communist ideology—and rather than establishing a
homeland for SlavicMuslims, Yugoslav communists sought to suppress public forms ofMuslim
political identity by banning both Muslim youth organizations, and traditional Muslim clothing
and headscarves. Borders were drawn to divide Muslim populations between the Montenegrin
and Serbian republics, creating a “Bosnian” republic understood to be purely administrative, not
national or ethnic in character. From the very beginning this approach seemed to ignore what
was obvious among Bosnian residents of all ethnic groups—that a Muslim ethnic identity was
present and strong within Yugoslavia. By 1961, the Yugoslav communist party conceded this
point, and adopted a policy of treating Muslims as a distinct ethnic identity, allowing for the cat-
egory “Muslim in the ethnic sense”5 to be added to legal documents (Carmichael 2015, p. 106).
This was upgraded to a national identity, equivalent to Croats and Serbs in 1971 and conferring
further legal rights, to “Muslim in the sense of a nationality”6 (Allcock 2000, p. 335). This
both acknowledged the presence and strength of an identity culturally and ethnically distinct
within Yugoslav society, but also helped to reconcile the apparent contradiction that many of
5“Muslimani u etnickom smislu”
6“Musilmani u smislu narodnosti.”
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those referred to as “Muslims” were atheist.
Despite the official acknowledgment of ethnic divisions in state administration, the prevail-
ing idea of Titoist communismwas “bratstvo i edinstvo” (“brotherhood and unity”). Government
activities were purposefully designed with a goal of uniting various Yugoslav citizens under a
multiethnic ideological platform. This policy of bratstvo i edinstvo was pursued more fervently
in Bosnia than any other Yugoslav republic, most likely as the result of both the frequent interac-
tion of members of the three ethnic groups, and the pressing state need in suppressing possibly
ethnically-motivated grievances. Communists made special efforts to integrate Bosnian insti-
tutions of public and social life, including schools, factories, and military units. This attempt
at multiethnic socialization and mobilization was largely successful, and by the late Yugoslav
period Bosnians of all ethnic groups showed extremely high levels of social tolerance and mul-
ticulturalism. Hodson, Sekulic &Massey (1994) found in a study conducted before the collapse
of Yugoslavia that Bosnia and Vojvodina were both the most ethnically diverse regions of the
Balkans, as well as where survey respondents expressed the greatest tolerance towards ethnic
and national outsiders. This was not only empty talk, as Bosnia also had an extremely high rate
of ethnic exogamy. Thompson (1992) claims that 27% of all marriages in Bosnia were ethnically
or religiously mixed.7 The long-term results of these multiethnic unions and the socialist ethnic
unification policies can be seen in census data. In the 1981 census, 7.9% of Bosnians listed
their ethnicity as “Yugoslav,” a civic nationalist identity tied to the state, not the traditional
ethnic identities of constitutive republics (Savezni zavod za statistiku 1981).
The current use of the term “Bosniak” came about during the early 1990’s, when communist
rule began to collapse and previous taboos on ethnic rhetoric crumbled. As Serb and Croat na-
tionalism becamemore prominent among political authorities in Belgrade, concerns that the use
of the term “Muslim” to deny Bosnian ethnic and national identity became a more pressing issue
7Some scholars have critiqued this finding by suggesting that mixed marriages were actually least common
in the most urban and ethnically diverse areas of Bosnia. They interpret this as suggesting that where Bosnian
citizens had the options of marrying within their own ethnic community because each group was large enough to
be independent, they usually would. The prevalence of mixed marriages, they argue, is driven by high rates of
migration caused by economic development. In other words, Croats may be relocated to predominantly Serb areas,
and when that happened, they would marry a Serb because that was the only choice available. As this happened
frequently, these scholars argue that it is the migration patterns that drive the exogamy, not the underlying attitudes
(Botev 1994, Bringa 1991, Knežević 2001). While the critique may suggest that ethnicity was not irrelevant to
Bosnian marriage decisions in the 1980’s, it also suggests that for large parts of the country, individual preferences
for endogamy were not so strong as to disqualify a potential spouse.
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within the Muslim community. The term “Bosniak” was not, strictly speaking, new. It had been
used during both the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian periods, but had largely been a regional
term, describing Slavic people of all faiths who lived in the area understood to be Bosnia. Set
against a rising tide of inter-ethnic hostilities, the 1993 Congress of Muslim Intellectuals voted
to adopt the term “Bosniak” as the official name of their community (Hromadžić 2013). One of
the main reasons the term had been chosen was that it completely inverted the presumed rela-
tionship between descent and religion that had existed before. The term “Muslim” implied that
the members of the community had started out as either Croats or Serbs and then differentiated
themselves by converting to Islam, feeding into the claim advanced by Serb nationalists that the
Bosniaks were Serbs who should be a part of a greater independent Serbia to justify territorial
conquest. The use of what had been a regionally-understood term suggested that the defining
characteristic of Bosniak identity was the region they came from, and implied that “Catholic,”
“Croat,” “Serb,” or “Orthodox” were deviations from Bosniak, since all three came from the
same region and the same common ethno-linguistic ancestor.8
In short, ethnic identities in Bosnia are much more fluid over time than is commonly per-
ceived. Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks were a single ethnic group at their time of their initial mi-
gration into the Balkan Peninsula. Despite the divergences in identity generated by religious and
political differences over hundreds of years, the three still speak the same language, albeit with
different alphabets and accents. Nevertheless, based on the definitions outlined in Chapter 2,
“Serb,” “Croat,” and “Bosniak” are clearly ethnic identities. While they may have initially been
tied closely to religion, in their current sense they speak to descent-based attributes, classifying
people based on which community they were born into. The nature and degree of politicization
of these ethnic identities show enormous variation, even within living memory. For most of
the 20th century everyday Bosnians lived and worked alongside those outside their own ethnic
communities, and political authority was described in ideological terms, not ethnic. A large
number of Bosnians saw themselves primarily in non-ethnic terms, identifying more with the
8The use of a regional term was especially appealing to secular and agnostic Muslim intellectuals, who sought
to emphasize their own ethnic and national distinctiveness as one equal to the other peoples of Yugoslavia, without
relying on a religious identity. Nevertheless, the use of a historical and regional term unique to Bosnia created a
certain tension forMuslim populations in the Sandžak region ofMontenegro and Serbia, where many had historical
links to Islam, but were not regionally part of Bosnia. See Dimitrovova (2001).
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civic identity “Yugoslavs” than with a specific ethnic group. The largest ethnic group in the
country was not even called by the same name less than thirty years ago and thirty years before
that was not acknowledge by political authorities to exist. Clearly, human agency can have an
impact on the political and social uses of ethnic identities in the Bosnian context. The choice
between ethnic and non-ethnic is not abstract in Bosnian history: both choices have been made
within most Bosnians’ lifetimes.
4.2 TheWartime Origins of Bosnian Democratic Institutions
As Yugoslavia crumbled in the early 1990’s, three main ethnic parties came to power in
Bosnia—the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the
Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA). Once in power, these leaders began to dismantle
the formal and informal institutions which had previously governed both Bosnia and Yugoslavia
as a whole. Under these parties’ ethnic leadership, the stalemate and stagnation of the 1980’s
gave way to hostility and violence, culminating in the Bosnian civil of 1992-1995. The political
institutions which govern the country today were negotiated as part of the peace deal to end
that war, and as such the negotiation process is a crucial starting point to understand Bosnian
democratic politics today. Bosnia’s current constitution is an appendix to the treaty that ended
the war, and should be seen largely as a concession to practical political expediency. The institu-
tions which govern Bosnia today were not necessarily designed to provide for the most equitable
division of power between the group or to facilitate economic and political development, but
rather to put an immediate end to a disastrously destructive conflict.9
The interests and relative bargaining positions of the threemain combatant groups during the
war are still evident in the Bosnian constitution today. Bosnia is legally defined as a state com-
posed of three constituent peoples who are identified by name (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks),
and the ethnic interests of these three groups are protected by three types of institutional safe-
guards. The first is territorial separation. Reconciling competing wartime demands for greater
ethnic autonomy and the continuation of the Bosnian state as a political entity, the constitution
9For a more thorough discussion of the civil war, see Burg & Shoup (1999), Misha (1996), O’Ballance (2016),
and Shrader (2003).
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outlines a federal system divided into multiple layers of government. Almost every sub-national
unit “belongs” to a specific ethnic group, with its borders purposefully drawn to encapsulate a
homogeneous population dominated by a specific group, and legal rights guaranteed to the ma-
jority ethnic population. Despite the complications created by the geographic dispersal of ethnic
groups throughout Bosnia’s mountainous terrain, subnational borders are drawn in an attempt
to create clear ethnic majority groups within each unit, and to ensure that as many people as
possible find themselves as part of the majority group in the political unit in which they reside.
The second mechanism is a system of quotas and legal protections written into the electoral
system, to ensure that elections produce parliamentary bodies capable of representing all ethnic
groups. Electoral districts purposefully create regions dominated by single groups, and quotas
guarantee that all three groups are represented in all arenas of state-level government. The third
is a series of mutual veto powers that give leaders representing each ethnic group the ability to
override any state policies or actions which they see as harming their own vital interests. In this
way, Bosnia seems intentionally designed as an exemplar of Lijphart’s consociational democ-
racy, having segmental autonomy; minority veto, grand coalition governments, and proportional
representation (Lijphart 1977, Belloni 2004).
The Bosnian state is divided into two entities: the “Republika Srpska,”10 and “The Fed-
eration of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”11 In this way a country with three ethnic groups is divided
into only two entities. This counter-intuitive outcome is the result of path-dependent processes
that unfolded during the war. In 1992, right before hostilities began in Bosnia, the European
Community proposed a compromise wherein Bosnia would be divided into Cantons based on a
model used in Switzerland. This would have created a patchwork of self-governing territorial
units under a loose confederation, but was ultimately rejected by both the SDA and the SDS.
10The name “Republika Srpska” is difficult to translate exactly into English, because of a grammatical double
entendre of the “-ska” ending in South Slavic languages. Adjectives modifying feminine nouns (such as “Repub-
lic”) end in “-ska,” in Serbian, but so do the names of many countries, including France (“Francuska”), Turkey
(“Turska”), and Switzerland (“Švajcarska”). Thus “Republika Srpska” can be translated as “The Serb Republic,”
indicating an ethnic designation of the political entity, or “The Republic of Srpska,” suggesting a country whose
name is “Srpska.” This is different from Serbia itself, which in the local languages is referred to as “Srbija”. The
government of the Republika Srpska often refers to itself as “The Republic of Srpska,” in English-language ma-
terials, but most western journalists and academics refer the entity as “the Republika Srpska”. I shall keep to the
latter convention.
11Note that despite Bosnia-Herzegovina the country having a federal structure, the term “The Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina” refers to the subnational entity.
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The Bosniak leadership felt that Bosnia must continue to exist as a political unit with the same
borders it had as a Yugoslav republic, while the Serbs insisted on the right of Serb-dominated
territories to succeed and become part of a greater Serbia (Ramet 2002, p. 206-11).
Burg and Shoup argue that the key to understanding the ultimate success of the negotiations
which ended the Bosnian civil war is the relationship between the Croats and the Bosniaks, and
the strategic sequence of negotiations pursued by international mediators (Burg & Shoup 1999,
p. 292). The American delegation’s strategy was to first negotiate a cease-fire in the west of
the country where fighting was primarily between Muslims and Croats, by establishing a joint
Muslim-Croat Federation that would acknowledge the de facto territorial control of the two fac-
tions. This essentially ignored fighting between the two groups and the Serbs, and divided only
part of the country into a Federation allotted to two groups, rather than addressing the concerns
of all three groups simultaneously. The Croat-Bosniak conflict was seen as the most readily
solvable, whereas Serbs were seen by some US officials as irremediably intransigent. Some
thought that by ending the conflict between Bosniaks and Croats, both could turn their atten-
tion more effectively to the Serbs, increasing the military threat to Serbs and pressuring them to
accept a brokered peace deal. Still others saw the Serb political leadership as so hopelessly stub-
born that direct US military intervention would ultimately be required (Sciolino 1994). Thus
the Federation and the Republika Srpska were created by two separate strands of negotiation
tactics independent of each other.
The final phase of negotiations, conducted in Dayton, Ohio in 1995, would ultimately be be-
tween the Muslim-Croat Federation, and the Republika Srpska.12 In order to preserve Bosnia as
a single country these two entities were combined into a single country defined as a two-entity
federation, whose official name would be “Bosnia and Herzegovina.”13 The state government
12Exact territorial boundaries of the entities is of importance in this dissertation only in so far as it establishes
the link between ethnicity, territory, and political authority. Nevertheless, the complexities of drawing boundaries
during the negotiations should not be underestimated. Many of the most vexing territorial issues remain unresolved
more than two decades after the agreement was signed, resigned to a “miscellaneous” category of still ill-defined
political authority. See Bieber (2005) and Jeffrey (2006).
13Note that this is the full country name. It is not “The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, which would be
in keeping with the naming conventions of all other Yugoslav successor states. Such a designation is politically
controversial, as it would suggest a degree of sovereignty vested in the Bosnian state that was superior to that of
the entities. In fact, some within the Serb and Croat factions had originally proposed that the country be called
“The Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina”, suggesting that the resulting state was less than a full sovereign country. See
Beriker-Atiyas & Demirel-Pegg (2000, p. 371).
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in the capital of Sarajevo is responsible for external relations (foreign policy, immigration, cus-
toms, border patrol, and treaty negotiations), but all other governmental functions are delegated
to the entities. This power-sharing arrangement makes Bosnia one of the most decentralized
countries in the world, with the entity-level authorities responsible for much of the day-to-day
policy decisions that affect Bosnian citizens. The arrangement helps to guarantee that the most
relevant political decisions are made in units that are much more ethnically homogeneous than
the state as a whole. Most Bosniaks live in Bosniak-majority Cantons, most Croats live in Croat-
majority Cantons, and most Serbs live in the Serb-majority Republika Srpska.
The Dayton negotiations guaranteed political representation within the central government
through a series of quotas designed to prevent any one group from dominating the others. At the
highest level of the executive, the Bosnian Presidency is a three-person body legally mandated to
contain one Bosniak, one Croat, and one Serb. The state legislature is bicameral, with the upper
house—the House of Peoples—composed of 15 members: five from each of the three groups.
The Dayton constitution also endows each of the ethnic communities with veto power over any
act of parliament. A majority of any of ethnic group’s delegations to the House of Peoples can
block any legislative act by declaring the proposal “destructive of a vital interest” of their ethnic
community. This sets a very high bar for the passing of any state-level legislation. In theory,
total unanimity on an issue in two ethnic delegations but dissent in a majority of one ethnic
group could cause a proposal to fail in parliament, despite being supported by twelve members
and opposed by only three.14 In the lower level of parliament, the House of Representatives, no
formal ethnic quotas exist. Serbs can legally be elected in the Federation seats, just as Croats
or Bosniaks can be elected in the Republika Srpska, and measures pass the lower house with a
simple majority. Within the Federation, though, the seats are allotted by electoral districts that
overlap with the cantonal borders, empowering-local level district majorities and increasing
barriers to entry for very small and geographically disperse groups. Since entity borders and
electoral districts overlap, the end result is that ethnically homogeneous districts usually elect
coethnic representatives to parliament.
This arrangement was successful in putting an end to the armed conflict in Bosnia—no small
14In other words, it is possible for a measure to be defeated despite being supported by 80% of the chamber.
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achievement by any standard and one that has rightly been celebrated as amajor victory for inter-
national peace-making. But the historical idiosyncrasies which built the institutions that would
govern Bosnia in the post-war period have created numerous inefficiencies and contradictions.
Bosniaks and Croats share a single entity, not because of common interest or ethnic similarity,
but because of the sequence of negotiations during the war. Some commentators have argued
that the legal link between ethnicity and sub-national political units enshrined by the Dayton
constitution effectively legitimizes genocide by rewarding a military strategy which used war
crimes as a way of solidifying political power (Bilefsky 2008). Moreover, while the legitimacy
of the constitution often rests on the assumption that people have been geographically sorted
into ethnically homogeneous sub-national units, the mapping between ethnicity and location is
far from perfect. While most Bosnian Serbs do live in the Republika Srpska, there are sub-
stantial numbers living in the Federation—over 56,000 according to the 2013 census—where
they are legally defined as outsiders. Likewise, over 200,000 non-Serbs live in the Republika
Srpska. All told, the most recent census estimates that 86.7% of Bosnian citizens live in “their”
entity—i.e., Serbs in the Republika Srpska or Croats and Bosniaks in the Federation. While this
number is relatively high, it nevertheless shows that more than 13% of Bosnians are minorities
within their entity. This is to say nothing of the Bosniaks or Croats who find themselves living
in Cantons dominated by the other ethnic group within the Federation, or the ethnic minority
inhabitants of highly homogeneous municipalities who live in cities dominated by another eth-
nic group. The entity system also completely ignores Bosnian citizens who do not belong to
the three main ethnic groups, including Roma, Jews, Turks, Poles, and Albanians. Nor does it
provide any legal protection for mixed-ethnicity or Yugoslav citizens, who will by definition be
outside the dominant group wherever they go.
4.3 The Evolution of Bosnian Political Actors under the New
System
The three main ethnic parties—the HDZ, the SDA, and the SDS—remained important and even
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Figure 4.1: Bosnian Effective Number of Parties 1996-2014
signedmany new parties have entered the political arena, and as Bosnian democracy has evolved
the political party system has fractured and diversified. Figure 4.1 shows how in the period
between the Bosnian civil war and the 2014 election, the effective number of political parties in
the lower house of the Bosnian parliament more than doubled.15
The dramatic rise in the effective number of parties is likely a result of the relative ease of
party formation and the low barriers to entry in the various parliaments of the country. While
the Dayton constitution creates overlapping layers of governance in a complicated, ethnically-
segregated federalism, elections are highly proportional with extremely high district magni-
tudes, relatively low electoral thresholds, and few barriers to entry for candidates. Bosnia uses
open list voting (closed list until 2002) to elect the state parliament, the entity parliaments, and
the cantonal assemblies. The electoral threshold for entering parliament is 3%. This makes
it easy for even small groups and niche parties to obtain some representation in government.
Party registration and campaigning laws in Bosnia also are highly permissive for new entrants
and competitors. Political parties require registration to contest elections, for which the most
15Calculations in Figure 4.1 follow the modified Herfindahl index outlined by Laakso & Taagepera (1979). Data
was obtained from the Bosnian Central Election Commission.
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onerous obstacle is the collection of voters’ signatures. Three thousand signatures are required
for contesting the state-level parliament, 2,000 are required for contesting the entity-level elec-
tions, and only 500 are required for contesting a cantonal election. This puts the difficulty of
forming a new political party in Bosnia roughly in the middle by the standards of other European
parliamentary democracies (LegislationLine 2006).16
The increase over time is most frequently the result of intra-party splits and leadership dis-
putes within existing parties. Such disputes are extremely common in post-war Bosnia. Despite
shared support of extreme tactics during the war Serb leaders Radovan Karadžić and Biljana
Plavšić were unable to agree on post-war policy for the Republika Srpska, leading to Plavšić’s
departure from the SDS and founding of the Serb National Alliance (SNS) in 1997. The Croa-
tian leadership notoriously split in 2006 over whether the HDZ should adopt a moderate stance
in order to appease the international community (including the increasingly moderate govern-
ment of Croatia), or risk international isolation by increasing its demands for greater autonomy
for ethnic Croats. Božo Ljubić led a walk-out of HDZ representatives and founded the “HDZ-
1990,” named because it sought to return to the more extreme policies the HDZ had advocated
in the lead-up to the war. Within the Bosniak community, several prominent Bosniak leaders left
the SDA following the war to form their own political parties. Bosniak academic Haris Silajdžić
had originally been a member of the SDA and a part of the Bosniak delegation to Dayton dur-
ing the peace accords, but left the party after the 1996 elections to found the SzBiH (“Stranka
za Bosnu i Hercegovinu”, Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina) which has taken a harsher stance
against the ethnic division of the country enshrined in the constitution than the SDA. Silajdžić
has advocated for the abolition of the Republika Srpska, and denounced the SDA as too willing
to absolve Serbs of war crimes in the name of inter-ethnic negotiations.
The Bosnian party system is so permissive that it is not uncommon to have splits-within-
splits. Fikret Abdić, the Bosniak head of Yugoslav Bosnia’s largest agriculture companies,
16Voter signatures are required in many European parliamentary systems, with substantial variation in the num-
bers required. Romania, another ethnically divided post-communist parliamentary democracy requires 25,000
signatures for a party to be placed on the ballot, which is roughly the equivalent of 5,000 voters in Bosnia, after
adjusting for differences in the country’s population. Denmark, another highly proportional parliamentary elec-
toral system—albeit one with a much longer-established democracy— requires 1175 of the voters to sign a petition
in order to register a political party. Applied to Bosnia, this standard would increase the signatures required from
3,000 to over 10,000. See Pilet & van Haute (2012).
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famously split with the Izetbegović government during the war to ally with ethnic Serbs
(Christia 2008). His DNZ party (“Demokratska narodna zajednica”, Democratic People’s
Union) met with some success in the post-war elections in the northeast of the country where his
company was based. But following a series of intra-party disputes, many of the party members
followed his daughter, Elvira Abdić-Jelenović, into the rival Labor Party of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which has since surpassed the DNZ in its electoral success. The tendency to resolve
intra-party disputes by forming new parties is also seen in non-ethnic parties. The Democratic
Front (DF), one of the most important explicitly non-ethnically identified parties in Bosnia to-
day, was founded after a split in the communist successor Social Democratic Party. Željko
Komšić, an ethnic Croat, had built up enough personal electoral support after being elected to
the Croat seat of the Bosnian presidency running as an SDP member that he was able to form
his own party to contest elections in 2014 and 2018.
Overall, the dominance of the three main ethnic parties and the primary communist succes-
sor party has persisted throughout the post-war period. But this dominance is not absolute, and
a large number of new parties have entered into Bosnian politics at all levels of government,
leading to an extremely fractured political party system. The result is that political actors from
the first Yugoslav election and the civil war are still highly relevant and influential in Bosnian
politics, but overall voters have many more parties to choose from when voting. Some of these
new parties are explicitly ethnic, and compete with other ethnic parties for the votes of their
own ethnic communities. Other parties are not, and seek to build multi-ethnic bases of support
in order to win elections. How exactly political parties in Bosnia employ their ethnic identities
in winning elections is a subject I turn to in the section.
4.4 The Political Use of Ethnicity in Bosnian Elections
In Bosnia, many parties choose to use ethnic identities to convince voters to support them. They
present their party as champions of ethnic interests, and invest substantial resources in money,
time, and energy convincing voters of their own ethnic credentials. Other parties emphasize
other, non-ethnic characteristics of their leadership and policy proposals. Some explicitly de-
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nounce parties that rely on ethnic labels to attract support. These parties put up websites in
multiple languages and recruit candidates from a variety of backgrounds to demonstrate to vot-
ers that citizens of all ethnic groups stand to benefit from their leadership.
To understand when Bosnian voters choose parties that rely on ethnic labels and when they
support parties that do not, it is important to understand and catalog the variation in the ways
parties employ ethnicity to attract voter support. In this section, I catalog the various methods
by which Bosnian political parties employ ethnic labels during campaigns. On the assumption
that voters are “cognitive misers” (Fiske & Taylor 2013[1984]), I start from the most readily
available and least costly form of information available and proceed to the most demanding.
First I examine the names that political parties in Bosnia give themselves, then the graphic
representations they use to portray themselves in campaign materials, and finally the texts and
policies they propose in their efforts to win elections. For each, I catalog the ways that ethnic
identities are employed, rejected, or ignored by various political actors.
4.4.1 Party Names
One of the most straightforward ways a party communicates to voters is its name. As it is
essentially impossible to talk or think about an organization without using its name, the choice
of party name is an important signal to voters about what the party stands for and how it wants to
be perceived. A party name is also one of the only pieces of information that is communicated
to voters by the process of voting itself. A voter who knows literally nothing about the politics
of her country or who had never read anything during the campaign would still be presented
with a list of party names when given her ballot on election day. The choice of party name is
not only a crucial one for candidates, but given the high frequency of political party splits in
Bosnia, it is a choice many politicians make more than once in their careers.
Several parties mention the name of a specific ethnic group in the name of the party. The
most prominent example of this are the Serb Democratic Party, and the Croatian Democratic
Union, but several smaller parties fall into this category as well. These would include the
Bosniak People’s Party, a minor contender with ties to Bosniak populations living in Serbia
and Montenegro which never managed to challenge the SDA’s dominance of the Bosniak vote.
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On the Croat side, many parties identify their Croatian identity by including the word “Croatian”
in their name. In addition to the HDZ, this would include the Croatian Party of Rights and the
Croats’ Union. Croat politicians also have a tradition of choosing party names which not only
include the name of the ethnic group, but recall historically important political organizations in
Croat and Croatian history. The above-mentioned Croatian Party of Rights takes its name from
the “Party of Rights” formed in 1861 to advocate national unity and autonomy for Croats within
the Hapsburg empire.
Other parties choose names which specifically declare a non-ethnic identity. Many of these
parties take names emulating the ideological parties common in Western Europe. This would
include the Liberal Democrats, the Socialists, the Bosnian Greens, the Communists, the La-
bor Party and the E-5 European Ecological Party. While other parties may make their ethnic
affiliation clear in their names, these parties make identifying specific ethnic allegiance more
difficult. Mirroring this strategy of avoiding ethnic labels, some parties which are competitive
only in specific parts of the country have adopted names based on regions. The Party for a
European Sarajevo competes only in the capital city, and the Posavina Party contests elections
only in the northeast of the country along the Sava River. A very small set of parties have cho-
sen names that align with individual-level identities. These parties speak to concerns of voters
which are not linked to region, ideology, or even class, such as the Party of the Handicapped,
the Bosnian Pensioner’s and Retiree’s Party, and the Women of Bosnia. While these parties rely
on individual identities, these identities are not strictly ethnic, since they speak to individual-
characteristics that are the result of circumstance, choice, or chance.
Still a third set of parties has chosen names that convey very little information, opting for
a kind of inoffensive banality. Several large and political relevant parties fall into this cate-
gory, including the Democratic Front, the Democratic People’s Alliance, Our Party, the Party
of Rights and Development, Union for a Better Future, and the People’s Party for Work and Bet-
terment. Most voters would be unable to identify the priority of these parties based on names
alone beyond their general support of universally popular ideas. Despite being the most dom-
inant Bosniak party and one of the most successful parties in Bosnia, the SDA could fall into
this category, as could the Alliance of Independent Democrats, the party that would come to
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dominate the ethnic Serb vote in Bosnia in the first decades of the new century.17
Another frequent characteristic of Bosnian political parties is the inclusion of an individ-
ual’s name. On the Bosniak side, this is the case with Sefer Halilović, whose political party is
officially named “The Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party - Sefer Halilović.” Halilović was
the head of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the war. His party
formed immediately after the war to contest the first post-war Bosnian election in 1996. Form-
ing an independent party may have been a reflection of Halilović’s long-standing disagreements
with Alija Izetbegović and the SDA leadership, as their disputes in 1996 were widely known.
The name itself refers to the “Patriotic League,” an ethnic Bosniak paramilitary group separate
from the Yugoslav armed forces that Halilović had founded in the lead-up to the civil war, and
which would eventually evolve into the Bosnian Army. Due to this militant defense of ethnic
Bosniak interests during the tumultuous time leading up to the war, Halilović is widely known
and respected among segments of the Bosniak population. Among Serbs and Croats, he is most
often associated with a war crimes indictment in The Hague in connection with a massacre of
Croat civilians and prisoners of war in the villages of Grabovica and Uzdol in 1993. Halilović
was ultimately acquitted of the charges, on the grounds that while the massacres were in fact
war crimes, Halilović personally did have command authority over the troops who committed
them and was not legally culpable. Halilović’s supporters have praised him as an ethnic cham-
pion who defended Bosniaks against outside aggressors, but also on the grounds that his volun-
tary surrender to The Hague and cooperation with their inquiry demonstrated a commitment to
international norms and human rights. His supporters—almost exclusively ethnic Bosniaks—
contrast Halilović’s cooperation with the war crimes tribunal and ultimate acquittal to the many
other indicted military leaders who fled, went into hiding, or were ultimately convicted of nu-
merous atrocities.18 The naming of the party seems designed to build a party identity around the
personal brand of its leader. Calling a party “Patriotic” conveys little information, but attaching
17The SDA actually had its founding convention at a time when explicit ethnic political campaigning was illegal
in Yugoslavia. This provision was eventually declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court, having been in
effect for only a fewmonths. The timing of the SDA founding convention is the reason that it is the only party of the
three main wartime combatants not explicitly named after the ethnic group it represents. See Burg & Shoup (1999,
p. 46-8). The Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) started as a non-ethnic party in the Republika
Srpska, but has evolved over time to become the leading voice of Serb nationalism and separatism in Bosnia today.
See Section 6 of the next chapter.
18See Selimbegović (2001), van der Wilt (2007), and Ramet (2012).
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Halilović to it conveys a certain commitment to both the integrity of the Bosnian state, and the
defense of ethnic Bosniaks.
Another instance of personal branding being used to develop a party identity is the
previously-mentioned SBB. Technically, the party registers under the name “Union for a Better
Future - Fahrudin Radončić,” so that the name of the party founder shows up on the ballot and
all government records. Radončić is a media mogul, founder and owner of the Dnevni Avaz
newspaper. Sometimes referred to as the “Bosnian Berlusconi19,” Radončić is famous for his
personal wealth and outlandish personality. The Dnevni Avaz was initially formed with support
from the SDA and the Bosnian military during the war, and the paper has long been seen as
promoting an ethnic Bosniak agenda. Nevertheless, Radončić seems to have broken with the
SDA in recent years, forming his own party and increasing negative coverage of the Bosniak
political establishment in the media outlets he controls. His decision to attach his own name
to the party he founded most likely represents an attempt to parlay his own personal brand as a
successful business man who has amassed a large fortune to that of his party.
Some of the parties which explicitly identify as Croat discussed above also employ this
branding technique of attaching the name of an individual to the name of their party, but rather
than the name of their party founder they use the name of a historical figure associated with a
specific ideology. The Croatian Peasant Party of Stjepan Radić invokes the name of a famous
Croat nationalist who is seen as organizing the nineteenth century agrarian ethnic Croat popu-
lation into a political force. Radić opposed Yugoslavism and is considered by many Croats as
a martyr, having been assassinated on the floor of the Legislative Assembly of the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the predecessor to the Yugoslav state) in 1928. Radić has been a
polarizing figure throughout the twentieth century, but is employed in the party branding to con-
vey a specific and relatively extreme approach to the defense of Croat ethnic interests. Another
Croatian break-away party, the Croatian Party of Rights Dr. Ante Starčević adopted the name
of a famous Croatian intellectual who died nearly a full century before the party was founded in
2010. Starčević had founded a similarly-named party in 1861, which argued for Croatian inde-
pendence from the Hapsburgs. The party has aligned itself in coalitions with other Croat ethnic
19See Mujanović (2014).
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parties, but often presents itself as more extreme in the defense of Croat national interests, and
is often considered by international observers to be a far-right party. In both of these instances,
the choice of naming the party after a revered figure from history signals a kind of purity. Radić
and Starčević are important historical figures, so much so that they both appear on banknotes in
Croatia. Employing the names of these important historical figures in the party name is a way
to signal that the party honors those who struggled in the past for the interests of Croats, and
presumably shares those values.
4.4.2 Party Logos
Graphic logos of a political party can be displayed at campaign events as a way of building
brands, and linking parties to policies and outcomes in the minds of voters. Since observing
a logo requires virtually no effort, voters are much more likely to engage with a visual logo
than they are to read a party platform, or listen to a campaign speech. For a disinterested voter,
a logo on a public billboard may be the deepest communication that voter has with the party
itself. Logos can be especially important in a new democracy like Bosnia where parties and can-
didates are unfamiliar to voters, and underdeveloped media makes acquiring information more
costly. Linking political affiliation to visual cues is common not just in Bosnia, but through-
out the democratic world: witness the United States’ perpetual discussion of “red states” and
“blue states,”20 or the colorful language used to describe Germany’s “red-green” or “traffic-
light” coalitions.21 In India, where illiteracy has been a major complicating factor in elections
since independence, political parties are assigned mandatory symbols representing them on the
ballot.22
Many Bosnian political parties have adopted logos and emblems that incorporate historically
or culturally relevant images in order to convey ethnic positions immediately to voters. Figure
4.2 shows a sample of graphic logos for each of the three main ethnic parties. Figure 4.2a is the
20Red states are those that support Republicans; Blue states are those that support Democrats. The color scheme
employed in the United States stems from the norms of election night coverage by the major American networks.
Confusingly, it is the opposite of the color scheme used in most of the rest of the western world, where leftist parties
adopt the color red, and conservatives adopt the color blue.
21Red is the color of the Social Democratic Party logo in Germany, while the Free Democrats use the color
yellow to represent their liberal ideology. When these two parties enter into a coalition with the environmentalist




Figure 4.2: Bosnian Ethnic Party Logos
logo of the SDS. The red, blue, and white crest is a reference to the Serbian flag, and the seal in
themiddle is a stylized version of the Cyrillic abbreviation for the name of the party, “СДС”. The
text is telling, as the Cyrillic alphabet is the main distinguishing characteristic between Serbian
and the mutually intelligible Bosnian and Croatian languages. Figure 4.2b shows the logo of
the HDZ. In a subtle touch, the small red square above the “H” is a nod to the red-and-white
checkerboard pattern of the šahovnica, the Croatian coat of arms and national symbol. In the
context of Bosnia, where ethnic divisions have been reinforced by violent conflict and citizens
are extraordinarily sensitive to declarations of ethnic identification, these details are impossible
to miss. The use of overt ethnic imagery and iconography, in conjunction with the use of the
ethnic group’s name in the very name of the party quickly eliminates any doubt which ethnic
constituency this party is seeking out, and makes the ethnicity central to the party’s presentation
of itself to voters.
Figure 4.2c shows the logo of the SDA, which as mentioned previously does not explicitly
refer to any ethnic group in its party name. Yet any ambiguity as to which group’s interests the
SDA champions is clearly resolved by the SDA logo, which appears prominently at political
rallies, and is used in printed and online campaign materials. The party’s fleur-de-lys blazon is
a medieval symbol, dating to the 14th century pre-Ottoman rulers of the Kingdom of Bosnia.
This symbol was not used during the Ottoman period, when Bosnia was often represented by
explicitly Islamic symbols, nor was it common during the Yugoslav period, when a uniform
99
a b c
Figure 4.3: Bosnian Non-Ethnic Party Logos
socialist iconography was imposed on all the republics. Bosniak troops resurrected the medieval
herald as combat insignia during the civil war, as it was the banner of the previous rulers of an
independent and sovereign Bosnia. During the war, the fleur-de-lys pattern became synonymous
with ethnic Bosniak interest, and a highly polarizing symbol. It is so contentions that keeping
the fleur-de-lys off the official flag of the newly formed country became an important point
of contention during the Dayton peace discussions for the Croat and Serb delegations (Pauker
2012). To further reinforce their connection to the Bosniak community, and the long-standing
connection between Islam and Bosniak identity, the stylized shadow surrounding the fleur-de-
lys is a reference to an Islamic crescent moon, seen on the flag of many predominantly Muslim
countries like Algeria, Turkey, and Pakistan. The official logo of the SDA features two green
bands running along the top and bottom, a color commonly used throughout the Muslim world
as a symbol of the Islamic faith.
Logos are not only used to convey ethnic affiliation; they are also used to reinforce identities
which are explicitly not ethnic in nature. Parties can choose logos that rely on the Yugoslav
communist past or symbols common in other European countries to avoid identifying the party
with a single ethnic group and project an image based on ideology or multiethnic identity. The
logo for the SDP is shown in Figure 4.3a. The image recalls the red rose that has long been
the symbol of the Socialist International and is still used by center-left parties in France, Italy,
and other countries. The use of the color red, inherited from the League of Communists of Yu-
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goslavia and common among labor movements worldwide, not only avoids identification with
a specific ethnic group, but links the party to its ideological past and with labor movements and
leftist parties throughout Europe. The logo of the Democratic Front seen in Figure 4.3b features
a shield of blue and orange. Orange has no strong historical association in Bosnia, and its use
is likely a reference to the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004-2005. DF candidates have re-
ferred to their party as “a revolution in orange,” and DF campaign rallies have featured orange
banners and flags in a way that vaguely suggests the historic protests in Kiev. The blue field with
white stars is a reference to the Bosnian state flag. While the use of a flag by a politician might
seem completely natural to western observes, it is important to remember that the current flag
of the Bosnian state was imposed on the country by the international community less than 20
years ago. It is a symbol of the legitimacy of the multiethnic state of Bosnia and Herzegovina
as it currently exists–hardly an empty gesture in a country where many still argue in support of
secession. Moreover, the DF official logo has two versions: one in the Latin alphabet, and one
in Cyrillic, suggesting the party’s desire to appeal to both the Latin-alphabet using Croatian and
Bosnian speakers in the Federation, and the Cyrillic-alphabet Serbian speakers in the Republika
Srpska. Figure 4.3c shows the logo of the Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The use of blue,
yellow, and white is yet another reference to the county’s current flag, and the triangular design
refers to the geographical shape of Bosnia’s current borders. By making the border of the coun-
try the first thing voters see when identifying the party, its leaders quickly convey that the party
supports the multi-ethnic state. The letters in the logo are not an abbreviation of the party’s
name, but rather the Serbo-Croatian preposition meaning “for.” This logo is highly effective
in quickly communicating the central political platform of this party—support for the Bosnian
state as it exists currently.
If voters are cognitive misers, then political parties need to be able to quickly and easily
communicate with voters. Many Bosnian parties use their logos as a part of a communication
strategy. Ethnic parties often incorporate ethnic and religious symbols which have long-standing
ties to specific groups in order to broadcast an ethnic identity to potential supporters. In a country
where ethnic identities are highly salient and voters are sensitive to markers of ethnic affiliation,
these graphic depictions serve to avoid confusion about who will likely benefit from the party’s
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policies, and uses polarizing imagery to instantaneously differentiate in-group members from
out-group members. Other parties use more recent symbols to distance themselves from ethnic
identification to convey a non-ethnic identity. Images tied to a Western European identity or a
communist identity avoid declaring support for a specific ethnic constituency, and references to
the internationally-brokered Dayton Peace Accords suggest a civic identity based on Bosnian
statehood rather than ethnic affiliation. In all of these cases, political elites are using the graphic
representations of their parties to quickly tell their potential voters where they stand on these
issues.
4.4.3 Campaign Rhetoric
Of course, voters don’t base their voting decision exclusively on names and logos. Office-seekers
and parties interact much more directly with citizens, as well. They give speeches and media
interviews, they release statements, and they make proposals. Those who win build reputations
by enacting policies and administering state offices. Politicians may not have the ability to force
voters to pay attention to their campaigns, but they can decide what to put out for those voters
who do choose to seek out information. In Bosnia, party platforms and campaign rhetoric often
follow the same patterns observed in party naming and logos. Some parties invest in explicit
ethnic identification, overtly portraying themselves as ethnic champions focused on representing
a single ethnic group at the expense of others. Others not only avoid explicit ethnic identification,
but also attack the mobilization of co-ethnics as a harmful practice and a reason to support one
party instead of its ethnic competitors. The degree to which parties employ ethnic identification
in building connections to potential supporters varies widely in Bosnia.
The Bosniak SDA has perhaps the most developed official platform of the three largest eth-
nic parties in Bosnia. This platform sets policy priorities and goals that are frequently taken as
an opportunity to broadcast ethnic allegiance. In foreign policy, for example, the SDA has his-
torically set EU ascension and integration into international organizations as a top priority, but
for reasons that are particular to its ethnic constituency and not the country as a whole: “Our
foreign policy priorities are full membership in NATO and the EU... In all international and
domestic institutions, special attention will be paid to fighting the anti-Bosniak lobbying taking
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place in the world today” (Stranka Demokraske Akcije 2014, p. 4). One might think that regard-
less of ethnicity, all Bosnians—as citizens of a very small country—might stand to benefit from
collective defense, freedom of travel, and access to EU markets. Yet the SDA emphasizes that
these benefits are means to advance the ethnic interests of the Bosniak community. Likewise,
the section on economic policy links development and refugee return—issues which the plat-
form claims cannot be resolved until the issue of jobs for Bosniaks is solved first: “Sustainable
refugee return cannot be achieved without sustainable economic development, for which we
must urgently address the problems in public education and government employment in those
areas where Bosniaks are in the minority” (Stranka Demokraske Akcije 2014, p. 7). In these
examples, even the most public of goods (i.e., development and security) are seen as benefits
that the party will direct only to Bosniaks at the expense of others. As the platform is worded
now it could even be construed as a direct attack on the other two ethnic groups, particularly
Serbs. “Areas where Bosniaks are in the minority” can be nothing else but a reference to the
Republika Srpska and the Federation’s Croat Cantons, just as the “international anti-Bosniak
lobbying” is likely to be interpreted by many Bosnians as an attack on Serbian support for an
independent Serb entity. Thus even issues with the potential to cross ethnic boundaries in their
popularity are used to identify with a specific ethnic group.
The HDZ campaign rhetoric also makes its investment in Croatian ethnic identity overt,
obvious, and clear. In the section on defense policy, the party writes:
The HDZ believes that the defense and security policies of the state should include
integration into international security processes and institutions such as the Part-
nership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Council, and NATO.
The armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina must reflect and maintain the rep-
resentation of constituent peoples and permanently ensure the recognition of the
Croatian Defense Council as one of the components in rationally sized armed forces
in accordance with economic possibilities and realistic security assessments....
The HDZ considers the preservation of all vital of the national interests of the Croa-
tian people as an integral part of the defense and security strategy at the level of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. (HDZ 2007, p.9)
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This suggests that in foreign policy, the HDZ is in agreement with the SDA: Bosnia’s defense
interests are best served by integration with European institutions of collective security. But
the writers of the HDZ platform go out of their way to show that this policy decision should
be made in a way that reflects Croat interests. Despite agreement with Bosniak politicians, the
HDZ specifically mentions the Croat Defense Council, the main Croat military force during
the war, as one that has a role to play in contemporary Bosnian defense policy because of its
importance to protecting ethnic Croats in Bosnia. The HDZ will represent only the Croats in
Bosnia, which they make clear throughout their policy proposal.
Ethnic Croat parties often employ a strategy of attacking the Dayton constitution on the
grounds that is unfair to Croats specifically. One frequently recurring grievance is that there
are three constituent peoples in Bosnia but only two entities. Croats must share their entity
with Bosniaks, and are thus perpetually disenfranchised because the Bosniaks are a larger com-
munity. Many Croat parties, explicitly attack the current consociational arrangement as unfair,
and attribute the relative dysfunction and paralysis of the Bosnian state to the fact that not all
groups are equally represented. Dragan Čović, President of the HDZ, has repeatedly claimed
in television interviews that the current two-entity system is unfair and an impediment to eco-
nomic development and European Union accession. In a 2017 interview with the Croatian-
language television channel Hrvatska radiotelevizija, Čović argued not only that the Dayton
Accords themselves may have been fundamentally unfair to Croats by not providing them with
an entity of their own, but that the future of Bosnia lies in the devolution of the country into
three, or possibly even four, five, or six separate entities (Oslobođenje 2017).
Advocating for a constitutional change theoretically could be a non-ethnic issue, advocated
by ethnic and non-ethnic parties alike. But in keeping with the logic of ethnic party, these policy
proposals are always espoused because of the impact that they will have on Croats. The official
party statute of the Croat Party of Rights, for example, states:
1. We are firmly committed to a European Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which the
Croatian people—together with the other two constituent peoples—will enjoy
full sovereignty and freedom, and where all citizens in the entire territory of
Bosnia and Herzegovina will be equal. We believe that this commitment can
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only be achieved through a complete constitutional reform and the adoption
of a new Bosnian Constitution where governing institutions are under the con-
stant control of the public.
2. We maintain that the final solution of the Croatian national question in Bosnia
and Herzegovina and the possible reorganization of the Federation should be
achieved through constitutional change. (HSP BiH 2015)
This statement is a fairly specific policy proposal stance by Bosnian standards: it proposes to
reorganize the Federation through the process of constitutional amendment. But the reason to
amend the constitution is not because it will make the government more fair or efficient for
everyone, but because it will make it fairer for Croats. Concerns of other groups, or even of
various groups within the Croat community, are ignored completely. In this way, the Croat par-
ties use language and rhetoric that make it very clear to their voters that they consider coethnics
more important than ethnic outsiders, and will govern the state accordingly. Ethnic parties like
the HDZ and the SDA actively emphasize their ethnic identities by viewing all policies through
the lens of how it will affect their coethnic communities. Even in areas where the two parties
agree on policy, they use divisive language which separates insiders and outsiders.
Other parties, however, actively seek to distance themselves from ethnic identification.
These parties use language which not only attack their ethnic party competitors, but also the
fundamental logic of ethnic representation itself. The most prominent example is the SDP. Their
party program identifies itself not as the party of any single ethnic group, but as the rightful heir
of Tito’s multiethnic and internationalist socialism. The SDP declares that Bosnia is inherently a
state of multiple ethnic groups, and that the post-war constitution must be preserved and upheld.
Its official position on nationalism and ethnic interests is somewhat reminiscent of twentieth-
century communist dogmas: “Nationalism, as well as neoliberalism and various forms of fun-
damentalism, are the biggest enemies of state development, social democracy and the social
democratic vision of politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (Socijaldemokratska Partija BiH 2014,
pp.29–30). The party’s vision blends western European Social Democratic Movements with
Yugoslavia’s unique twentieth-century experience of inter-ethnic cooperation. In terms recall-
ing communist propaganda, party members are committed to persevere “in the struggle against
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Figure 4.4: Bosnian Campaign Advertisements
ethno-nationalist concepts of governance as well as social injustice which threatens the disinte-
gration of Bosnian society and the Bosnian state” (Socijaldemokratska Partija BiH 2014, p.31).
In this way the party links its current struggle for economic development, European integration,
and effective governance to the struggle of Tito against fascism and Stalinist totalitarianism
(Socijaldemokratska Partija BiH 2014, p.7).
This hostility towards ethnic mobilization extends into the party’s electoral campaigns. Fig-
ure 4.4 shows a comparison of political advertising done by the HDZ, SDA, and the SDP. The
HDZ ads and SDA ads are remarkably similar: both feature portraits of their party chairman.
Both use divisive ethnic symbols. In the HDZ ad, Čović is standing in front of a red and white
checkerboard to represent Croatian national identity, whereas Izetbegović’s ad uses the color
green and both the Bosniak fleur-de-lys and the Islamic crescent moon in the party logo. The
language used in the ads is highly polarizing: the HDZ ad text translates to “Nation and Home-
land”, clearly indicating that the policy priorities of the HDZ are understood in ethno-national
terms. The SDA text reads “The people know,” suggesting a double meaning. The text implies
not only that the (Bosniak) people are the ones who know how to run the country, but also that
Bosniaks know that the only real vote choice is Izetbegović and the SDA. The SDP ad, however,
is markedly different. The SDP has chosen not to put a single individual on their campaign
poster, but a committee. They have also written all of the portrayed candidates’ names on the
list, for a very clear reason: the names convey ethnic markers which suggest a multi-ethnic
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group of people.23 The campaign slogan translates as, “A country for all of us!” suggesting that
the party is refusing to align itself with a single ethnic group.
The SDP is not the only party to denounce ethnic mobilization. The more recently formed
Democratic Front also uses anti-ethnic rhetoric throughout its campaign materials and policy
documents. While the DF has been less directly socialist, it still uses the language of univer-
sal populism to strike a markedly anti-ethnic stance. The party manifesto explicitly denounces
“[t]he ethno-predatory capitalism imposed on the social life of Bosnia and Herzegovina after
the war...” as “... based on exploitation, marginalization, and discrimination.(Demokratska
Fronta 2014)” In domestic matters, the DF advocates for political restructuring of the state
guided by European principles of efficiency and economy, rather than ethnic self-determination.
The DF manifesto also outlines a multi-ethnic vision by making explicit references to all groups
as important parts of Bosnian society. Its vision of pluralism is founded on principles of secu-
larism and separation between church and state, and outlines a vision of recent Bosnian history
that “[r]espect[s] everyone’s sacrifice and everyone’s loss...” while holding a responsibility “to
find the strength to look to the future, not the past.” In this way, the DF acknowledges the impact
of the civil war on contemporary politics while trying to avoid alienating any particular group.
In foreign policy, the DF advocates integration into western European institutions like NATO
and the EU, noting that other countries in the region have already or soon will join NATO, men-
tioning by name Croatia, Albania, and Montenegro. The mention of these three countries can
hardly be accidental, but used to further justify the multi-ethnic appeal of NATO in the region:
Croatia, obviously, is the “motherland” of Bosnia’s ethnic Croats; Albania is a historically Mus-
lim country with an Ottoman heritage shared by Bosniaks; and Montenegro is a predominantly
Eastern Orthodox country with close cultural and linguistic ties to Serbia.
Some parties employ similar anti-ethnic rhetoric in their programs, but emphasize regional
and local issues, rather than international. The Posavina Party employs language of “polycen-
trism” and “anti-fascism” to explicitly denounces the ethnic organization of the state, claiming
that the Dayton constitution has created “permanent crisis” that benefits only the kleptocratic
23“Čengić” is a Slavicization of a Turkish name linguistically related to “Genghis” that would be interpreted by
most Bosnians as Bosniak or Islamic. “Mašić is a traditionally Croat name, while “Magazinović” is a name used
primarily in Serbia, but is present in Croatia as well. “Srna Bajramović” is a compound of traditionally Slavic and
Islamic family names.
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leaders who claim to represent specific ethnic groups. The party denounces those leaders who
“. . . use nationalist rhetoric of the threat to ‘us’ from ‘them’ and divert attention from the real
problems of this society...”(Posavska Stranka 2010). The party cites its main concern as the
economic underdevelopment of the Posavska region of Bosnia, which they say is because of
the:
...administrative division into unnatural, ethnic and non-functional areas (the two
entities and the Brčko District) as well as the incompetent, impenetrable and cor-
rupt government that subordinated the public functions to personal rather than gen-
eral interests....This and other factors has enabled the implementation of unfair and
unethical privatization, increasing crime and corruption, legalization of unfair po-
litical and other privileges, the lack of a purposeful economic development and an
increase in unemployment, a decline in social standards, the disappearance of the
middle class and general impoverishment of citizens.
The party distances itself from the ethnic rhetoric of parties like the SDA and the HDZ, by laying
out a doctrine of regionalism rather than the socialism and populism of the SDP. It rejects the
arbitrary territorial divisions of the country into entity and cantons, but argues instead for a
regional decentralization and local governance which it maintains would be more efficient and
less corrupt.
On the other side of the country, in Una-Sana, Fikret Abdić’s DNZ also uses regionalism as
an alternative to ethnic mobilization. Using his own personal base of support, and his reputation
as a prominent Bosniak with strong ties to Serb forces during the war, Abdić portrayed the
DNZ as a party based on a “Western Bosnian” identity independent of ethnicity, nationality,
or religion. In a statement released prior to the 2008 election, the DNZ described itself as an
opposition to the ethno-nationalism of the dominant parties: “The Democratic People’s Union
of Bosnia and Herzegovina originated in Velika Kladuša in 1993 as a result of disagreement with
the SDA’s policies and its leadership in Sarajevo who led Bosnia into total war and its citizens
to exodus and pain....this newly formed party calls on all those who see nationalism, religious
radicalism, and intolerance as a great danger for the isolated regions of Western Bosnia, and for
Bosnia and its citizens (DNZ BiH 2008).”
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Another subset of parties in the Bosnian context are remarkable for the way they completely
ignore the ethnic cleavages present in Bosnian society. One such example is the SzBiH of Haris
Silajdžić discussed above. Silajdžić is undeniably an important leader of the Bosniak com-
munity. He was a former member of the SDA, leaving in 1996 after conflicts with the party
leadership (Šedo 2010, p. 88). He was part of the Bosniak delegation to Dayton during the civil
war, and he has previously been elected to the Bosniak seat of the Bosnian presidency. He is un-
apologetically in favor of a unitary Bosnian state—the exact position advocated by the Bosniak
military and political leadership during the civil war, and the solution to the war that was most
unacceptable to Croats and Serbs. Silajdžić is a polarizing figure, having stated to western film
crews in 1995 that he “enjoyed” watching the NATO bombing of Bosnian Serbs, since Serbs
would “finally feel what it means to be targeted; to be defenseless. And they deserved it.” (The
Death of Yugoslavia 1995) Language like this often has the feel of an ethnic appeal: it clearly
has a narrow audience, since claiming that Serbs “deserved” to be bombed would probably be
much better received among ethnic Bosniak audiences than Serb audiences. Nevertheless, the
SzBiH official positions and campaign statements often go out of their way to avoid making the
explicit ethnic appeals that we see among other parties. The very first sentence of the SzBiH
Program Statement claims, “[p]eople are by nature made different, but should in society and in
law be equal (SzBiH 2015, p. 1).” Seeming to accept the diversity inherent in Bosnian society,
the SzBiH nevertheless maintains that ethnic divisions should not be the basis of institutional
design or policy making in Bosnia. The party further makes this clear in more direct statements:
“It is [the principles of equality] that make it possible for the citizens and peoples of Bosnia and
Herzegovina—historically a society of diverse faiths, ethnicities, and cultural traditions—to
survive, accepting unity in differences and evolving in reciprocity, through practice and history
(SzBiH 2015, p. 1).”
The SzBiH does not overtly identify itself with a specific ethnic group. But unlike the so-
cialist, populist, or regionalist parties described above, the SzBiH does not overtly attack the
ethnic organization of the state as corrupt or inefficient. In fact, the SzBiH justifies all of its
policy proposals in a way that largely ignores ethnic identity. On the subject of constitutional
and administrative reform, the SzBiH seems close to the position of the Croat nationalist parties:
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the constitution should be reformed and greater autonomy given to harmonized, local units. But
this is seen as desirable because it will conform to European standards of efficiency and human
rights, not because of its impact on any single ethnic group:
Bosnia and Herzegovina through the process of constitutional changes should en-
sure the full harmonization of the Constitution of BiH with basic human rights
guaranteed by the international conventions and human rights chapters and elimi-
nate from the existing Constitution both ethnic and territorial discrimination. Pro-
tection of the rights to citizenship should be incorporated into the new constitution,
as well as the right to returning property that is subject to the denationalization
and restitution process. The new constitution should also provide a mechanism that
will allow the rationalization of public spending through the creation of greater
efficiency, e.g. increased capacity for the state, the revision of the provisions on
education and public sector salaries, and the harmonization of this spending with
the economic growth. The BiH Constitution should establish a single police struc-
ture of the BiH through the implementation of three principles of the European
Commission, as a commitment undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina through the
signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the EU.(SzBiH 2015,
p. 3)
On the subject of wartime reparations, the SzBiH claims:
We must provide all the elements necessary for the immediate return of over
150,000 refugees and displaced persons who have expressed their willingness to
return to their homes. It is also necessary to provide the preconditions for a sus-
tainable return of all those who have already returned to their homes or who will
return. It is most important that the internally displaced citizens of our country who
are accommodated in the centers are allowed as soon as possible to rebuild their
homes and provide conditions for their undisturbed return. It is of utmost impor-
tance to maintain ties with the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina who live around
the world who left their homelandmainly due to aggression, ethnic cleansing, geno-
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cide and overall war destruction and demographic propagation of the population.
(SzBiH 2015, p. 7)
Internationally, these positions have been warmly received. Silajdžić himself has often spo-
ken in the west at prestigious universities and important policy research centers—an honor not
shared by many participants in the Yugoslav civil wars. His support of efficient government,
human rights, and refugee return often presents in Europe as forward-thinking, progressive, and
democratic. But within Bosnia, the SzBiH’s appeal is limited almost entirely to Bosniaks. The
extreme importance that the SzBiH places on homogenizing government structures and facilitat-
ing refugee return is seen by many as an open attack on the Serb entity, a sentiment Silajdžić has
not dispelled by his referring to the Republika Srpska as “the genocide entity” while campaign-
ing for office (Knezevic 2016). Croats often perceive the positions of the SzBiH as designed to
limit the institutional protections that prevent small groups from being overrun and dominated
by demographically larger groups—a position that favors Bosniaks over others. Thus while the
SzBiH does not make overt ethnic appeals, the policies they advance seem designed to appeal
to a single ethnic group.
Similar issues are present with the People’s Party for Work and Betterment.24 Founded
in 2001, the NSRzB presents itself as a multi-ethnic party, committed to civic identities and
representation for all. The party’s founding statute declares that it will, “bring together all the
peoples and citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina of the same political attitudes and orientations.
The NSRzB will represent the interests of all citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and shape
public and political life on based on democratic principles in accordance withWestern European
standards (NSRzB 2008).” The party’s official platform and policy statements also frequently
contain language attacking the ethnic organization of the state: “Every human is subject to
mistake and guilt. Human imperfection and ignorance can create borders in politics. If we are
aware of these borders, we can avoid dogmatism and totalitarian understandings of politics, and
can create the possibility for reconciliation” (NSRzB 2004, p. 10).
Yet there are convincing reasons to believe that the NSRzB is a Croat party. The party
chairman, Mladen Ivanković-Lijanović is himself an ethnic Croat, and has run for president only
24“Narodna Stranka Radom za Boljitak”, NSRzB
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in the Croat seat of the Bosnian state presidency The NSRzB is run primarily from the town of
Široki Brijeg, in the overwhelmingly Croat canton of West Herzegovina. Historically, Široki
Brijeg has been strongly associated with Croat nationalism. This reputation was so strong that
the communist government actually renamed the town in order to undermine what they feared
may have been a nationalist rallying point during the Yugoslav period.25 The party cannot really
claim to be state-wide in scope, and attracts supporters mostly in the regions in the south-west
of the country where Croats are concentrated. Moreover, the party’s multiethnic rhetoric is
supported by a commitment to decentralization. As the party writes in their official Statement
of Principles:
Individuals and small communities are the units closest to daily life, and should be
given the responsibility for solving their own problems. These smaller units should
absorb the responsibilities of the entities and the state, which will be freed to focus
on the planning and implementation of only those tasks requiring state authority. It
is necessary to review the existing division of capacities and to relieve the state of
those tasks that local institutions can do better.
We stand for the view that an individual should demand from the community only
what he cannot do on his own.
There must be a clear separation of powers which extends from the local to the inter-
national level. The European Union’s principle of federalism, where autonomous
municipalities and regions come together into states and larger communities is our
guiding principle. (NSRzB 2004, p. 14-5)
This support of decentralizing is not, strictly speaking, an ethnically polarizing principle. Many
countries, including the United States and Germany which are less ethnically diverse have fed-
eral systems and debate on the appropriate allocation of power between local and higher au-
thorities. But the plea for decentralization in Bosnia is much more popular among Croats than it
is among Bosniaks. Given their smaller size relative to the Bosniak population, a weak central
government was a key demand of the Croat forces during the war, and centralization remains
25The locals returned the original name in the lead-up to the civil war (Hall 1994, p.49).
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unpopular among ethnic Croat voters who frequently fear being overwhelmed by the larger
Bosniak community. The fact that the party wins most of its support from Croats in Croat areas
on a platform of decentralization which tends to be popular among ethnic Croat voters creates
an impression at odds with the party’s presentation of itself as a multi-ethnic, entirely program-
matic organization. The party is often discussed in the Bosnian media as Croat party which
competes only with the HDZ and other Croat nationalist parties.
4.5 Classifying Bosnian Political Parties
From the descriptive analysis above, I argue that the best way to understand Bosnian parties
is with a qualitative three-part typology: ethnic, anti-ethnic, and ethnically ambiguous. Such
a categorization system captures the most important variation in political party strategies, and
facilitates the analysis of Bosnian voting behavior in the next chapter. While all parties fall into
one of these three categories, only one typemeets the standards of an ethnic party as described in
chapter 2. First, I outline this classification system. Then, I respond to potential concerns about
why the differences between ethnic parties and other types of parties is important to understand
both in a general theory of ethnic voting, and the Bosnian case specifically.
4.5.1 A Three-Part Typology
Many parties in Bosnia meet the definition of an ethnic party. Parties such as the SDA, HDZ, and
SDS campaign almost exclusively on ethnic communal interests. In their choice of party name,
logo, rhetoric and campaign strategy, they consistently strive to ensure that voters associate
their party with a specific ethnic group, and provide a clear understand that the party will favor
coethnics at the expense of ethnic outsiders. The parties even decry inter-ethnic cooperation,
using ethnically divisive language to describe policy proposals that would likely have broad
multi-ethnic support. For these parties, policy positions may be vague or fickle, but on the
question of who the party will represent, they are nothing if not steadfast.
While identifying an ethnic party is relatively straightforward, it is less clear what to make
of those parties that do not meet the definition. For that, I propose that the remaining parties
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should be subdivided into two categories. This ultimately creates a three-party typology into
which all Bosnian can parties fall.
Some parties may be thought of as anti-ethnic. These parties openly attack ethnicity as the
basis of legitimate political mobilization. They clearly communicate to voters that if elected,
no citizen should expect to benefit because of their ethnic identity at the expense of citizens
from other groups. Parties like the SDP and the DF that insist on a civic identity and attempt
to communicate to voters that they will show no favoritism to any specific group fall into this
group. Just as an ethnic party speaks directly to a specific ethnic group, an anti-ethnic party
vocally disavows any connection to a single ethnic community. Anti-ethnic parties acknowledge
that Bosnia is an ethnically divided country and concede the possibility that political blocs may
form on the basis of identity, but argues that such an outcomewould be normatively undesirable.
In doing so, the party makes it clear that it is rejecting ethnic identities as the basis of policy-
making.
Those parties which do not fit into either of the other two categories can be thought of as
ethnically ambiguous. These are parties which neither accept nor reject ethnicity as the basis
of political action. They do not seek to build a political base of support using ethnic identities,
nor do they actively seek to create a multi-ethnic group of supporters. These parties do not take
positions on ethnic issues. They treat the country’s ethnic divide as unimportant, or ignore it
completely. Parties like the SzBiH and the NSRzB may get most of their support from a single
ethnic group, but this is not necessarily because they refuse or discourage support from other
ethnic groups. The party may advocate policies that only a single group would find appealing,
but if the policy is advocated on its own merits, and not because it will advantage a single group,
then the party can still be coded as ethnically ambiguous.
The typology I employ here is important because it facilitates an explanation demanded by
the research question. It is minimally descriptive, dividing Bosnian political parties into cat-
egories based only on the most pertinent category for the question at hand: the use of ethnic
identities. In keeping with the qualitatively different nature the different categories, this system
is nominal rather than ordinal or absolute (Collier, LaPorte & Seawright 2012). The three types
of parties are descriptive categories which cannot be quantitatively compared to each other.
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Type Characteristics Examples








Ignores Ethnic Division of
Country; Does not use Eth-
nicity as Basis of Inclusion or
Exclusion
SzBiH, NSRzB
Table 4.1: Bosnian Party Typology
They cannot be arranged spatially: an ethnically ambiguous party is not somehow “less” ethnic
than an ethnic party or “more” ethnic than an anti-ethnic party. Instead, the three are fundamen-
tally and qualitatively different categories used to describe how a party employs ethnicity as a
political asset. The three categories are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, facili-
tating the study of Bosnian political activity by reducing complexity, consolidating similarities,
and differentiating contrasts (Bailey 1994, chap. 1). On the subject of ethnicity, all Bosnian
political parties must do one of three things: adopt an ethnic identity, reject ethnic identity, or
ignore the question altogether.
The typology described here allows for variation in relationship between ethnicity and voting
that can help provide explanations for voting behavior. It allows for each vote cast in Bosnia to
be coded as one of these three categories, and facilitates the quantitative analysis of qualitatively
different behavioral observations. In this, I follow King, Keohane & Verba (1994, chap. 2) in
using a typology to provide conceptual clarity in quantitative study. In the next chapter I use
this typology in a statistical analysis of Bosnian voting behavior.
4.5.2 Can a Bosnian candidate really be “non-ethnic?”
It may be objected that the typology I propose overestimates the differences between parties,
because all parties in Bosnia are in some way “ethnic.” Intuitively, any form of political activity
that is not in some way influenced by ethnicity seems hard to imagine in Bosnia. Ethnic identi-
ties are entrenched in virtually every aspect of life, and their social salience has been reinforced
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by recent violence. Institutions and social convention segregate groups in a way that minimizes
meaningful inter-ethnic activity. Given the extreme sensitivity of Bosnian voters and politicians
to ethnic issues, and the highly visible way in ethnicity is communicated through family names
and speech patterns, it may seem that a non-ethnic or even an ethnically ambiguous party is
simply impossible. These concerns merit serious discussion, but ultimately, ignoring the pos-
sibility of parties which are not necessarily ethnic in nature obscures important insight to be
gained from a study of ethnicity in Bosnian politics.
One valid concern is that “non-ethnic” appeals cannot be equally appealing to all ethnic
groups. It is true that during the civil war, bargaining positions and strategic objectives were
closely linked to each group’s social status within Bosnia: Serb forces advocated for secession,
Croats advocated for federalism, and the Bosniaks advocated for centralization. These positions
are still among the main policy proposals advocated by ethnic parties in each faction, and it is
plausible that these positions are the still logical consequences of each groups’ position within
Bosnia. As the largest group, Bosniaks would likely dominate a centralized government that had
no explicit ethnic protections. Given their small size and territorial concentration, Croats would
gain political power and autonomy under a further decentralized state. If policy preference is a
function of ethnicity, then a policy proposal is no different from an ethnic appeal, and treating the
two as separate is inappropriate. It may also be argued that ethnic identities in most cases cannot
be hidden in Bosnia. The moment a person declares herself a candidate she identifies with a
specific identity group, and that identification will inherently influence people’s thinking in a
social context where ethnic divisions are pervasive. A Bosnian voter who sees a party headed
by a chairman with an obviously Turkish or Islamic name can readily assume that the candidate
is a Bosniak, and may also infer that the party will support the Bosniak community if elected.
If this is the case, then all the party rhetoric about a multiethnic state and civic nationalism is
essentially empty talk.
It has also been argued in other contexts that appeals to non-ethnic identities can them-
selves be a way to reinforce the dominance of one ethnic group over another. Sociologists and
critical theorists of race relations world have often argued that the “invisibility” of ethnic iden-
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tities is in fact a system which reinforces pre-existing privileges.26 In this sense, while the SDP
may advocate a country where ethnic divisions are of no import, they may actually be support-
ing the preservation of a specific system of ethnic relations linked to Yugoslav communism.
Their pleas for a strong centralized state which provides generous social welfare benefits could
be interpreted as proposal to return to the era of Titoist administration, when most powerful
Bosnian politicians were ethnic Bosniaks and Serbs tied closely to Belgrade. A proposal for an
increased emphasis on human rights and accountability may sound “ethnically blind” to western
observers, but has enormous implications on ethnic group relations given Bosnia’s history. Since
the current Bosnian institutional arrangement linking political authority, territory, and ethnicity
is largely possible because of genocide, ethnic cleansing, and targeted violence against civilians,
focusing on accountability for human rights violations may be seen as an attack against the ex-
isting order which grants equal status to all three ethnic groups. These appeals are particularly
hostile to Serbs, as the Republika Srpska is set apart from the other two groups largely as the
result of military conquest and 1990’s era genocide. Even appeals to local autonomy and federal
decentralization may be seen as a way to reinforce existing norms which benefit certain groups
over others. Croats, for instance, may find local autonomy appealing because it empowers small
groups concentrated in specific areas (i.e., Croats), but not extremely small groups scattered
through the country (i.e., Jews, Roma, and Turks).
Yet empirically, it remains undeniable that variation in the use of ethnic identities among
political parties exists, and that this variation is systematic. Given the high degree of consis-
tency in the use or rejection of ethnic identification among specific actors, this variation is best
explained by parties and candidates making conscious decisions in pursuit of political goals. Po-
litical actors cannot easily control or change their own ethnic identities, but they can change how
they present those ethnic identities to voters. It is clear from the summary above that Bosnian
politicians expend enormous resources to accentuate or downplay their ethnic identities. Some
parties—those I describe as ethnic—talk about nothing but ethnicity, even when it doesn’t seem
strictly necessarily. On issues like the environment, security, or EU accession, ethnic parties
26See Carby (1992), Roman (1993), Dyer (1997), and Dalton (2008), among others. While much of this literature
is focused on racial identities, recall from Chapter 2 that the definition of “ethnicity” in this dissertation is any
identity associated with descent. Under this conceptualization, racial identities are ethnic identities.
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feel the need to differentiate themselves from parties representing other ethnic groups, even
when the two parties are in agreement. This suggests that it is so important to their strategy
to provide an ethnically-based justification for their actions that they are willing to antagonize
other ethnic groups (and potential coalition partners) just to ensure their own ethnic brand is
strong in the minds of voters. Non-ethnic parties, likewise, go out of their way to avoid being
perceived as affiliated with a single ethnic group. Cognizant that voters may be inferring an eth-
nic attachment from the names of the candidates or party leadership, the SDP purposefully puts
together obviously multi-ethnic party lists, to prevent the impression of Bosniak dominance in
the minds of voters. The NSRzB goes out of its way to put voter platforms in all three languages
(despite complete mutual intelligibility) on its web page, to bolster its credibility as a party that
shows no favor to any single ethnic group. From the outside, it may appear that ethnicity is the
all-consuming issue in Bosnian politics. But to ignore this variation risks ignoring an important
variable that links ethnic diversity to democratic outcomes.
Rejecting the differences between the different types of parties further risks over-reliance on
an essentialist view of ethnic identity, and a rejection of human agency. It is true that Bosnia
is ethnically divided, that Bosnia has a recent history of extreme ethnic violence, and that eth-
nicity in highly polarizing in Bosnia. But to claim that because of these underlying conditions
all political action is explainable by ethnicity assumes that there is something inherent in ethnic
identities that will automatically be more politically relevant than all other identities, prefer-
ences, or social cleavages. Such an interpretation implicitly endorses the primordialist notion
that ethnic identities are “givens” in the Bosnian context. This is not consistent with recent
Bosnian history. As explained in Section 1 above, the very existence of the largest ethnic group
in Bosnia was still debated as recently as the 1970’s. It has long been observed that ethnic iden-
tities can appear to be “natural” for a variety of reasons.27 Nevertheless, accepting ethnicity as a
natural form of self-identification or inherently politically relevant risks ignoring the processes
which created the identity and gave it social salience in the first place. Ethnic identities may be
slow to change, and individuals may have relatively little capacity to change the political signif-
icance of ethnicity in the short term, but that is not to say they have no agency at all. Politicians
27See Barth (1969), Bentley (1987), Cornell (1996), Hirschfeld (1998), Gil-White (2001), Wimmer (2008), and
Brubaker (2009).
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can choose how to present themselves to voters, and whether they will emphasize their ethnicity
or not.
Ignoring this variation begs the question: what does non-ethnic politics in an ethnically
divided society look like? Since every person has an ethnic identity, shouldwe assume that every
action is a manifestation of their ethnic identity? If we deny political actors the possibility of
political action independent of their identities, we essentially assume the inevitability of ethnic
division in any diverse democracy. The assumption would make it impossible to participate in
any form of political community that transcends ethnicity, condemning any non-homogeneous
society to what Howard (2012) calls “the ethnocracy trap.” Ethnic political mobilization, even
in countries as polarized as Bosnia, must not be an assumption, but rather a phenomenon to be
scrutinized and subjected to falsifiable empirical testing. The typology proposed here allows
for variation in ethnic mobilization, and in the next chapter uses this classification system to
empirically measure the degree of success for each type of appeal.
4.6 Conclusion
The three main ethnic groups in Bosnia are all descended from a common ancestor, and share
much in history, culture, language, and tradition. While the distinction between these groups
is currently institutionalized by the Bosnian political system, this has not always been the case.
Even within living memory, Bosnia was governed by a socialist regime that sought and often
succeeded in integrating the three groups into a cohesive multiethnic society. While the ethnic
civil war of the mid-1990’s devastated Bosnian society, it also produced a new set of political
institutions designed to facilitate electoral competition and democratic governance. Under this
system, political entrepreneurs seeking to win elections use ethnicity in varying ways. Some
actively invest in their ethnicity, making exclusively ethnic appeals to an exclusively coethnic
constituency. Others are open to multi-ethnic bases of support, either vocally denouncing ethnic
segregation or simply ignoring it entirely to frame their proposals in more broadly acceptable
terms.
The result is that Bosnian voters find themselves living in an ethnically polarized society,
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where ethnic parties compete directly with non-ethnic parties in the same elections. In chapter 2,
I argued that voters in such a situation should systematically vary in their willingness to support
ethnic parties depending on institutional and demographic factors. In the next chapter, I use the
framework outlined here to test these theories through a quantitative analysis of Bosnian voting
behavior.
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5Ethnic Voting in Bosnia and Herzegovina
In the previous chapter, I outlined the qualitatively different types of appeals made by Bosnian
politicians to voters during elections. I argued that all party positions can be categorized by
a three-part typology: explicitly ethnic, explicitly non-ethnic, or ethnically ambiguous. In this
chapter, I use that typology to test predictions generated by the theory outlined in Chapter 2.
There, I argued that demographics directly influence voters’ assessments of the benefits to ethnic
policy platforms as well as the barriers to entry for ethnic group representation. In many con-
texts, it is difficult to disentangle the effects of demography on these two dimensions, because
it is usually not feasible to observe variation in the demographic circumstances while holding
other factors constant. Fortunately, such variation is present in the Bosnian context. The con-
stitutional structure of post-Yugoslav Bosnia and Herzegovina requires voters to elect leaders
to multiple bodies of government simultaneously under varying demographic circumstances.
Elections to the political entities under study here are coterminous, which holds constant vot-
ers’ political preferences, turnout rates, and international and economic political contexts, while
varying demographic conditions between levels of government.
In this chapter, I exploit that variation. Mapping the qualitative differences in the ways
which parties use ethnicity on to quantitative voting data, I show that Bosnian voters are quite
willing to vote for ethnic and non-ethnic parties even in the context of a single election. Split-
ticket voting between ethnic and non-ethnic parties is extremely common in Bosnia, despite
the fundamental contradiction in the logics these parties use to justify their positions. I argue
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that this behavior is explainable by the variation in demographics between the different levels of
government in Bosnia. When ethnic representation is most instrumentally useful, voters support
ethnic appeals. When it is less useful, voters support parties that do not campaign as champions
of ethnic groups, favoring ideological or non-ethnic populist parties.
In the first section of this chapter, I explain why an analysis of split-ticket voting in the
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a useful tool to identify the effect of group size on the
willingness of voters to support an ethnic party. In the next section I describe the novel data set
used to conduct this analysis. The third section shows the results of the analysis, and argues that
split-ticket voting in Bosnia reflects systemic patterns of ethnic party support consistent with the
predictions outlined by the theoretical chapter. Section four presents the observable implications
of the general pattern at a more micro level, examining a single Bosnian municipality and the
specific parties which ran for office at both levels there. Section five provides a brief overview
of the same pattern observed over time, and section six concludes.
5.1 Split-Ticket Voting and Ethnicity
Within the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, voters can find themselves citizens of a mu-
nicipality, a canton, an entity, and a state. Each of those polities has an independently elected
legislative assembly, meaning that a voter must vote to fill four separate legislatures. Voters may
find themselves in drastically different demographic circumstances at each level. The majority
of Croats live in Croat-majority cantons, and the majority of Bosniaks live in Bosniak-majority
cantons. Territorial ethnic homogeneity is not perfect, though. As it is essentially impossible to
draw a territorial boundary that perfectly includes a single ethnic group while excluding all oth-
ers, a significant number of people found themselves on the “wrong” side of a cantonal border
at the end of the war, living in cantons that are legally defined to be representative of another
ethnic group. Moreover, while the boundaries between cantons and entities have not changed
since the signing of the peace accords, internal migration and refugee returns have served to
increase the ethnic diversity of many cities and towns. As a result, while cantons can be said
to be much more ethnically homogeneous than the country as a whole, they nevertheless retain
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pockets of ethnic minority voters.
Cantonal Assemblies and the State House of Representatives are both parliamentary bodies,
elected by an open-list PR ballot. Yet the barriers to entry for would-be politicians are clearly
much higher at the state level than they are at the cantonal level. The state-level House of
Representatives has 42 seats, elected from both the Federation and the Republika Srpska. Elec-
toral districts, whose borders overlap with cantonal boundaries in the Federation, elect multiple
members, the lowest district magnitude being three and the highest being six. Mathematically,
this means that a party or candidate is guaranteed a seat in the parliament if they can win 16 of
the vote share in the least restrictive district. Compare this to the cantonal assemblies, which
are also selected from an open-list PR ballot using the canton as single electoral district. The
smallest Cantonal Assembly in BiH is Posavina, with 21 seats, and the largest (a three-way tie
between Sarajevo, Tuzla, and Zenica-Doboj) have 35 seats. This means that even in the most
restrictive case, a candidate is guaranteed a seat if they earn 121 of the total vote share. Can-
tonal Assemblies have a much lower barrier to entry for smaller parties, and consistent with
the literature on party systems and electoral laws, we should expect a much more fragmented
party system at the cantonal level, with greater ease for cantonal-level ethnic minorities to gain
representation. A summary of the differences between the Cantonal Assemblies and the State
House of Representatives is shown in Table 5.1.
In keeping with the consociational model, the Bosnian constitution is designed to put as
many people as possible in situations of low barriers to entry for ethnic parties. The arrange-
ment actually creates divergent patterns of benefits and ease of access across ethnic groups at
different levels of government. Consider the example of a Bosniak who lives in majority Bosniak
canton. When voting at the cantonal level, the benefits of ethnic representation are relatively
low. Coethnics are likely to dominate both private and public sectors simply by virtue of their
demographic advantage. The Bosnian language would likely dominate because most of the can-
ton belongs to the same linguistic community, and would thus need relatively little protection.
The possibility of diverting resources specifically to other Bosniaks–i.e., taxing ethnic outsiders
to the benefit of fellow Bosniaks–yields a small pay-off, because the target population that could
be expropriated is relatively small. In short, ethnic representation is unprofitable, and ideology,
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Cantonal Assemblies House of Representatives
1 3
Constituent People (Either Bosniaks orCroats)
(Bosniaks, Croats, and
Serbs)
Territory Governed 1 of 10 ethnically homo-geneous Cantons
The entire multiethnic
state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Polity Population <500,000 4 Million
District Magnitude High (21-35) Low (3-6)
Value of Ethnic Repre-
sentation
Low for Cantonal Ma-
jorities; High for Can-
tonal Minorities
High for Cantonal Ma-
jorities; High for Can-
tonal Minorities
Ease of Access for Eth-
nic Parties
High for Cantonal Ma-
jorities; High for Can-
tonal Minorities
High for Cantonal Ma-
jorities; Low for Can-
tonal Minorities
Table 5.1: Institutional and Demographic Differences between Cantonal Assemblies and House
of Representatives
class, or some other social cleavage will likely paymore dividends as the basis of representation.
The ease of access for Bosniak ethnic parties in this scenario, however, is extremely high.
Since institutions are designed to create an overwhelmingly large majority group in ethnically
homogeneous cantons, voters can be sure that ethnic representation is a completely viable op-
tion with hardly any electoral obstacles. The electoral institutions compliment the demographic
circumstances to give ethnic parties appealing to the majority group virtually no risk of coor-
dination failure or vote wasting. With an extremely high district magnitude for elections to the
cantonal assemblies, parties appealing to the majority group are almost certain to be able to win.
In this case, for those in the majority group the homogeneous nature of the cantons presents a
typical majority group outcome: a clear path to ethnic representation, but relatively little to gain.
The circumstances are different, however, for elections to the state-level parliament.
Majority-group voters can be reasonably certain that ethnic representation is still possible, since
they remain the overwhelming majority in their district. Even though the district magnitude at
the state level is substantially lower, creating increased obstacles to representation for smaller
political groups, ethnicmajorities can remain confident in their ability to clear those hurdles pro-
vided an organized mobilization effort. The potential benefits of ethnic representation, though,
have changed dramatically. Now, the body to which voters are electing representatives is gov-
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erning a fundamentally different body of citizens. This authority is charged with setting poli-
cies governing the entire country, which is much more ethnically diverse. The dominance of
the local-level majority group cannot be assumed at this point, since the other two groups are
also electing leaders to parliament. Numerical dominance is no longer sufficient to ensure pro-
tections for language and culture, and electing ethnic champions may have increased appeal
to voters concerned about discrimination or oppression. Moreover a platform of diverting re-
sources from ethnic outsiders to benefit coethnics has a much larger target population to tax,
increasing the potential rewards to each voter of electing an ethnic party to office.
In short, a voter living inside a canton dominated by coethnics has varying incentives to
support an ethnic party at the cantonal level and the state level. Ethnic parties are viable at both
levels, but have much more to offer at the state level than the cantonal level. This voter should
therefore be more likely to support an ethnic party in the House of Representatives than in the
Cantonal Assembly. For a minority group member, however, i.e., a voter from a group who is
not a dominant majority within her canton, the situation is reversed.
Whereas a majority group member has relatively little to gain through ethnic representation
at the canton level, a minority group member has much. As a minority, she is likely to live in
an environment where her language is spoken by relatively few, and could be dominated by the
larger numbers of the majority group without explicit legal protection or media subsidies. A
preference for hiring coethnics or blatant discrimination among the majority community could
make it harder for her to gain access to jobs or state resources due to her ethnic outsider status. In
a country like Bosnia, where ethnic violence is a very real memory for much of the population,
security issues could also be extreme. The dominance of the police, justice system, or security
services by local majority groups may mean an increased risk of intimidation or expropriation.
In addition to these risks which a voter would like to avoid, there are also potential rewards to
be gained through ethnic representation. Financial transfers to minority group members would
effectively tax a very large proportion of the population to redistribute to a small portion of
the population, providing a potential windfall of resources. For all of these reasons, ethnic
representation is likely to be very appealing to a minority group voter in the canton in which
she lives, resulting in a very high level of benefits at the cantonal level. Since the state is also
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highly diverse, all these same arguments would apply to the state House of Representatives,
meaning that level of benefits to be gained by ethnic representation is quite high at the local and
highest levels of government for minority groups.
Even though the potential benefits of ethnic representation are high at both levels of gov-
ernment for cantonal-level ethnic minority groups, the viability of such ethnic representation
varies drastically between the two levels. Ironically, despite the intent of the Bosnian consti-
tution’s designers, ethnic minority groups are most viable at the cantonal level where they are
ethnic outsiders—not the state level. Since Cantonal Assemblies are composed of dozens of
seats, and use the canton as a single electoral district, less than three percent of the vote may
be enough to guarantee a legislative seat at the Cantonal level. This drastically reduces the risk
of vote wasting or coordination failure that ethnic minority voters may face when voting, com-
pared to the state level. At that higher level of governance, district magnitude is much lower,
where more than five times the vote share would be required to be guaranteed a seat in the state
parliament. As such, the ease of access for smaller groups is substantially higher at the Cantonal
level than it is at the State level due to reduced barriers to entry.
This produces several hypotheses of Bosnian voter behavior. First of all, against theories of
ethnic heuristics, or preference derived from ethnic attachment, Bosnian citizens should vary
in their willingness to support ethnic parties based on the political unit whose offices they are
electing. Since the potential gains of ethnic representation and the likelihood of actually obtain-
ing it are not the same at both levels of government, we should not expect to individual voters
to respond to ethnic appeals made by parties in the same way in both contexts. Secondly, the
variation in voter willingness to support ethnic parties should be a function of their local-level
demographic status. Cantonal majority group should be more likely to support non-ethnic par-
ties at the cantonal level, but switch their vote to ethnic parties at the state level. This also means
that an increase in ethnic voting at the state level should be directed to cantonal-level majority
groups (and not cantonal-level minority groups). Cantonal minority groups should exhibit the
opposite behavior, supporting ethnic parties at the cantonal level, but non-ethnic parties at the
state level. A summary of these predictions is listed in Table 5.2.
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퐻5.1
Vote share for ethnic and non-ethnic parties will vary between cantonal
and state-level elections
퐻5.2
Ethnic voting in elections for the House of Representatives will decline
in proportion to those votes going to ethnic minority parties for the Can-
tonal Assembly
퐻5.3푎
Ethnic voting in elections for the House of Representatives will increase
in proportion to those votes going to non-ethnically identified parties for
the Cantonal Assembly
퐻5.3푏
Increases in ethnic voting in the House of Representatives Elections will
be driven by increased support for parties representing local ethnic ma-
jorities, not minorities
Table 5.2: Hypotheses
5.2 Data Collection and Sources
The fact that Bosnian institutions have voters electing officials simultaneously under different
institutional environments presents a unique opportunity to test a theory of ethnic voting based
on the desirability and feasibility of ethnic representation. Elections for cantonal and state-level
parliaments are held concurrently, and the voter’s perception of pressing policy issues or pref-
erences are not likely to change between local and national-level elections. Under permissive
electoral laws and a highly fragmented political party system, the same political parties com-
pete at both subnational and national-levels for political office. Under Bosnia’s ethno-federal
constitution the cantonal governments and the state government often have overlapping author-
ity, suggesting that voters are likely to evaluate candidates by the same criteria at both levels
of government. To exploit this opportunity, I construct a novel data set that consists of two
parts: a qualitative coding of which parties in Bosnia make ethnic appeals and which do not,
and precinct-level voting data collected directly from the Bosnian Election Commission. The
data set covers all elections in Bosnia 2006-2014. The time period under study starts more than
ten years after the end of the Yugoslav Civil War, at which point international election observers
and NGOs had certified that elections were free and democratic.
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5.2.1 Coding Parties
Party registration rolls from the period under study contained 149 different political parties,
pre-electoral coalitions, and individual candidates. Many of these entries were duplicates or
alternate abbreviations of parties and candidates listed elsewhere. After consolidating the list
of parties registered with the Bosnian Election Commission to eliminate these discrepancies, I
was left with 91 unique parties, coalitions, and individual candidates. I then coded all political
parties as either ethnic parties representing Bosniaks, ethnic parties representing Croats, eth-
nic parties representing Serbs, or non-ethnic parties. This was done based on party platforms,
party information, candidate declarations, and mission statements downloaded from publicly
available political party websites. Of the 91 registered electoral choices, 20 of them were inde-
pendent candidates or parties so small that they had no trace in the public record that I could
find. I therefore drop these votes from the dataset, treating them as if the people who had voted
for these candidates had simply abstained. Since these parties are extremely small and had very
low levels of support, it is not expected that they should systematically bias the analysis in any
direction. In total, the coding scheme covers 98.48% of all votes cast in all three elections.
In coding parties, I rely on the definition of “ethnic party” outlined in Chapter 2. For a
party to be classified as ethnic in this dataset, it must clearly identify itself with a specific ethnic
group. It must also exclude other ethnic groups from their agenda, making it obvious who
the “outsiders” are who will not benefit from the policies enacted by the party once in power.
The party must also make its ethnic identity central to its brand, with ethnically-defined group
interests as the central mission of the party’s political agenda. The standard employed is whether
or not a reasonably intelligent voter would be able to clearly and quickly identify which ethnic
group a party claimed to support using information made readily available by the party itself.
While the criteria applied may be considered somewhat subjective, the nature of campaign-
ing in the Bosnian context provides a certain degree of clarity. Because of the political party
activities outlined in Chapter 4, there are relatively few controversial coding decisions. Many
parties rely so heavily on ethnic cues in campaigning to voters that the name of the ethnic group
is also the name of the party, and national or ethnic symbols are frequently used as party logos.
For these parties, which ethnic group the party represents is abundantly clear from immediate
128
observation, especially to Bosnian voters who are often extremely sensitive to ethnic identifica-
tion. Other parties explicitly attack ethnic parties as corrupt and denounce ethnic divisions as
immoral and illegitimate, making their own non-ethnic identity extremely obvious.
The potential difficulties in coding stem from the category defined as “ethnically ambiguous”
in Chapter 5. These are the parties which completely ignore ethnic issues in their campaigning,
neither explicitly identifying with a single ethnic group, nor publicly declaring their advocacy
of interests on explicitly non-ethnic grounds. For the purposes of this data set, these parties
are classified as non-ethnic. This is a deliberate decision, and one that is consistent with the
approach and aims of this dissertation. First, the definition of “ethnic party” used in this dis-
sertation requires explicit ethnic identification. This high standard is the most appropriate to
explaining the choices people make in mobilizing along ethnic grounds during elections. The
definition creates a measurement standard that captures the variation most important to this
question: the choice of politicians to identify as an ethnic champion, and the choice of voters to
support them.
Nevertheless, this standard puts my coding decisions at odds with other definitions com-
monly used in the literature. Many parties in Bosnia meet the standard used in Horowitz (1985)
in that virtually all of their voter support is derived from a single ethnic group, but nevertheless
present themselves in non-ethnically defined terms. Many regional experts on Bosnia classify
these parties as ethnic. Šedo (2010), for instance, classifies the Party for Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina (SzBiH) as a Bosniak nationalist party, whereas I classify it as a non-ethnic party. There
are admittedly convincing intuitive reasons to label the SzBiH as an ethnic party: its political
support comes almost exclusively from Bosniak areas, and it was originally formed as a result of
an internal rift within the front-running Bosniak nationalist party.1 But to classify the SzBiH as
ethnic because of which ethnic group supports it assumes the primacy of ethnicity as a mech-
anism for vote choice, and thus cannot be used to analyze the relationship between ethnicity
and voting. Coding parties such as the SzBiH as non-ethnic holds that voting for a party that
explicitly advocates for the interests of a single ethnic community is categorically different than
voting for a party that does not. As such, the coding system allows for the possibility that ethnic
1See discussion beginning on page 108.
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identity is epiphenomenal to some other interest, and is more helpful in explaining why voters
are mobilized along ethnic lines.
The biggest concern with this standard is that Bosnian voters do not judge a party by their
words, but by their supporters. It is entirely possible that voters do not form ideas of parties’
ethnic allegiances based not on what they claim they will do (or even what they actually end
up doing) but by their base of supporters. This problem may be exacerbated by the Bosnian
media, which often presents even ostensibly non-ethnic parties as if they catered to a single
group. Politiciansmay have incentives to portray competitors as being beholden to ethnic groups
as part of an electoral strategy, further compounding the problem. If this is the case, then
the perceptions driving voting behavior are not adequately measured by the party campaign
strategies, since voters assess parties by factors not directly under the party’s control. Given the
high degree of salience that ethnicity has in Bosnian daily life, and the complete lack of stigma
surrounding explicit ethnic appeals in Bosnia, I do not believe this is the case. Nevertheless, I
cannot completely discount that these assessments may be the ways in which voters understand
parties when making voting decisions. As such, I recode the parties classifying these ethnically
ambiguous parties as ethnic parties in Appendix A as a robustness check.
5.2.2 Voting Data
Voting data was obtained directly from the Bosnian Election Commission using a series of au-
tomated web scraping scripts. Voting results were collected at the precinct-level for all three
elections under study. Precincts in Bosnia are quite small, bringing them as close as possible
to the individual-level. Pooling results from all three elections produces over 6,000 observa-
tions (after excluding the two mixed-ethnicity cantons), with mean and median precinct size
of roughly 300 people. As precincts represent individual neighborhoods within municipalities,
they tend to be much more ethnically homogeneous than the cantons and municipalities as a
whole. Precincts are not perfectly homogeneous, though, and there is the potential that system-
atic differences between group members could bias the results. However, this bias would most
likely be towards null effects, with minority and majority members canceling each other out.
Moreover, the relatively high sample size of this study can increase confidence that any results
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observed are the result of systematic behavior.
While precincts are quite small, they remain amalgamations of individuals. This raises the
possibility that any findings could be affected by ecological fallacy. One possible solution to
this would be to rely on polling data of individuals, such as exit polls or voting intent data.
Such an approach would have the advantage of bringing the unit of analysis in line with the
level where the theorized mechanism operates. However, there are drawbacks to this approach.
The most obvious is availability of data. Bosnian public opinion data is not always readily
available, and many of the surveys which do exist do not always explicitly differentiate between
cantonal and state-level categories among the same group of respondents. Survey respondents
may not be the most reliable sources of data on their own behavior, as studies in other countries
have demonstrated a general trend for under-reporting split-ticket voting in a variety of contexts.
Burden&Kimball (2009) note that comparing self-reported survey data to actual election results
in the United States shows that voters report higher levels of straight party ticket voting than
are borne out by the actual electoral results. Burden (2009) shows that in Japan, voting for
smaller niche parties goes under-reported in self-reported survey data. Since some parties may
be more viable in either the Single Member District or Proportional Representation side of
Japan’s mixed electoral system ballot, the under-reporting for small parties creates a systemic
bias where substantially less ticket-splitting voting is self-reported than is actually observed.
These concerns are especially potent in this context, as the Bosnian ballot is enormously
complicated. In some elections, a Bosnian voter could be expected to vote for a municipal
councilor, a mayor, a member of a cantonal parliament, a member of an entity parliament, and
a president all at once. When asked to recount who they voter for at each election, a voter
could be forgiven for confusing exactly who she voted for when. Moreover, the concerns of
misreporting driven by conscious or unconscious social desirability bias may be especially acute
here, as survey respondents would be in a position of having to admit that they voted for parties
espousing two contradictory arguments in the same electoral contest. Voters may not be willing
to admit to this behavior, and as such relying on self-reported data would introduce a strong
possibility for bias towards null results.2 Using actual electoral data alleviates these concerns,
2Anecdotal evidence from my own fieldwork suggests that the social desirability bias against admitting split-
ticket votingmay be quite strong in Bosnia. In many informal discussions with Bosnian academics, political figures,
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since the behavior is observed directly.
5.3 Analysis
5.3.1 Descriptive statistics
Conventional wisdom holds that most voting is ethnic voting in Bosnia. While this is indeed
the case, the degree to which this is true may have been overstated. Pooling cantonal and state-
level elections over the three electoral cycles surveyed, only 51.75% of the vote went to parties
explicitly identifying as ethnic.3 This focus on state-level aggregation though ignores important
district-level variation.
Figure 5.1 hints at this variation by displaying a box plot of the vote share going to ethnic
parties in the entire data set. In this figure, the solid line in the box represents the median vote
share going to ethnic parties at either the cantonal or state-level legislative elections among all
precincts. The box represents the first and third quartiles, and the whiskers extending beyond
the box represent the 1.5 times those values to cover the ethnic vote share of 3/4 of the precincts
surrounding the median. Not surprisingly, the ranges covered by the second and third quartiles
are rather large. This suggests a large degree of precinct-level voting heterogeneity, which is
generally to be expected in most democracies, as people are not randomly assigned to voting
precincts. Even at this level of aggregation, the median precinct shows greater ethnic voting
at the state level than the cantonal level. While the median precinct supported ethnic votes in
cantonal legislatures at the rate of 28.57%, this level rises to 36.69% at the state level. A 푡 test of
and everyday citizens, I mentioned that I was studying Bosnian elections, and had found that a substantial number
of Bosnian voters engaged in split-ticket voting between ethnic and non-ethnic parties. No single person I discussed
this with ever admitted to voting for different parties at different levels of government themselves, but offered up a
variety of explanations as to why someone elsemight. I never revealedwhat the actual pattern was, but interestingly,
people offered intuitive explanations that diverged in their prediction. Some thought that ethnic voting was more
likely at the local level than at the national level, suggesting that some voters were fine with living in a multiethnic
state, and respecting ethnic and cultural diversity at the national level, but disliked the idea of actually having to
tolerate ethnic outsiders in their immediate vicinity. Others thought that ethnic voting would be more likely at
the national level, suggesting that contact with ethnic outsiders in immediate circumstances would lead people to
think that all of the out-group members they knew personally were “the good ones,” even if they distrusted the
other groups as a whole in the abstract. No one seemed to offer a sympathetic or supportive explanation for this
behavior, mostly seeing it as inconsistent or attributing it to ignorance or mercenary motives. While this evidence
is completely anecdotal and no conclusions should be drawn from it, it is at the very least suggestive that a social
desirability bias against split-ticket voting may skew results.

























Ethnic Voting in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Figure 5.1: Ethnic Voting in Bosnia at Cantonal and State Levels
mean ethnic party support between Cantonal Assembly and House of Representative elections
produces a change of 6.9%, with a 푡 value of 29.004 (푝 < .001), suggesting a modest, but highly
statistically significant tendency towards increased ethnic voting in House of Representatives
elections over voting for Cantonal Assemblies. This indicates that a not insignificant number of
Bosnian voters are varying in their support of ethnic parties between different levels of elections.
Figure 5.2 disaggregates local-level majorities and minorities. The left hand side of this
figure shows the vote share at both the cantonal and the state level going to parties who represent
the cantonal-level majority, i.e., it combines the shares of parties claiming to represent Croats
in Croat Cantons, and parties representing Bosniaks is Bosniak cantons. The right-hand side
shows the vote share at both levels going to parties who represent the cantonal level minority.
This include parties representing Bosniaks in Croat cantons, or Croats in Bosniak cantons.4 Note
that the whiskers reflecting the median 75% of the precincts are now much narrower. Whereas
the range in Figure 5.1 spreads from 0 all the way to 1, the majority group ethnic vote share in a
precinct rarely exceeds 75%, and the minority group vote share is rarely above 35%. This makes
sense, given the demographic circumstances of each group. Both majorities and minorities have
their maximum support levels capped by demographics. By definition, majority groups have
larger numbers, so their cap is less restrictive. But they are rarely the only group in a given
4It also includes those parties which represent Serbs in either type of canton, but this number is small enough




















































Figure 5.2: Ethnic Voting in Bosnia by Group Type
district. Even in a district where everyone voted for ethnic parties, the majority group would
still not win 100% of the vote, as a small number of ethnic minority group members would vote
for parties of their own group, not the majority’s. The cap is much more restrictive for minority
group members. Since minority members by definition constitute less than half of their canton,
it would be extremely surprising for parties representing them to exceed the 50% barrier. While
they may reach relatively high numbers due to their geographic concentration within precincts,
this is quite rare, and results in a relatively low median vote share by precinct.
Comparing aggregated means, while suggestive, ignores the enormous variation between
precincts. Figure 5.3 shows a scatterplot of ethnic voting. Those dots on the 45◦ line represent
precincts where voters supported ethnic and non-ethnic parties in equal proportions in elec-
tions for Cantonal Assemblies and the House of Representatives. Dots above the line are those
precincts which supported ethnic parties at a higher level in the House of Representatives than
they did in the Cantonal Assemblies, and those below the line represent lower levels of eth-
nic party support in the House of Representatives than in the Cantonal Assemblies. While a
large number of precincts are concentrated on the 45◦ line, a significant number of precincts
deviate substantially, suggesting a high degree of split-ticket voting between ethnic and non-
ethnic parties. Moreover, points are scattered both below and above the 45◦ line, suggesting




























Split Ticket Voting in
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Figure 5.3: Ethnic Voting Scatterplot
others have moved away from ethnic parties. At the extremes, in the upper left corner and the
lower right quadrant, are those precincts which saw almost total shifts between ethnic and non-
ethnic parties, with virtually every single voter switching their vote from ethnic to non-ethnic
(or vice-versa) in a single election.
Figure 5.3 shows that even in a country like Bosnia, where ethnicity is extremely relevant to
many aspects of social and political life, identity alone is not sufficient to predict voting behavior.
Substantial numbers of voters are voting splitting their tickets between ethnic and non-ethnic
parties even in the context of the same election. Of the 8,311 precincts covered in the study,
1,272 saw a change in ethnic voting (in either direction) of more than 25%. In the next section,
I test 퐻5.2, 퐻5.3푎 , and 퐻5.3푏 using regression analysis.
5.3.2 Local majority/minority status as independent variable
I use ecological regression analysis with ballot-level fixed effects in order to identify patterns in
split-ticket voting to test 퐻5.2, 퐻5.3푎 , and 퐻5.3푏 . In the absence of individual-level data, ecolog-
ical regression represents the best possible way to generate estimates of individual-level ticket
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splitting. I therefore model three separate regressions using the following model specification:
푦푘푖 = 훼푘 + 훽푥푘푖 + 휀푘푖
where 푘 indexes cantons-years and 푖 indexes voting precincts. The dependent variable 푦 is the
difference in ethnic voting in precinct 푖 in canton 푘 between the cantonal legislative election and
the state legislative election. A value of 푦푘푖 greater than zero indicates that ethnic parties did
better at the state level than they did at the national level, whereas a negative 푦푘푖 indicates that
non-ethnic parties did better at the state level than the cantonal level. When 푦푘푖 = 0, support for
ethnic parties and non-ethnic parties did not change between cantonal and state-level elections.
Three separate regressions are run with the independent variable 푥푘푖 representing the share of
the vote going to ethnic parties representing the cantonal-level majority group, the cantonal-
level minority group, or non-ethnic parties. The models must be run separately, as putting all
three measures into a single model specification introduces near-perfect colinearity. Since all
votes are coded as belonging to one of the three categories, vote shares of all three measures
sum to one in almost all precincts.
OLS estimates of 훽 therefore produce estimates of the percentage of the voters who voted
for either ethnic majority parties, ethnic minority parties, or non-ethnic parties at the cantonal
level but switched their vote at the state level. The sign on the coefficient also indicates the
“direction”—in this case, whether in favor of ethnic parties (a positive 훽) or in favor of non-
ethnic parties (a negative 훽). The interpretation of 훽—i.e., that a one unit change in 푥 generates a
훽 unit change in 푦— is the probability that a single voter will change their vote between cantonal
levels and state levels; because 푥 measures vote share, a one-unit change in 푥 corresponds to
going from zero voters to all of the voters. Ecological regression of this form has been used
in other studies of voting behavior, where voter characteristics be relevant but are difficult to
measure at the individual level. It has been used most commonly in the American context to
study voting differences based on gender or race in heterogeneous electoral districts.5
Indexing 훼 by 푘 allows for intercepts to vary by canton, and controls for some important
5See Gosnell (1957), Loewen & Grofman (1989), Freedman, Klein, Sacks, Smyth & Everett (1991), Grofman
& Davidson (1992), King (1997) and Cho (1998).
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OLS Analysis
Dependent Variable is Change in Ethnic







Adjusted 푅2 0.459 0.452 0.401
푛 6483 6483 6483
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*:p< .05; **:p< .01; ***:p< .001
Model includes Canton-Year fixed effects (Coefficients not shown)
Standard errors are clustered by Canton-Year
Table 5.3: Split-Ticket Voting Regression Results
theoretical concerns and other possible explanations. Burden & Kimball (2009) argue that
split-ticket voting in the United States is a result of contest-specific factors, especially candi-
date quality, influencing individual voters. Given that American elections allow voters to vote
for individuals, not parties, an especially popular or competent candidate may be able to over-
come partisan attachment in a specific race (or equally possible, an especially incompetent or
unappealing candidate may be able to drive co-partisans to the other side of the aisle). While
somewhat lessened in the Bosnian context, this concern is not completely irrelevant. Bosnian
political parties have very strong brands, and are generally controlled by strong and recognizable
party leaders. The highly fragmented party system and relative ease of starting a new political
party is such that strong individual candidates typically form their own parties if they develop
a large enough following on their own. Nevertheless, an open-list system does give Bosnian
voters the chance to cross party lines at different levels of government, which they may very
well do if a specific candidate on a party list is highly appealing. If, for example, a particularly
appealing non-ethnic candidate was campaigning at the state level, those who voted for ethnic
parties at the state level but switched to vote for that particular candidate would drive increases
in 푦 correlated with 푥, introducing omitted variable bias. Including fixed effects in the model
controls for this effect as candidate quality would be constant at the cantonal level. Since can-
tons are the smallest level of election in this study, canton-year dummy variables are equivalent
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to ballot dummies.
Table 5.3 shows the results of these regressions. The positive coefficient on the non-ethnic
parties suggests that a voter who supports a non-ethnic party for a cantonal-level election has
a roughly one in four chance of switching her vote to support an ethnic party at the state level,
which supports 퐻5.3푎 . Since these voters are the majority group within their canton, ethnic
parties remain viable contenders for political office with a high chance of winning on the basis
of ethnic mobilization at both cantonal levels and state levels. But since the state is much more
ethnically diverse than the canton, these groups stand to gain more through ethnic representation
at the state level than they do at the canton, and thus have stronger incentives to support ethnic
parties there. The negative coefficient on the Ethnic Minority Party term confirms 퐻5.2. The
estimate indicates that roughly one in three people who support minority ethnic parties at the
canton level switch their vote to support non-ethnic parties at the state level. The theory predicts
that those supporting canton-level ethnic majority parties should have the weakest incentives to
change their vote, as any reason to support the ethnic majority party at the cantonal level is only
stronger at the state level. This group of voters shows the smallest likelihood of switching their
vote, at only one in ten. While all of these values are statistically significant at the .05 level, the
final coefficient on canton-level majority groups only barely meats the standard (푝 = .05003).
Increases in ethnic voting at the state level should be driven by votes going to parties that
represent cantonal majority groups. Since those groups have a much greater likelihood of ac-
tually winning office, ethnic majority group members are more likely to support ethnic parties
than ethnic minority group members. The dependent variable specified in the three models
above is the difference in ethnic voting, and cannot differentiate between ethnic voting increases
in majority or minority groups. I therefore run two more regressions, this time using differ-
ence in canton-level majority and minority ethnic party support as the dependent variable, and
the non-ethnic party share at the cantonal level as the independent variable. Table 5.4 shows
these results, and confirms the predictions of 퐻5.3푏 . Roughly one in five voters who support
non-ethnic parties at the cantonal level switch their vote to support parties of the local level ma-
jority group, whereas only one in seventeen voters who supported non-ethnic parties switched
to support canton-level minority parties.
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Party Share (0.063) (0.030)
Adjusted 푅2 0.609 0.301
푁 6483 6483
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*:p< .05; **:p< .01; ***:p< .001
Model includes Canton and Year fixed effects
(Coefficients not shown)
Standard errors are clustered by Canton-Year
Table 5.4: Disaggregated Dependent Variable
5.3.3 State level demographic status as independent variable
I have argued that local level demographic circumstances are strong predictors of ethnic voting
behavior, and that majority or minority status should affect all voters regardless of which specific
group they belong to. In other words, it is less important whether a voter is a Croat or a Bosniak
than whether they are a member of a cantonal minority or majority group. If we could hold the
voter’s ethnic identity constant, but vary whether that identity group is a majority or minority
group within their district, we should observe variation in voting behavior. While it is not
possible to randomize group status, it is possible to compare group behavior across regions,
exploiting the fact that in the Bosnian context the same groups can be majorities or minorities
depending on which canton they find themselves in. I do this in Figure 5.4.
These plots show the differences in the coefficients discussed in Table 5.3 disaggregated by
ethnic group. These wider confidence intervals around Croat cantons are a result of different
sample sizes. Since Croats approximately 15% of the population of the country, whereas Bosni-
aks are roughly 50% of the country, there are more Bosniak-majority precincts in the dataset
than there are Croat-majority precincts. Disaggregating by specific ethnic group thus results in
more precise estimates for Bosniaks than it does for Croats. Nevertheless, the majority/minority
distinction seems to matter more than specific ethnic identification. The coefficients for major-
ity share in Bosniak cantons and majority share in Croat cantons overlap (i.e., a Croat living in
a Croat canton who voted for a Croat party at the cantonal level has roughly the same chance of
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Figure 5.4: Comparison by Group
changing her vote to a non-ethnic party as a Bosniak living in a Bosniak canton who voted for
a Bosniak party). Likewise, the coefficients for minority share in Bosniak cantons and minority
share in Croat cantons overlap (i.e., a Croat living in a Bosniak canton who voted for a Croat
party at the cantonal level has roughly the same chance of changing her vote to a non-ethnic
party as a Bosniak living in a Croat canton who voted for a Bosniak party). The differences
between groups given majority or minority status are not statistically significant. However, the
differences between majority and minority do not overlap, as the differences between them are
statistically significant. All this suggests that a local level minority group member is more likely
to behave the same way as local-level minority group member of the other ethnicity than she is
as coethnics living in areas where they are the majority. When it comes to ticket-splitting, local
demographics matter more than group attachment.
Things are murkier when looking at the multiethnic share, as seen in the lowest two line
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Figure 5.5: Ethnic Vote Share Precinct Distribution
segments of the figure. While both coefficients are positive and statistically significant after
disaggregating by ethnic identification, there is no overlap between them, suggesting a statisti-
cally significant difference in the magnitude of split-ticket voting between the two groups. This
would imply that that those living in Bosniak cantons are actually more likely to switch their
vote to ethnic parties than those living in Croat cantons. While this is borne out by the data, this
is likely the result of ceiling effects. The analysis here measures split-ticket voting to gauge the
relative weight voters place on ethnic labels when voting, and as such is susceptible to ceiling
and floor effects. In the Bosnian case, this is a more serious issue among Croat voters than
Bosniaks.
141
The issue is that even though both Bosniaks and Croats show similar propensity for split-
ticket voting, they differ in their likelihood to support ethnic parties in the first place. Figure
5.5 shows a smoothed distribution plot of vote share going to ethnic parties representing the
cantonal-level majority group at both levels of elections. The top chart in the figure is the
cantonal elections, while the bottom chart is the state level elections. The x-axis ranges from
zero to one, (i.e., those precincts where ethnic parties received no votes on the left side to
those where majority groups ethnic parties received all the votes on the right), and the y-axis
represents the probability density in all the data set. The red area represents the votes going to
Croat ethnic parties in Croat cantons, while the green area represents the votes going to Bosniak
ethnic parties in Bosniak cantons.
The two distributions skew in different directions. The Bosniak distribution is single-peaked
with a skew towards 0, while the Croat distribution is saddle shaped, but skewing to the right.
This suggests a difference between the two groups. This is consistent with other scholarly work
on Bosnia, which frequently finds that Croats tend to be much more ethnically-oriented than
Bosniaks within the Federation (Džankić 2015, Hulsey 2015, Keil & Perry 2015, Zdeb 2016).
Candidates in the Croat community often rally voter support on the creation of parallel insti-
tutions and demands for the creation of a third entity, separating the Bosniak and Croat sides
which currently share a federal entity between them. Ethnic parties on the Croat side are also
more radicalized and face weaker non-ethnic or ethnically ambiguous competition. That the
Croat side is more radically ethnified creates the potential for bias in the estimations in Croat
cantons.
Nevertheless, the “push” between cantonal levels and state levels moves both groups of peo-
ple to the right. The large bulge on the left of the distribution at the cantonal level is noticeably
more to the right at the state level, suggesting an increase in ethnic voting. That same movement
in the Croat distribution is detectable, although it is pushed up against the edge of the figure by
ceiling effects. A more plateaued distribution on the right side of the figure at the cantonal
level becomes a peak pushing up against the 100% mark at the state level. However, since the
vote share cannot exceed 100%, estimates produced for Croat voting are likely to be lower than
Bosniak voting.
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Table 5.5: Voting Returns from Odžak 2010*
Classification Cantonal Level State Level
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) Croat 1955 1927
Croatian Party of Rights/HDZ 1990/New
Croat Initiative Croat 1321 1493
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) Bosniak 1382 972
Social Democratic Party (SDP) Non-ethnic 843 1055
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SzBiH) Non-ethnic 439 294
People’s Party for Work and Betterment
(NSRzB) Non-ethnic 307 46
Union for a Better Future - Fahrudin Radončić
(SBB) Non-ethnic 192 347
Posavina Party Non-ethnic 158 0
Party for the People of Bosnia Non-ethnic 146 0
Total Majority Share Croat 48% 54%
Total Minority Share Bosniak 20% 15%
Total Non-ethnic Share Non-ethnic 32% 31%
*Table shows only parties gaining 100 votes or more
5.4 The Results in a Single City: the Case of Odžak
The general pattern documented in the statistical analysis above can also be observed directly
in individual cities. Consider the city of Odžak, a small, predominantly Croat municipality
in the Croat canton of Posavina in the north-east of the country. Odžak is near the three-part
border betweenCroatia, Serbia, and Bosnia, less than ten kilometers away from the Croat border,
and less than one hundred kilometers away from the Serb border.6 Odžak is typical of many
cities in the Federation: it has a clearly dominant demographic group (Croats, in this case), but
large numbers of ethnic minorities (predominately Bosniaks) that are politically significant. The
party system is heavily fragmented, with large numbers of parties contesting elections at each
electoral contest. Ethnic parties claiming to represent both ethnic groups and non-ethnic parties
campaigning on a wide range of non-ethnic social issues are all present on the local ballot.
Table 5.5 shows the vote tallies for the 2010 canton- and state-level elections in Odžak. The
Croat ethnic vote, by far the biggest electoral bloc in the city is divided between two parties:
the HDZ, and a coalition of HDZ break-away parties. The Bosniak ethnic vote is mostly con-
6Odžak is a municipality, but the unit of analysis in the regression is the precinct. In the regression, Odžak is
represented by the 22 voting precincts of the city. The example uses the municipality level as a more intuitive way
of understanding how strategic voting impacts outcomes.
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solidated into a single party—the SDA. The non-ethnic side is highly fragmented. Three of
the parties would meet the standards of “ethnically ambiguous” outlined in the previous chap-
ter: The Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Union for a Better Future are both strongly
associated with Bosniak candidates, and tend to do well in Bosniak areas. The People’s Party
for Work and Betterment is an ostensibly non-ethnic party that campaigns almost exclusively in
Croat areas. Three parties are truly non-ethnic: the Social Democratic Party is an anti-nationalist
successor party to the Yugoslav communists, the Posavina Party is a multiethnic party advocat-
ing for regional interests, and the Party for the People of Bosnia is a minor populist multiethnic
party originally founded in nearby Zenica that had expanded to contest elections in Posavina.
For most parties there is extremely little consistency in the vote totals between the canton
and state levels. The HDZ is the only party to swing less than 10% between the two levels of
elections, and some parties sway by hundreds of votes—a high level of volatility in a city of
well under 10,000 voters. But the gains and losses between the two levels of elections are not
random. In total, the Croat ethnic vote goes from 48% to 54%. Since Croats are the majority
group in the canton but a minority in the state, it stands to reason that they have much more to
gain through ethnic representation at the state level, and will therefore be more likely to support
ethnic parties at that level. The Bosniaks, on the other hand, are theminority group in the canton,
and thus have more to gain at the cantonal level than the Croats, and face smaller barriers to
entry at the cantonal level. This helps explain why the Bosniak share of the vote is higher at
the cantonal level than the state level—the opposite pattern from the Croat ethnic parties. The
non-ethnic party’s vote share remains relatively constant, but it is clear that this is the result of
Croat ethnic ticket-splitting and Bosniak ethnic ticket-splitting canceling each other out. The
SDP seems to have gained many votes while the SDA has lost many, which would be consistent
with Bosniaks supporting an ethnic champion at the cantonal level, but multi-ethnic socialists
at the state level as a second-best option. This may also explain the increased vote tallies of the
SBB, who campaigns on an ostensibly multi-ethnic platform but still targets mostly Bosniaks.7
7The SBB is one of the few parties in the dataset that changes classifications between ethnic and non-ethnic. In
2010, the party was ostensibly non-ethnic. See next section.
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Figure 5.6: Bosnian SNSD Logo, adopted 1996
5.5 Variation over Time
The results presented above suggest that for political parties making strategic decisions about
how to campaign to win elections, the optimal strategies depend on both constituency and the
level of government for which a party is campaigning. For the State House of Representatives,
the optimal strategy for winning is to mobilize an ethnic majority group within a canton using
ethnic appeals. If a party is trying to win a cantonal assembly, then a non-ethnic appeal targeting
a multi-ethnic voting base is a more viable strategy, as doing so will be likely to win votes
from both cantonal majority and minority groups. The ecological regression research design
employed above is ill-equipped to observe and test this tendency, as it cannot detect trends
over time. In the time period under study, only one party ever makes demonstrative efforts
to change its appeals from ethnic to non-ethnic. In Chapter 6, I turn to the case of Latvia to
document that elites actually do adopt new strategies regarding ethnic appeals in light of the
incentives I document here. Nevertheless, there is some qualitative evidence of the parties that
have substantially changed their ethnic appeals that support this prediction. In this section,
I survey three parties that have made noticeable changes to their ethnic appeal strategy: the
Serb-dominated SNSD, led by Milorad Dodik, the Union for a Better Future led by Fahrudin
Radončić, and the Bosnian Patriotic Party, led by Sefer Halilović.
The highest profile example of this change is the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats
(SNSD), led by Milorad Dodik. In the early days of post-war Bosnia, the SNSD was identi-
fied by foreign development agencies and peacebuilders as a potential moderate party in the
Republika Srpska. Dodik, who advocated a more moderate political platform than Karadžić’s
SDS, was seen as the natural partner for the international community seeking to moderate and
diffuse ethnic tensions. This initial moderation is still represented in the party’s name and logo:
the name simultaneously suggests a conciliatory approach to politics (“Alliance” and “Inde-
pendent,” rather than any ethnic labels), and an ideological orientation (it is a party of “Social
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Democrats”). Its logo is also surprisingly devoid of any nationalist imagery: the stylized flower
suggests an homage to the same red rose pattern used by the SDP. Despite close involvement
with the international community, Dodik felt the SNSD was poised to gain votes from the SDS
by attacking it as corrupt and inefficient. But in its campaigns, the SNSD combined a left-of
center ideology and appeals to valence issues like incorruptibility with more extreme nationalist
positions, attacking the legitimacy of the Bosnian state and the oppression of Serbs at the hands
of the other two groups (Toal 2013). The ethnic rhetoric proved a highly successful electoral tac-
tic, and increased in every electoral cycle until the party was warned and eventually suspended
from the Socialist International for nationalist and extremist political positions that were incon-
sistent with the tenets of social democracy (Dnevni avaz 2011). A far cry from his initial status
as the moderate partner of international peacebuilders, in January of 2017 the United States
Treasury Department placed sanctions on Dodik’s personal assets in the United States, arguing
that he was actively trying to subvert the peace deal in his country and attempting to create
an independent Serb territory by partitioning the Bosnian state (Radio Liberty 2017). Today,
Dodik is the Serb president of Bosnia, and has effectively broken all ties with Washington and
Brussels, campaigning on a platform of secessionism, ethnic Serb nationalism, denial of Serb
atrocities during the civil war, and closer ties with Serbia and Russia (Surk 2018, Pandora’s
Box 2018, Hall of Infamy: Milorad Dodik 2019). The SNSD thus began as a moderate, social-
ist party (similar in ideology to the Social Democratic Party), that campaigned as a non-ethnic
alternative to the ethnic Serb parties in the Republika Srpska. It became a hardline extremist
ethnic party, and in doing so became the most important party representing the Serb entity of
Bosnia. The electoral dynamics outlines here suggest that such a transition should not be sur-
prising: the strategywhichmakes it easiest to win state-level votes in Bosnia is one of mobilizing
local-level ethnic majority groups.
A similar progression is seen on the Bosniak side, with the candidacy of Fahrudin Radončić
and his Union for a Better Future. As mentioned in Chapter 4, Radončić is a wealthy media
and construction magnate based in Sarajevo. Radončić established his own party, the Union
for a Better Future (SBB) in 2009. Having run for the Bosniak seat of the presidency multiple
times, Radončić seems to have more actively embraced an ethnic identity as his political career
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The text in the middle reads, “Serb Power!” The text boxes in the graphic
wall behind read “For Serb Victory” and “A Serb Future”
Figure 5.7: Bosnian SNSD Homepage, February 2017
evolves. The SBB was established as a secular, multinational party, advocating for the rights of
all citizens of the Bosnian state–a position still reflected in its official statute in 2014 (SBB). Yet a
stark contrast in the party’s strategy was visible on the streets of Bosnian cities between the 2010
election and the 2014 election, when Radončić changed his branding strategy in his campaign
for the Bosniak seat of the Bosnian Presidency. The contrast is displayed in Figure 5.8. In 2010,
Radončić described himself as “a successful person, for a successful Bosnia.” In 2014, Radončić
was portrayed as a “successful Bosniak for a strong Bosnia” (emphasis added). To emphasize
that voters were voting for a Bosniak, the diacritic mark above the ‘s’ in “Bošnjak” was replaced
with a check mark used on electoral ballots. The 2014 election also saw the introduction of a
party-wide slogan, “with the people,” used in campaign materials for presidential, legislative,
and local races. While it is hard to say exactly what affect this had on Radončić’s electoral
success—he lost the presidency in both elections, and actually did slightly worse in 2014 than
in 20108 But it is telling that Radončić’s campaign seems to have made a conscious decision to
portray him using ethnic labels as he sought state-level office. In this way, Radončić exhibits
8This may have been attributable to the strong showing of the DF in the election, which had not competed in
the 2010 election, but came in third in 2014.
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2010 2014
“A successful person “A successful
for a successful Bosnia!” Bosniak for
a strong Bosnia
With the People”
Figure 5.8: Campaign Posters for Bosnian SBB
a less extreme version of the trajectory followed by Dodik and the SNSD: increasing ethnic
appeals in order to campaign at the state parliament and presidential levels.
Both Dodik and Radončić show a tendency for increased ethnic appeals as they rise to promi-
nence at the state level. But there is also at least one example of the opposite tendency: for can-
didates to employ fewer ethnic appeals in order to contest elections at the local level only. Sefer
Halilović, also discussed in Chapter 4, was a Bosniak political and military leader, often seen as
an opposition leader to the SDA within the Bosniak community. His military campaigns earned
him name recognition and prestige in the Bosniak community, as well as an indictment for war
crimes from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (he was eventu-
ally acquitted of all charges). The founder of the Bosnian-Herzegovinian Patriotic Party-Sefer




Figure 5.9: Logos for Bosnian BPS
himself in 2014 and earning the party’s highest ever share of the vote: 8%. Despite never win-
ning the presidency, the party has had some success in the state parliament, and local-level
governments. But over time, as it has become clearer that the party’s successes will be mostly
at the local level rather than the state level, the party has distanced itself from its explicitly
Bosniak roots. Originally founded by a Bosniak military leader famous for being accused of
atrocities against Croats (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 2005), the
party has undergone a substantial “rebrand” seen in Figure 5.9. The original logo in Figure 5.9
shows a prominent Bosniak fleur-de-lys. The new logo in Figure 5.9b, implemented before the
2014 election, removes nationalist identifiers in favor of a generic light bulb icon, suggesting
innovation rather than ethnic representation. The rebrand is also present in the new party pro-
gram, which defines its origins not as a Bosniak organization, but as an anti-fascist political
movement, which sought only to defend Bosnian statehood–an arrangement it claims benefits
all groups (BPS - Sefer Halilović 2016).
Parties changing from ethnic to non-ethnic or vice versa are relatively rare in Bosnia. Most
ethnic parties have been that way since their founding, and have not substantially changed in
their explicit advocacy of ethnic group interests, or in their self-identification as members of
a specific ethnic group. These examples suggest that when parties do adopt ethnic identifiers
that they previously did not employ, it is when they are seeking national-level office. Both
observed cases of politicians who changed strategies towards more explicit ethnic identification
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and more extreme ethnic rhetoric did so in pursuit of office in the state-level parliament and the
presidency, the highest offices in Bosnia. Abandoning ethnic identifiers happens when parties
are declining in state-level relevance, and instead concentrate on winning lower-level races like
local and cantonal assemblies.
5.6 Conclusion
Bosnia is one of the most ethnically polarized countries in the world. Large sections of daily
life are segregated by ethnicity, and reminders of ethnic tensions are ever-present. Politicians
routinely stir up ethnic grievances, and for many people in the country extreme and highly
traumatizing experiences with ethnic violence are real and present memories.
Yet even in in this highly contentious environment, where ethnic identities are a fact of life,
voters prove surprisingly flexible in their willingness to support ethnic parties. Non-ethnic par-
ties can and do win elections in Bosnia, and a large number of voters are responsive to claims
that ethnic identities should not be the basis of political action. Ethnic identities are not the
only possible basis of political activity in Bosnia. It is not the case that Bosnian voters view
themselves in either ethnic terms or non-ethnic terms at all times. Rather, Bosnian voters have
both ethnic and non-ethnic identities which overlap and complement each other, and can be used
as the basis of political mobilization depending on circumstances. When ethnic representation
stands to benefit them the most, and when ethnic parties are the most likely to win real political
power, Bosnian voters are more likely to support parties that claim to champion ethnic interests.
If they have little to gain through ethnic representation, either because the benefits they would
receive are slight, or because their group has no chance of gaining access to political power,
they will respond to non-ethnic appeals. Many voters can even vote for two candidates espous-
ing radically contradictory ideologies on the role of ethnicity in politics even in the context of
the same election. All of this suggests that identity is not deterministic on voting behavior, but
instead complements the way voters perceive their circumstances, interests, and options. Eth-
nicity in Bosnia is clearly important, but ethnic representation is a means to an end, not a goal
in and of itself.
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This chapter has examined the use of ethnicity and the choices voters make when presented
with plausible ethnic and non-ethnic options for political representation. In the next chapter, I
turn my attention to the choices made by elites, and whether they choose to mobilize voters on
ethnic grounds or not.
5.7 Appendix: Robustness to Alternate Coding: Voter Per-
ceptions over Candidate Declarations
Perhaps the biggest concern with this analysis is that it relies on a coding scheme which privi-
leges the ways that parties describe themselves. However, since the theory rests on the strategic
calculations of voters, the ideal measurement would be the way that voters perceive the par-
ties, not the way that parties try to describe themselves. This is a particular concern, since the
Bosnian media tends to describe several of the parties I have coded as non-ethnic as if they were
supported exclusively by single ethnic blocs.
I therefore test the results against alternate coding schemes that take this into account. For
some parties, there is absolutely no reason to question whether or not they are ethnic. Parties
like the Bosniak SDA, and the Croat HDZ are nearly universally accepted to be explicit ethnic
group advocacy parties, and make that advocacy central to their party programs and electoral
campaigns. There are also some parties which are undeniably non-ethnic. The Social Demo-
cratic Party and the Democratic Front openly broadcast that they are running multiethnic can-
didate lists and have declared themselves as left-leaning alternatives to Bosnia’s ethnic blocs.
Some of these parties go so far as to run multiple candidates for the various ethnic seats of the
presidency in order to make it clear that they are privileging no single ethnic group over others.
The concern, then, is in the parties which describe themselves as non-ethnic, civic-minded
parties but in fact draw nearly all of their support from a single ethnic group. If voters per-
ceive these to be ethnic parties despite the parties’ own rhetoric, then the strategic calculation
theory could be called in to question. I therefore created an alternate coding scheme that is
more generous in assigning ethnic affiliation. On the Bosniak side, the biggest changes to the
coding scheme concern Haris Silajdžić’s Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina (SzBiH) and Sefer
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Regression Results–Alternate Coding Scheme
Dependent Variable is Change in Ethnic







Adjusted 푅2 0.289 0.275 0.261
푁 6483 6483 6483
Standard Errors in Parentheses.
*:p< .05; **:p< .01; ***:p< .001
Model includes Canton and Year fixed effects (Coefficients not shown)
Standard errors are clustered by Canton-Year
Table 5.6: Robustness to Alternative Codings
Halilović’s Bosnian Patriotic Party. Both parties are closely tied to the personalities of their
founders, both of whom were actively identified with Bosniak military forces and have been
extremely vocal in their condemnation of Serb war criminals against Bosniak civilians. While
their parties generally advocate for European principles of civic national identity for Bosnia, it
is not unreasonable to suspect that at least some part of the Bosnian population may view them
as Bosniak nationalists. On the Croat side, the biggest change is the People’s Party for Work
and Betterment (NSRzB), founded by Mladen Ivanković-Lijanović. While more sedate in his
explicit identification as an ethnic Croat, Ivanković-Lijanović has been the NSRzB’s only pres-
idential candidate, contesting only the Croat seat of the Bosnian Presidency, and media sources
often describe the NSRzB as a party whose support derives predominately from Croats.
Having modified the party codings, I run the regressions again on the change in ethnic party
vote share. The results are listed in Table 5.6. Comparing with the results shown in Table 5.3,
it is clear that the alternative coding scheme does have an effect on the coefficient estimates.
The estimates are greatly diminished, taking the value of roughly half of the estimated values
in the standard coding. However, the general pattern predicted by the theory remains, albeit
in diminished form. The coefficient on the majority party variable is much smaller than the
minority or non-ethnic party variables, and the signs on the coefficients are in the expected
directions. Essentially, what this means is that the strategic vote-switching seen in Bosnia, even
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when limited only to the explicitly avowed multiethnic parties and regional non-ethnic parties,
is still of a magnitude great enough to support the predictions of the theory. Moreover, under
this alternative classification, the values on the Adjusted 푅2 drops substantially. This suggests
that the previous coding scheme, relying on the explicit declarations of candidates and parties,
explains a substantially larger proportion of the observed variation in Bosnia ticket splitting than
this alternative coding that relies on subtext and assumed perceptions.
The coefficient estimates are smaller because those voters switching from the SzBiH—an
avowedly non-ethnic party with a solid mono-ethnic support base—to the overtly Bosniak SDA
under this coding is ignored as unimportant. This coding would, however, produce a larger co-
efficient on the multiethnic support base if large numbers of voters were switching from avowed
multiethnic parties like the Social Democrats to the SzBiH, which the estimates suggest is not
happening. These findings shed some light on a pervasive puzzle in Bosnian politics. If parties
like the SzBiH rely on a single ethnic base, why do they insist on pretending to a non-ethnic
identity justified by ethnicity-blind rhetoric? These results suggest that the advocacy of civic
over ethnic nationalism may be an asset in attracting voters who are strategically concerned
about wasting their votes on non-viable ethnic parties.
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6Ethnic Politics in Latvia
In this chapter, I turn to the case of Latvia, and show how the voter-level phenomena which
I documented in the previous chapters impact the long-term development of a party system
in a country consolidating democratic institutions. Bosnia is a consociational democracy with
overlapping levels of governance. Ethnic diversity is managed by institutions consciously engi-
neered to facilitate the representation of all relevant ethnic groups in a multi-ethnic democracy.
In contrast, Latvia is a straightforward parliamentary system. It is a small, highly centralized
state using proportional representation reminiscent of other European parliamentary democra-
cies like Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Whereas Bosnian institutions are intended to
ensure equal representation among all three of the country’s constituent peoples, the constitu-
tion of Latvia grants no special consideration to the interest of ethnic minorities. In fact, the
bulk of Latvia’s constitution institutional structure predate the ethnic diversity of the country as
it exists today.
Whereas Bosnia’s transition from socialism was accompanied by a devastatingly destruc-
tive civil war, Latvia is often seen as a “success story” of post-communist transition. It declared
independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, and successfully installed a democratic regime
in the early 1990’s. After meeting European standards of democracy, market liberalism, and
human rights, it joined the European Union in 2004, and adopted the Euro in 2014. Despite
having been the site of several important Soviet military and naval installations as recently as
the early 1990’s, Latvia joined NATO in 2004. This transition from Soviet republic to European
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democracy has been accomplished with virtually no serious inter-ethnic violence or military
confrontation. The peaceful nature of the transition is all the more remarkable given the tension
caused by Latvia’s enormous Russian-speakingminority. Largely the result of Soviet-era migra-
tion, ethnic Latvians today constitute only a bare majority of the country’s population. Today,
only three-fifths of Latvia is ethnic Latvian, with the remainder mostly Russian-speaking Slavs.
In this chapter I examine the ethnic diversity of Latvia, with the goal of identifying how
ethnic divides are politicize by elites seeking to mobilize voters and win office through demo-
cratic elections. In the first section I briefly overview the historical background of the ethnic
divide in Latvia, drawing attention to the divergent languages and historical origins of the two
groups. The legacy of colonialism and the domination of ethnic Latvians by outsiders is espe-
cially important in post-Soviet campaigning, as many political entrepreneurs use this narrative
to draw distinctions between ethnic groups and argue for the necessity of group representation.
I then discuss the transition from communism to democracy at the end of the twentieth century,
and how that transition established many of the relevant political actors and institutions which
structure ethnic conflict and constrain the choices of Latvian political entrepreneurs today. I then
examine Latvian political campaign strategy in the post-Soviet period, showing how political
parties adopt names, positions, and rhetoric which either embraces a specific ethnic identity,
rejects ethnicity as a relevant political distinction, or ignores the issue entirely. The final section
concludes.
6.1 Historical Background
Latvia is generally understood to be divided between two groups: “Latvians” and “Russians.”
Yet the designation “Russian” is not entirely accurate, since many “Russians” are actually
Russian-speakers who may or may not consider themselves ethnically Russian. According to
the most recent Latvian census, ethnic Latvians comprise 62.07% of the population. Ethnic
Russians are by far the largest ethnic minority group, at 26.91% of the population, followed by
Belorussians (3.29%), Ukrainians (2.21%), Poles (2.16%), and Lithuanians (1.18%) (Central
Statistical Bureau of Latvia 2011). Unlike in Bosnia, the ethnic divide in Latvia is a product of
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relatively recent demographic change. While the area known as Latvia has long been a meeting
point between ethnic Germans, Balts, and Slavs, the bulk of the ethnic minority population today
are those who arrived during the period when Latvia was a part of the Soviet Union and their
descendants. The majority group and minority group share no recent common ethnic ancestor,
and differ not only along ethnic cleavages but also linguistic and religious lines. Russian and
Latvian are written in different alphabets, come from distinct linguistic families, and are in no
way mutually intelligible. Among ethnic Latvians, Lutheranism and Catholicism are the most
common religious traditions, while the Latvian Orthodox Church is the most common religion
among ethnic Russians.
Some Latvian historians claim that the defining feature of Latvian ethnic and national iden-
tity is the history of subjugation by foreign powers (G, e¯rmanis 2007, Kalnins 2015). While the
Latvian people and their ethno-linguistic ancestors have lived in the region around the Baltic
Sea for millennia, a sovereign Latvian political authority has existed for only a few decades
throughout all of recorded history. Latvian political entrepreneurs frequently draw attention to
the rarity of ethnic Latvian self-determination as a reason justifying ethnic representation when
campaigning for votes. Four separate historical periods are crucial for understanding the his-
tory shared by ethnic Latvian ethnic identity: the pre- and early-modern domination of the Baltic
territory by German aristocrats and the Russian Empire, the brief period of independent Lat-
vian statehood following World War I, the communist period under which Latvia was forcibly
incorporated into the Soviet Union, and the transition to democracy in the 1990’s.
People speaking Baltic languages that today are recognized as dialects of Latvian and Lithua-
nian can be placed in the area around the Baltic Sea at end of the last ice age. While Latvian and
Lithuanian today share a high degree of overlap and mutual intelligibility, they are completely
distinct from Estonian (a Finno-Ugric language closer to Finnish and Hungarian) and the Slavic
and Germanic languages. One of the last pockets of Europe to Christianize, the Baltic people
were first converted to Catholicism following a crusade in the thirteenth century by the Teu-
tonic Order. These German knights subjugated the Baltic tribes and installed themselves as
feudal lords over the conquered territory. These Livonian territories comprised independent
duchies, similar to the other German feudal divisions until the late eighteenth century, when
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the territory was annexed by the Russian empire under Catherine the Great. The feudal system
imposed by the German knights was essentially serfdom reinforced by ethnic and linguistic dif-
ferences: at the top where a German-speaking warrior class and their aristocratic descendants,
while the lower classes were Baltic-speaking peasants.
Latvian ethnic and national identity emerged under the limited liberalizing reforms of the
Russian empire in the 19th century. Alexander I placed limits on feudal rights exercised by the
German nobility in the early 19th century, which freed many rural laborers to migrate away
from the agricultural fields. As these ethnic Latvians migrated to cities, they not only entered
into bourgeois professions, but also began studying at Baltic universities. While cities had been
almost exclusively German and Russian speaking, these waves of migrants brought a substantial
Baltic-speaking population into cities like Riga. When czar Alexander II eased restrictions on
political organizing and publishing, many of these Latvian-speakers began publishing Latvian-
language newspapers, pamphlets and volumes. This era is often referred to as the “Awakening,”
and is the first time a distinct Latvian ethnic identity emerges as a cultural and social force.
It is during this time that the peasants in Latvia began to be known as latvieši (“Latvians”),
when they had previously been known simply as undeutsche (“not-Germans”). This also dis-
tinguished the Latvian people from the other Baltic groups. The boundary-making process of
these identity entrepreneurs also absorbed three separate regional identities into a single ethnic
and national identity. Plakans (1974) writes that the word latvieši and its eventual entrance into
common parlance “was meant to suggest the existence of a Latvian tauta (Volk),” uniting the
inhabitants of Livland, Kurland, and Vitebsk into a single identity under a shared culture and
common historical descent. Intellectuals and scholars in this period codified a standard “Lat-
vian” language, relegating Livonian and Curonian to status as dialects of an official high Latvian
language which they argued had the potential for literary and scientific achievement on par with
Russian and German.
Zake (2007) argues that this identity formation did not initially have any substantial polit-
ical ideology or agenda, but was rather the result mainly of ethnic Latvian intellectuals and
students attempting to reconcile their own perceptions of cultural and ethnic distinction from
ethnic Germans and Russians following the process of modernization and urbanization. Given
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the overwhelming dominance of Germans in the universities and cultural institutions of Latvia
in the 19th century, Latvians absorbed the influence of German nationalism and adopted this
intellectual approach in describing and codifying their own identity. German nationalist philos-
ophy at the time had stressed romantic ideas of common heritage, common culture, and common
language. Latvian identity emerged as a result of applying this template to existing Latvian cir-
cumstances: if the Germans had a common way of life, then the Latvians must have one, too.
Since the non-German people of Latvians were overwhelmingly agrarian, Latvian identity was
understood to have a fundamentally rural character, and Latvian nationalist intellectuals put a
heavy emphasis on documenting supposedly Latvian folk songs, stories, and pre-Christian Lat-
vian mythology. The common history of the Latvian people was described in romantic terms
in relation to what differentiated them from the land-owning and urban German upper classes.
Ijabs (2014) argues that Latvian ethnic and national identity should be understood less as a po-
litical movement, and more as an example of post-colonial mimicry as described by Bhabha
(1994). Here identity is formed by adopting the presumably universal aspects of the culture of
the colonizer (theGermans), while also internalizing and accepting the fundamental “otherness”
of the colonized (the Latvians).
The earliest expressions of Latvian identity were not strongly linked to demands for political
autonomy. Early ethnic Latvian intellectuals were also often extremely supportive of Russian
administration, despite today’s Latvian nationalists’ often pro-western and anti-Russian posi-
tions. The Young Latvians, the intellectual movement based in Tartu most strongly associated
with this first wave of Latvian identity formation, often expressed sympathy for Russian rule,
and maintained close ties to Slavophiles and Russian nationalists. Krišja¯nis Valdema¯rs, the
most prominent of early Latvian intellectuals, published many of his tracts in Russian national-
ist newspapers and journals, and spent much of his life writing in St. Petersburg and Moscow.
Valdema¯rs seems to have seen Russian nationalism as entirely compatible with Latvian iden-
tity, with its focus on “non-western” ideology (i.e., distinct from German nationalism), and its
emphasis on rural agrarian traditions and resistance to modernization (Zake 2007, p. 323).
Moreover, the reforms of liberally-minded leaders in St. Petersburg had been the main force
limiting the seigneurial authority of the German elites, and the Russian annexation of the Baltic
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territories had facilitated the more liberal environment which allowed Latvian intellectuals to
develop their identity.
Despite the existence of a strong sense of ethnic and national identity going at the start of
the twentieth century, the politicization of that identity and systematic movements for an inde-
pendent Latvian were rare before the First World War. Even the most radical ethnic Latvian
politicians usually accepted that small ethnonational groups would inevitably be absorbed by
larger empires, and advocated only for a limited form of self-rule within a more democratic
Russian state (Purs 2012, Chapter 1). World War I drastically changed this, with Latvians na-
tionalists fighting a war of independence against German attempts to absorb Latvia into a unified
German state, Bolsheviks attempting to expand communist control into the Baltic region, and
White Russian soldiers fighting to maintain the integrity of the Russian empire. In 1920, an in-
dependent Latvian political authority signed a peace treaty with the newly-formed Soviet Union,
establishing legal recognition of an independent Latvian state.
The legacy of the interwar Latvian state is hotly debated by historians. The constitution
enacted in 1922 established a democratic regime which extended civil liberties to Latvian citi-
zens and insisted on popular sovereignty as the basis of government. It established a unicameral
parliament, the Saiema (Latvian for “gathering”), and a relatively weak president appointed by
the parliament. The country was divided into five administrative regions—the four cultural and
historical regions corresponding roughly to German ducal boundaries plus the capital—each
of which would elect deputies to Parliament using proportional representation. The electoral
system notably created no serious obstacles for would-be officials to enter electoral contests or
form their own parties. There was no electoral threshold, and a political party could legally be
established by any group of five persons or more. These rules produced an enormous number
of political parties. Between twenty and thirty parties were elected to parliament in each elec-
toral cycle, requiring very fragmented coalition governments. The resulting governments were
very fragile, resulting in sixteen separate cabinets in fourteen years. The system did, however,
facilitate the representation of many non-Latvian ethnic minorities, and the 1922 parliamentary
election saw deputies seated from parties representing Germans, Russians, Jews, Lithuanians,
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Poles, and Old Believers.1
The interwar Latvian government eventually descended to an authoritarian regime. With
echoes of Weimar Germany, economic crisis increased social tension throughout the 1930’s,
including the rise of an anti-Semitic nationalist paramilitary group, the Pe¯rkonkrusts, resem-
bling the German Brown Shirts. In this environment, a state of emergency was declared and
Prime Minister Ka¯rlis Ulmanis was given emergency powers in 1936 as “leader of the peo-
ple” (Hope 1999).2 Ulmanis, remembered by some historians as Latvia’s only domestically-
produced dictator, is sometimes said to have ruled a “dictatorship by consensus” (Lieven 1994,
p. 70). The Ulmanis regime imposed a ban onmany political activities in the name of civil order,
and relied on a nationalist paramilitary force, but also coopted rather than imprisoned poten-
tial political rivals. For the left, Social Democrats were given cabinet positions in the Ulmanis
government, while at the same time the regime imposed laws severely restraining the organiz-
ing capacity of trade unions. For the right, the regime adopted an official stance of “Latvia for
the Latvians,” and made life increasingly difficult for Germans, Russians, and Jews. Histori-
ans debate whether this regime was ultimately on the path to a totalitarian regime accompanied
with severe ethnic persecution (Purs 2012, p. 47). The Latvian state ceased to operate as an
independent sovereign body when Ulmanis was forced by a Soviet ultimatum to sign a “Mutual
Assistance” treaty with Stalin following the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939. Within a year,
the USSR had completely occupied Latvian territory and installed a puppet parliament which
voted to join the Soviet Union.
The Soviet period was a time of massive social, economic, and demographic change. The
Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic was identified by Soviet economic planners as a strategically
vital, resource-rich, but ultimately underdeveloped region of the USSR. It contained fertile lands
and rich forests, and held an important port position on the Baltic Sea for both military mobi-
lization and international trade. But it remained largely agrarian, rural, and under-educated
compared to other parts of Europe. A large segment of the population also resisted Soviet in-
corporation for nationalist and ideological reasons (Shtromas 1999). The Soviet development
1“Old Believers” are the descendants of those who fled persecution in Russia after refusing to acknowledge the
Eastern Orthodox Church reforms of 1652-1666.
2Tautas Vadonia in Latvian, but often translated into German as Führer.
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strategy had three parts: purges designed to remove potential reactionary elements from Latvian
society, migration from other parts of the Soviet Union to both provide skilled labor and change
the ethnic make-up of the republic, and a Russification project which would see Russian replace
Latvian and German as the official language. Throughout the post-war period, large numbers
of migrants came to Latvia, especially from Russia and Ukraine, concentrating mostly in major
urban areas, and Latgale, the easternmost region of the country closest to Russia. As Russian
language proficiency was required for employment in heavy industry and the civil service, eth-
nic Latvians had strong incentives to learn Russian, but few ethnic Russians learned Latvian to
any high degree of proficiency (Prazauskas 1991, Misiunas & Taagepera 1993, Lieven 1994).
Ethnic segregation was further compounded by Soviet centralized housing policy. Under
the command economy, many of those who worked for Soviet ministries and the Red Army
were housed in apartments built by those agencies directly; since Russians disproportionately
comprised employees for those agencies, they also tended to live together in ethnic enclaves
within urban areas (Kolstø 1995, p. 111). Even at the end of the Soviet period, the segregation
between the ethnic groups was obvious: the leadership of industrial sectors was overwhelming
ethnically Russian, while the agricultural sector leadership was almost exclusively ethnically
Latvian (Lieven 1994, p. 291).
6.2 From Soviet Republic to European Democracy
The end of Soviet control in the Baltic states began with the economic and political reforms
of the 1980’s. As part of the glasnost policy, Gorbachev’s moderately liberalizing reforms al-
lowed Soviet citizens to criticize and question state policies in hopes of increasing efficiency
and spur innovation. In Latvia, this new liberalized political space was quickly exploited by
nationalists and independence advocates who began staging the so-called “calendar demon-
strations” (Clemens 1991, Chapter 6). Commemorations of important historical milestones of
Latvian statehood, or the Soviet occupation of had previously been banned by Soviet censor-
ship, and for the first time public events were allowed to draw attention to the historical circum-
stances surrounding Latvia’s incorporation into the USSR. Latvian reformers not only tried to
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advance economic reforms, but also sought to address historical grievances over past injustices,
specifically surrounding the Stalinist purges of Latvian nationalists. Much of the opposition to
Soviet rule came from this historical perspective. In 1988, the Latvian Writers’ Union—the
state-controlled organization which regulated creative and literary professionals—publicly de-
fied long-standing state positions by declaring that there had been no popular uprising in support
of Soviet annexation, and that the Soviet take-over of Latvia had been orchestrated completely
from Moscow. Historians and other academics followed suit, as revisions to the official Soviet
narrative spread throughout universities and publishing houses. One of the most famous politi-
cal protests at this time was the so-called “Baltic Chain,” when an estimated two million people
joined hands to form a human chain connecting Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius. Protesters united the
three Baltic capitals as part of a commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary Molotov-Ribbentrop
Pact between Germany and the Soviet Union that ceded the Baltic states to the Soviet sphere
of influence. In this way, debates over the historical record became one of the main mobilizing
points for opponents of the Soviet regime. While glasnostmay have been intended to encourage
Soviet citizens to look for solutions for the future, many Latvians looked back to the past.
Another crucial mobilizing force against Soviet Rule was in pre-modern Baltic folk tra-
ditions, and the organizations established to preserve them. Consistent with Soviet national-
ity policy, folk songs, dances, and national costumes were to be celebrated as a way to high-
light the multicultural diversity of global communism. Concerts of traditional Livonian, Lat-
vian and Latgalian songs were permitted under this policy throughout the Soviet period, and
even formed part of state visits and dignitary’s processions. These performances, though, were
also occasionally censored due to Soviet fears that traditional cultural expressions may also be
politically sensitive. Given the strong link between these folk practices and cultural expres-
sions and the origins of Latvian identity, there was concern that these could be used to mo-
bilize Latvians in support of a Latvian national identity that saw itself as incompatible with,
or even superior to, the Soviet class-based identity which was to triumph over bourgeois eth-
nic association (Dreifelds 1996, Ginkel 2002). This embrace of diversity ironically preserved
ethnic Latvian culture in a way that was utilized by anti-Soviet activists following perestroika
(Jubulis 2007, Agarin 2010). Members of these preservation societies participated in many of
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the historical commemoration events, singing and dancing to traditional (i.e., pre-Soviet) songs.
These non-violent, but nonetheless politically provocative activities came to define the Latvian
independence movement as “the singing revolution” (Eglı¯tis 1993).
That the resistance to Soviet rule should focus so strongly on nationalist historical grievances
and the violation of Latvian national sovereignty has led some to see the revival of ethno-
nationalist attitudes in Latvia as a “Rip VanWinkle” story: ethnic identities had “gone to sleep”
suppressed by Soviet censorship, and had now “woken up.”3 But this interpretation underesti-
mates both the degree to which other, non-ethnic grievances were important points of protest
and mobilization, as well as the extent to which ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers were
actively involved in the protests against Soviet occupation. Specifically, environmental issues
were also one of the most crucial rallying point for anti-Soviet agitators, and comprised a large
multi-ethnic force opposed to the Soviet regime (Galbreath & Auers 2010). In 1986, a Moscow-
proposed plan to build an enormous hydroelectric dam on the Daugava River—called ‘the river
of our destiny, the river of our souls’ by a traditional Latvian saying (Kalnins 2015, p. 177)—
attracted an enormous amount of scrutiny. Local activists were concerned that official party as-
sessments had drastically overestimated the economic and technological benefits of the project
by inflating projections of the electric output while underestimating its costs, specifically in
the economic impact of the destroyed forest and farmland and personal displacement due to
flooding. The project lead first to a massive letter-writing, public protest, and petitioning cam-
paign which ultimately collected 30,000 signatures. The activists and experts who campaigned
against the dam constituted a multiethnic organization: the Daugava River flows through sev-
eral major cities in Latvia, including the capital Riga and the second largest city, Daugavpils,
and has historically constituted the boundary between Latgale (with a high concentration of
ethnic Russians), and Vidzeme (considered by Latvian nationalists to be the “purest” Latvian
region). The project thus attracted attention from both ethnic Latvian and Russian activists
(Muižnieks 1987, Rich 1987). The hydroelectric project was ultimately halted by the protests.
In this way, Latvia resembled other eastern bloc countries where environmentalism was an
importantmobilizing force (Albrecht 1987, Jancar-Webster 1993, Fagin 1994, Steger 2004). The
3See summary in Holmes (1996).
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Soviet economic system had long been guided by centralized planned economics, seldom valu-
ing natural conservation or realistically assessing environmental impact. The Baltic republics
especially had been enormously impacted by environmental degradation. Enormous Soviet in-
vestment and immigration had caused rapid industrialization and urbanization throughout the
post-war period, yet Soviet planners had spent little effort assessing the possible impact of such
industrialization on air and water quality (Taagepera 1981). Opposition leader, Dainis I¯va¯ns
would later recall that, “In Latvia everything began with the movement to save the environ-
ment,” claiming that was the moment, “the big awakening had started.” (Dreifelds 1996, p.
59).
I¯va¯ns’s organization, the Latvian Popular Front first emerged in this context of public protest
and discontent. The PF quickly took on a coordinating role absorbing the many smaller or-
ganizations and in doing so became a general catch-all organization for all protests, whether
historical, cultural, or environmental (Penikis 1996). In response, the USSR launched a rival
organization, the Interfront. Interfront was to have branch organizations in all the Soviet Re-
publics, and sought to persuade Soviet citizens that any form of nationalism or secessionism
was reactionary. The main source of disagreement between the two “fronts” was over the power
of the center to control the periphery: the PF demanded greater autonomy and recognition of
Latvian sovereignty, while Interfront asserted the right of centralized communist control even as
the USSR instituted moderate liberalization reforms. The debate between the two organizations
increasingly took on an ethnic quality. Nationalists became a dominant force within the Popular
Front which eventually became an overt pro-independence movement. Interfront, meanwhile
increasingly dropped its “communist” identity for a “Russian” one. By the early 1990’s, Inter-
front publications were articulating a “Russian idea”, rather than a Marxist one, and at one point
even implored citizens to “Remember that you are Russian!” explicitly dropping the ideological
platform for an ethnic one (Kolstø 1995, p.113-5). In this way, independence began to look like
an ethnic issue, with popular perception putting ethnic Russians on the side of remaining in
the Russian-dominated Soviet Union and ethnic Latvians on the side of an independent Latvian
state.
Nevertheless, the interpretation that these two blocs were perfectly ethnically divided is
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inaccurate. It is true that nearly all ethnic Latvians supported independence from the Soviet
Union, as advocated by the PF. It is also true that Interfront was supported almost exclusively
by non-Latvians. However, it is not true that all non-Latvians supported Interfront, as many
ethnic Russians supported the PF and independence. By 1991, an overwhelming 94% of ethnic
Latvians supported independence from the Soviet Union, while 38% of non-ethnic Latvians
did as well. Many ethnic Russians held high positions in the apparatus of the PF, most notably
Anatolijs Gorbunovs4 who served as Chairman of the Latvian SSR’s Supreme Soviet, but nev-
ertheless publicly broke with Moscow and lead a faction of high-ranking communist officials
to the Popular Front. Gorbunovs’s role coordinating a link between the Popular Front and the
communist party would earn him the position of Latvia’s first post-independence speaker of
Parliament (Purs 2012, p. 85).5 Many ethnic Russians found it easy to support the PF because it
was extremely ideologically diverse. While there were those who advocated for total indepen-
dence from the Soviet Union and tribunals which would hold Soviet officials legally accountable
for an illegal occupation of the country, there were also moderate wings who wanted little more
than increased autonomy within a reorganized, decentralized Soviet system. Still others were
motivated only by increased control over education and history, and accountability for envi-
ronmental degradation. Questions of citizenship and the ethno-national nature of the Latvian
state were generally tabled by the PF, which in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s promoted an
extremely inclusive line and welcomed members of all ethnic groups and ideological affiliations
(Bennich-Bjorkman 2017).
The PF would be the most important organization supporting the Latvian independence
referendum in 1991. Following the success of the referendum, its members would also guide
the transition to an independent Latvian state. The most consequential decision made by PF
leaders was not to create a new Latvian state, but rather to “restore” the constitution of 1922.
Unlike many Soviet republics, Latvia and the other Baltic states had experienced their own
statehood in the interwar period. Give the PF’s reliance on commemoration of that statehood in
4Gorbunovs is from a family of Russian Old Believers, so while he is technically ethnically Russian, he is in a
different category of most ethnic Russians in Latvia.
5In the early 1990’s, Gorbunovs’s stance on ethnic Russian rights was also decidedly out of step with the
preferences of many ethnic Russians. In 1992, Gorbunovs advocated that citizenship issues should be decided by
a referendum, with voting restricted to only the descendants of pre-1940 citizens (Lieven 1994, p. 305).
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mobilizing its supporters, that period had come to be idolized by large sections of the Latvian
population. The decision was therefore made to adopt a legal interpretation that reflected the
historical narrative celebrated by those demonstrations and commemorations. They argued that
Latvia’s incorporation into the Soviet Union had been illegal under international law, and that
the only legal remedy to this essentially criminal act was to restore the Latvian state as it existed
in 1940.
This decision reestablished the electoral institutions which would facilitate an extremely
volatile and unstable party system (Davies & Ozolins 1994). This conscious nostalgia for the
interwar republic was politically popular with most of the former PF. As the interwar consti-
tution required the newly formed parliament to appoint the state President, the first post-Soviet
government chose Guntis Ulmanis, the grandson of the brother of Ka¯rlis Ulmanis, the president
of Latvia at the time of the Soviet annexation.6 The Latvian electoral system of 1922 also con-
tained a unique form of open-list voting. Latvian voters must first cast their vote for a party list,
but within that list they are also free to give each individual candidate on the ballot either a plus
or a minus. Pluses move candidates up the list from their original position; minuses move them
down. As a result, Latvian party leaders have less control over their candidate lists than leaders
in other countries. An extremely unpopular party leader may find herself low enough on the list
after an election that she is not able to enter parliament if she earns enough minuses, just as a
candidate who was not popular with the leadership of a party may start in a low position on the
party list but rise up through massive support among voters. While the system does empower
individual candidates and encourage them to invest in their personal popularity, it nevertheless
requires party membership. A candidate cannot run as an independent, so she must join a party
in order to have a hope of ever being seated in parliament. Post-Soviet reformers did make one
change to the interwar electoral law: implementing a 5% electoral threshold for all elections
after 1995 (Smith-Sivertsen 2004). Cognizant of the chaos caused by the enormous number
of parties in the interwar period, the threshold was intended to reduce the influence of fringe
parties and result in more stable governments with fewer coalition partners.7 The threshold also
6Guntis Ulmanis had spent the decades before independence as a member of the communist party, and had been
living under his step-father’s surname at the time. He changed his name back to “Ulmanis” after independence.
7Anecdotally, some candidates and MPs in Latvia complained in interviews about what the Latvian electoral
system does to intra-party policymaking. Many politicians decide to run for office on the basis of their own personal
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encouraged candidates to come together to form political parties larger than the comparatively
small factions that had existed in the independence movements. Small factions united by per-
sonal ties and single-issue positions often struggled to locate other would-be candidates whose
interests and ideologies similar enough to put together a platform, and then form a pre-electoral
coalition to pool support (Lieven 1994, Golder 2006).
These historical and institutional factors are helpful in understanding why the Latvian po-
litical party system shows extreme volatility, not just in the immediate post-Soviet period, but
even decades letter. The communist party faction represented by Interfront was rendered al-
most entirely irrelevant by early losses in founding elections. As a result, there is no single
strong Soviet successor party in Latvia, with former communist leaders breaking apart to form
several smaller parties and factions. As the Popular Front and its leadership in the late 1980’s
had been most concerned with creating a large, “big tent” anti-Soviet political factions, they
tended to ignore many issues that would eventually come to the fore. By focusing on issues of
environmental protection and historical grievance the Popular Front effectively tabled issues of
citizenship, political reform, and economic transition—the main issues that would eventually
dominate electoral contests. The Popular Front was effectively a large collection of small, atom-
ized factions, coordinated around a broadly anti-Soviet agenda. It was too internally diverse to
survive as a political party, but the smaller factions were too small to be viable political parties
on their own. As a result, elections are usually dominated by institutionalized coalitions which
are rarely permanent. New parties, often composed of reconfigurations of existing elites, have
emerged at every single electoral contest, and many of them win large portions of votes. Parties
also sometimes form purely on the basis of personal connections between candidates. When this
happens, those parties often do not outline comprehensive platforms or ideological positions,
support, or popularity within a specific subset of the population. Often this popularity is large enough for them to
get a large number of “plus” votes on the open ballot system, but not large enough to clear the 4% threshold for
entry in Parliament. Those politicians therefore have strong incentives to join existing parties, and then encourage
their voters not only to give them a plus on the open-list ballot, but to give minuses to every other candidate within
the party, knowing that moving everyone else down the party list may be the only way to ensure their preferred
candidate actually wins a seat. One established candidate from a mainstream party told me that they had started to
feel that most of their campaigning energy was spent trying to fend off the negative consequences of minuses from
new candidates within their own party, not convincing voters to support the party itself. They said that while they
didn’t like the idea of telling supporters to cross out other members of the party, they started to feel the need to do
so to preserve their own seat. While anecdotal, this link between electoral institutions and intra-party animosity
may account for the extremely high rate of new party formation and party division in Latvia, even compared to
other post-communist states (Kreuzer & Pettai 2003).
167
and instead campaign on the basis of the few interests or positions shared between the candi-
dates. The result has been extremely high volatility with virtually no strong individual-level
party identity to speak of. Nevertheless, a scholarly consensus has nevertheless emerged that
two cleavages have dominated Latvian politics in the post-Soviet period: the economic divide
between socialists and liberals, and the ethnic divide between Latvians and Russian-speaking
Slavs (Pabriks & Stokenberga 2006, Zake 2002, Smith-Sivertsen 2004, Saarts 2011).
The decision to restore the interwar constitution created an enormous divide between ethnic
Latvians and ethnic Russians which persists as one of the most important political cleavages
in the country almost three decades later. The 1922 constitution had been extremely liberal
towards the rights of minorities in the country, and while the authoritarian Ulmanis regime had
ultimately limited the linguistic and economic rights of non-Latvians, the constitution granted
ethnic minorities the same civil liberties as everyone else. But the legal interpretation espoused
by the transitional authority was that Russians who had migrated to Latvia were the remnants of
an illegal occupation force. Russian Latvians were not citizens, but invaders. Russian-speaking
Latvians were therefore not automatically citizens of the new, restored Latvian Republic, but
instead foreigners whose rights to naturalize was a political matter to be decided by the new
leadership (Brubaker 1992). Whereas Russian speakers had previously been welcomed as an
important part of the Popular Front’s mobilization efforts, some hardline politicians were now
vocally opposing the Russian-speaking Latvians, as one prominent leader would say, “You are
living illegally on the Latvian territory...you will be forced to leave sooner or later (Lieven 1994,
p. 307).”
This hardline nationalist faction would ultimately guide Latvian citizenship policy. The
official position enshrined in the law was that communist rule in Latvia had been an illegal oc-
cupation of the country by the Soviet Union, and the only legal constitution that could govern
the transition process was that which was in place in 1940. At the same time, by this logic, the
only legal citizens of Latvia were those who had been citizens in 1940, or would have inherited
Latvian citizenship from their parents since then. Of course, this excluded the large numbers
of residents of Latvia who had emigrated to the Republic from elsewhere in the Soviet Union
and their descendants. Most ethnic Russians, even those who were born in Latvia and had never
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known any other home, suddenly found themselves denied citizenship and excluded from polit-
ical participation. For some hardline nationalists, the policy also resolved a difficult dilemma of
the ethnic composition of the Latvian state. Of all the three Baltic post-Soviet states, Latvia was
where the titular majority was the most vulnerable to becoming the minority. In 1994, the year
the law on citizenship was passed, ethnic Latvians comprised only 54.2% of all residents (Chinn
& Truex 1996). Nationalist leaders predicted that if all residents of the country were granted
citizenship in a democratic state, the non-Latvian population would be politically strong enough
to undermine the Latvian nation-state. But this somewhat draconian nationality policy would
ultimately create two different fronts of conflict for the new Latvian state: one between the Lat-
vian nationalists and the disenfranchised ethnic minority population, and another between the
Latvian state and the western Europe, which saw the citizenship policy as a violation of both
fundamental democratic values, and existing human rights laws as established by the United
Nations and the European Union (Chinn & Truex 1996).8
The citizenship laws put Latvian nationalists in a difficult position. On the one hand, they
needed to ensure the continued ethnic Latvian majority if the state was to remain ethnically and
culturally Latvian in nature. They also needed strong ties to the west through NATO and the
European Union in order to protect their sovereignty from what they saw as their main geopo-
litical threat: Russia. But policies guaranteeing ethnic Latvian dominance put the country at
odds with European standards on human rights and democratization. The Copenhagen Crite-
ria, which outlines the standards applicant countries must meet before joining the European
Union, specifically describes the protection of minorities and the extension of full civil liberties
to minority populations as a requisite component of democracy (Hillion 2004). Ironically Lat-
vian politicians often found European leaders sympathetic with the plight of ethnic Russians.
European officials pressured Latvia throughout the 1990’s to increase the rate of naturaliza-
tion and refused to accommodate initial nationalist plans for a program encouraging voluntary
“repatriation” of ethnic Russians to the Russian Federation. Under pressure from the European
Commission and the OSCE, Latvia abolished quotas for naturalization, reduced costs and re-
quirements to naturalization, and established exemptions to certain requirements on vulnerable
8For amore comprehensive discussion of Latvian citizenship policy, see Commercio (2008), andAgarin (2010).
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populations deemed disproportionately onerous (Morris 2003).
Latvia’s minority citizenship issues were often handed through the OSCE. European lead-
ers in the early 1990’s were more fundamentally concerned with security and stability than
encouraging full democratic citizenship and human rights, and often treated de-militarization
as this more pressing issue in the immediate post-Soviet period (Vrbek 2015). While most
Soviet troops had left Latvia by 1994, some units of the Russian armed forces remained scat-
tered throughout Latvia until 1999. Russia had sought to militarize the issue of the Russian
minority in Latvia by making minority rights a condition of troop withdrawal, and the OSCE
made delinking the two a very high priority in order to avoid potential escalation and violence
(Muiznieks 2011). The OSCE therefore put pressure on Latvia to resolve the citizenship issue
as a way of neutralizing potential security threats to Latvia from Russian claims to protect ethnic
Russians in the Baltic. This pressure from European institutions is correlated with an increase
in applications. As seen in Figure 6.1, naturalizations increased markedly in the late 1990s and
early 2000’s, when Latvia implemented policy reforms in support of its application to join the
European Union was at its highest. Naturalizations surged again following Latvia’s accession
in 2004. Applications have tapered off in recent years, largely indicative of the fact that those
remaining non-citizens in Latvia are not applying for citizenship either because they are unable,
or unwilling (Kuczyńska-Zonik 2017).
Thus while the bulk of Latvia’s non-citizens have gained citizenship over the past two
decades, citizenship policy in Latvia has been vitally important in shaping the relationship be-
tween the two ethnic groups. Even though many non-citizens were born in Latvia and have
known no other home, having a parent or grandparent who had immigrated to Latvia as a result
of Soviet policies relegated many ethnic Russians to second-class status. Many ethnic Russians
found themselves deprived of voting rights and other civil liberties as a result of historical events
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Figure 6.1: Naturalizations in Latvia: 1995-2018
6.3 The Political Use of Ethnicity in Latvian Elections
In this section, I explore how Latvian political actors use this history and the differences between
ethnic communities to get elected. Latvian politicians have a unique, state-sponsored resource
that their Bosnian counterparts lack. In Latvia, politicians hoping to get on the ballot must join
a party list, and that party must submit a political party platform. These pre-election programs
are not only part of the public record, but are distributed to media to be published in newspapers
and broadcast on TV and radio, and also provided to voters on election day when they receive
their ballots (Ikstens 2017). As a result, these programs are not just a bureaucratic hoop that
parties and candidates must jump through, but are effectively state-sponsored free advertising.
They are the only legal way that a party can communicate to voters when they are actually in
the voting booth, and parties have strong incentives to portray themselves in the best possible
light.
These programs are limited by law to 4,000 characters, meaning that Latvian political pro-
grams are extremely short by international standards.9 This was by design: shorter party pro-
9For comparative purposes, the German Christian Democratic Union’s 2017 party program was over 150,000
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grams are more accessible to everyday citizens. Four thousand characters can easily be printed
on a pamphlet, and read relatively quickly by a typical voter, and Latvian citizens are far more
likely to have seen and considered official party programs than their counterparts in other demo-
cratic countries. The character limit also ensures comparability across parties for the purposes
of comparative research, as it forces all parties, regardless of electoral viability or professional-
ization, to identify only their most important campaign themes and present them to voters.
In this section, I discuss party naming conventions and the rhetoric parties use regarding eth-
nic identity, drawing on the party platforms that parties have submitted when registering to con-
test elections. I find that most often ethnic affiliation is conveyed through reference to language,
culture, and the differences in historical legacies which represent the most salient differences
between the two groups. Latvian ethnic affiliation is communicated through an emphasis on a
history of colonial occupation, mostly during the Soviet period, but references are also made
to the pre-modern domination of Latvia by Germans and Russians. Politicians campaigning on
ethnic Latvian platforms often speak of the vulnerability of the ethnic Latvian community and
of the risk of group extinction as a reason to elect ethnic representatives. Ethnic Russian parties
also campaign on the basis of representing a vulnerable minority. They often propose a counter
argument to the historically-justified claims of ethnic Latvian parties, arguing that the achieve-
ments of the Soviet Union and the Russian-speaking population it brought to the country are
worthy of celebration on their own rights. A third, but much smaller group explicitly campaigns
on the grounds of civic nationalism. These parties argue that the Latvian state should cham-
pion no single ethnic group, and should instead advocate for cultural pluralism, multilingualism,
and policies which incorporate all members of society, regardless of ethnic background, as full
democratic citizens. A fourth group of parties completely ignores the ethnic divide of the coun-
try to instead campaign entirely on ideological or policy positions.
characters. The American Republican Party’s platform for the 2016 election was over 240,000 characters. The anti-




As in Bosnia and other countries, party names are important signals of ethnic affiliation. In
Latvia, several parties include the words “Latvian” or “Russian” in the name of the party. Par-
ties also use names which employ references to Latvian history, appropriating the names of
independence movements or even pre-Soviet political parties. Other parties use naming con-
ventions to distance themselves from ethnic labels and nationalist positions by adopting names
which emphasize civic nationalism, internationalism, and universal human rights.
Given the relative importance of historical commemoration during the independence move-
ment in Latvia, it is perhaps unsurprising that many parties adopt names that have historical
significance. References to pro-independence and anti-Soviet names appear frequently. For the
1995 elections, politicians who had been part of the Popular Front attempted to rebrand as a
political party, also called the “Latvian Popular Front.” The name was clearly meant to high-
light the pro-independence contributions its members had made in the late 1990s, and the party
adopted a more hardline ethno-nationalist stance. Voters clearly found the appeal unconvinc-
ing, and the party failed to clear the electoral threshold. Many of its candidates rebranded, and
competed as a Christian Democrat party in the following election. The same could be said of
Latvian Way, a party which also contested elections in 1995 on an ethno-nationalist platform.
The Latvian name for the party—“Latvijas Cel,š”— uses the same word for “way” as the “Baltic
Chain” (“Baltijas cel,š”) discussed above. The event is considered an important milestone in the
history of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Latvian Way was far more successful electorally
than the Latvian Popular Front, participating in governing coalitions following the 1993, 1995,
and 1998 elections. A third example of this phenomenon would be the party “Helsinki-86,”
which formed not in 1986, but in 1998, and sought to build on the legacy of the eponymous or-
ganization (which was formed in 1986) and was one of the earliest instances of anti-communist
mobilization in Latvia. Helsinki-86 also took one of the strongest pro-ethnic Latvian positions
of all the parties, arguing not only for linguistic and cultural rights for ethnic Latvians, but also
for the establishment of a cabinet-level “Ministry of Repatriation,” which would coordinate the
“return” of ethnic Russians back to the Russian Federation.
All three of these parties are named after independence-era movements which were not
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ostensibly ethnic at the time. The original Latvian Popular Front had large numbers of
ethnic Russians, and as discussed above purposefully reached out to ethnic minorities and
Russian-speaking Latvians to create the broadest coalition possible in support of their pro-
independencemovement. Likewise, the Baltic Chain protest was explicitly designed as a demon-
stration of unity, comprising not only ethnic Latvians, but also Lithuanians, Estonians, and
pro-independence Baltic Russians (Eglitis & Ardava 2012). The leadership of the original
Helsinki-86 organization was comprised entirely of ethnic Latvians, but was nevertheless mobi-
lized around a treaty which advocated basic human and civil rights. It is a great irony that a party
named after a treaty which demands “...the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social,
cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which derive from the inherent dignity of the hu-
man person...” and “...conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights” (Helsinki Declaration 1975, Ar-
ticle VII), would advocate the forced expulsion of those born in Latvia—denial of the freedom
of movement and residence established under Article 13 of the Universal Declaration of Hu-
man Rights. Instead, these parties claimed to be continuing a new form of the independence
movement, even after Latvia became a sovereign state. No longer focused on the struggle for
independence, these parties were now fighting for the sovereignty of the Latvian people, and the
dominance of the Latvian ethnic community within an ethnic state. For these parties, the legacy
of the independence movement is not necessarily one of human rights or anti-communism, but it
was a struggle for the rights of ethnic Latvians against ethnic others. Appropriating the names of
the movements signals to voters that these parties “continuing” that fight, even if that particular
struggle was but a small component of the original organization’s agenda.
Other parties show their connection to the ethnic Latvian communities by adopting names
that show a pre-Soviet historical identity. The clearest example of this is the Latvian Farmers’
Union, whose name suggests not only an agrarian link and a connection to the rural population
outside the major cities, but also a link to the inter-war period when farmers were an important
force. The eponymous Latvian Farmers’ Union, formed in 1917 but suppressed during the
Soviet period, was the second-largest party in Latvia in the election of 1931, and the most
important conservative force in Latvian politics at the time. By adopting the name of a party
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that hadn’t existed for more than half a century, party leaders conveyed to voters that they were
in effect reviving an older, established political party in the same way that independent Latvian
statehood was also being resurrected after decades of illegal Soviet occupation. In its 1995 party
program, the party explicitly claimed the heritage of that party, noting, “The Latvian Farmers’
Union, historically established and grown up along with the Latvian nation, is the largest party
in Latvia. It is the party of Ka¯rlis Ulmanis,10 Zigfrı¯ds Meierovics,11 Ja¯nis Čakste,12 and Guntis
Ulmanis.”13 In this way, the choice of name seems coordinated with an attempt to convince
voters that the party is a continuation of the party most responsible for independent Latvian
nation-state. The party, like many in Latvia, has evolved throughout the post-Soviet period
through a series of mergers, but in its current incarnation as part of the Union of Greens and
Farmers remains an important party in Latvia, having been included in governing coalitions and
frequently holding the presidency.
Another important way parties use their names to show an ethnic affiliation is to exploit
a quirk in the Latvian language that differentiates between the Latvian state, and the Latvian
language or ethnic identity. Many parties identify themselves using “Latvijas,” the genitive sin-
gular noun form of the word “Latvija,” meaning either the territory or the state of Latvia. Other
parties identify themselves as “latviešu,” the genitive plural form of “latvietis,” which refers
to an ethnic Latvian or Lettonian person. The difference is difficult to render in English, but
very clear in Latvian. A “Latvijas” organization is simply an organization that exists within
the country of Latvia. A “latviešu” organization is one that is filled with ethnic Latvians, or
reflective of ethnic Latvian culture, or speaks the Latvian language.14 Political parties use this
difference in their names to convey their ethnic affiliation. This is perhaps most clear in the case
of “LATVIEŠU LATVIJA!” an all-capitals party name which could be (awkwardly) translated
as “An Ethnically Latvian Latvia!” or, “Latvian-speaking Latvia!”, but also seen in “Latviešu
10First Prime Minister of Latvia, and leader of the interwar authoritarian state.
11Interwar Latvian Foreign Minister, celebrated for negotiating recognition of Latvian statehood and support
against Bolshevism from western powers.
12First President of Latvia.
13Grand-nephew of Ka¯rlis Ulmanis, appointed as the first post-Soviet president of Latvia.
14The difference also exists in Russian: note the difference between “русский” and “российский”, and “ла-
тышский” and “латвийский”. Perhaps the best way to understand the difference is to look at the Latvian Russian
Union. Composed almost entirely of ethnic Russians, the party calls itself “Latvijas krievu savienı¯ba”—literally
“Latvia’s Russian People’s Union.” A “Latviešu krievu savienı¯ba” is almost a logical impossibility in this context,
since such people would simultaneously be ethnically Russian and ethnically Latvian.
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partija,” which would normally be translated as “Latvian Party,” but actually means “Party of
Ethnic Latvians” or “Party of Latvian-Speakers.” Perhaps the most perplexing outcome of this
linguistic quirk for English speakers is the election of 1995, which saw both a “Latviešu Zem-
nieku Savienı¯ba” and a “Latvijas Zemnieku Savienı¯ba” competing against each other. Both can
be translated as “Latvian Farmers’ Union”, but the former is an ethnic designation (i.e., the
farmers are ethnic Latvian) while the latter is a territorial designation (i.e., the farmers live in
Latvia).
For those parties which explicitly campaign as champions of ethnic Russian causes, the nam-
ing is often extremely straightforward: they identify themselves as “Russian” in the name. There
can be little doubt as towhich ethnic group the “Russian Party” claims to represent, likewisewith
the “Latvian Russian Union,” or the “Russian Citizens of Latvia Party.” Perhaps the most subtle
reference to Russian identity comes from the Dzimtene Patriotic Political Association. “Dz-
imtene” can be translated as “homeland.” Latvian nationalist monuments, including the famous
Freedom Monument in central Riga often declare their loyalty to the homeland using the word
“te¯vzemei.” “Te¯vzemei” comes from the word “te¯vu” meaning “father,” and “zeme,” meaning
land. It is a literal, word-for-word translation from the German “vaterland.” “Dzimtene,” on the
other hand, is modified version of “dzimt,” to be born. It is a literal translation of the Russian
“родина”— “motherland” or “land of birth.” Given Dzimtene’s expressed position that, “There
is one dzimtene, one country, where Latvians, Latgalians, Russians, Ukrainians, Poles, Ger-
mans, Byelorussians, Jews, Roma, etc. live together. We need to find the strength to be united,”
this alternative form of “homeland” presents an alternative to the German-derived word which
they saw as appropriated by ethnic Latvian parties. The party formed to contest the 2006 elec-
tion, and was comprised primarily of ethnic Russian candidates who left other parties as they
drifted more towards ethnic Latvian positions. It failed to clear the threshold for representation
that year, and did not compete again.
Many ethnic Russian parties adopt names which stress the value of human rights. The party
“For Human Rights in a United Latvia,” which has contested in several electoral cycles, formed
from the merger of several separate Russian-dominated parties. In 2002 the party campaigned
on a broad leftist platform of anti-privatization and increased pensions and wages for state work-
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ers, as well as directly attacking nationalist rivals. The party also made its ethnic affiliation clear,
arguing that Russian should be given official language status, and that naturalization for Rus-
sian non-citizens should be made easier. Over time, the party’s position on Russian language
rights became more extreme, and by 2011, the party was campaigning for higher education
opportunities in more international languages like Russian and English (i.e., not Latvian), and
for opening the border with Russian and Belarus in order to normalize trade and increase ease
of personal travel. They claimed that officials should “speak the language of the taxpayer’—a
rebuke to Latvia’s monolingual policy of Latvian as the only official state language. The party
was highly successful in mobilizing Russophone support, earning second place with a quarter
of the seats in parliament in 2002, but eventually declined as factions within the party split to
compete independently.
The other most common identifier in a party’s name is the word “Harmony.”15 As the largest
party in Latvia today, Harmony Center has built its support by putting together a coalition of
Russians and Russian speakers with ethnic Latvian leftists. The term “Harmony” first appeared
on the Latvian ballot as the “Peoples’ Harmony Party,” when it campaigned on a platform
of Russian language rights, extension of citizenship to Russian-speaking non-citizens, and a
repatriation law that would encourage ethnic Russians who had emigrated from Latvia to Rus-
sia to return to their homes. Since then, various forms of “Harmony” have appeared as the
party reformed, rebranded, and evolved. It went from the “Peoples’ Harmony Party” in 1998 to
“Harmony Center” in 2006, then the “Harmony Social Democratic Party” in 2014. The term
“Harmony” is meant to convey compromise and the peaceful coexistence of multiple groups
in Latvia. The party has varied in the degree to which it directly appeals to Russian ethnic in-
terests, but the party has always been supported predominantly by Russian speakers, and has
always been opposed to an ethno-national state dominated by ethnic Latvians.
In short, both Latvian and Russian groups use their names to convey to voters the ethnic
affiliation of their party. Ethnic designations of “Latvian” and “Russian” appear directly in the
15“Saskan, a” in Latvian, and “согласие” in Russian. Today’s Harmony party officially translates the word into
English as “Concord,” and every Harmony supporter and elected official I spoke with during fieldwork was per-
sonally unhappy that the party has come to be known as “Harmony” abroad, noting that the words “harmonija” and
“гармония’’ also exist in Latvian and Russian, and are not the official name of the party. In my own interviews,
even when speaking English or Russian, most people referred to it as “Saskan, a.”
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names of several political parties, helping voters immediately see the ethnic affiliation of the
party when making voting decisions. Ethnic Latvian parties also show the tendency to rely on
historical markers to convey their connection to ethnic Latvian nationalism, and the indepen-
dence of the Latvian state from foreign interference. While some of the historical signifiers the
Latvian parties adopt could be plausibly construed to include non-ethnic Latvians, ethnic Rus-
sian parties do not show the same willingness to adopt historical allusions in their party names.
Instead, Russian parties tend to rely on labels that stress universal human rights or multi-ethnic
coexistence.
6.3.2 Campaign rhetoric
Of course, voters do not rely solely on party names when making voting decisions, and the
positions that a party takes as well are important. In Latvia, parties convey their ethnic affiliation
through a variety of policy positions and statements of their own identity. Latvian political
parties often employ historical allusion to convey an ethnic identity to their voters. These parties
differentiate between “us” and “them” by emphasizing historical grievances against former non-
Latvian occupiers, and argue that political representation for coethnics may help redress group
grievances. They also often stress the historical differences between Latvians and non-Latvians
even if many of those distinctions are less relevant now than they once were. These parties
praise rural and agrarian ways of life in a reference to the fact that ethnic Latvians were often
relegated to agricultural production while both German and Russian colonizers weremore likely
to settle in cities. Latvian parties also tend to stress the vulnerability of the Latvian nation
given its small size and geopolitical position between great powers. They also make reference
to the citizenship laws in Latvia which almost exclusively disenfranchised Russian-speaking
residents, and promise linking benefits to citizenship as a means of diverting benefits to coethnic
supporters.
Perhaps the most straightforward way that parties identify their affiliation is to openly de-
clare that they will enact parties that benefit coethnics. The “Latvian Latvia” party mentioned
above promised to represent the ethnic interests of Latvians, proclaiming that “the national eco-
nomic, capital, budgetary, taxation, and monetary policy all must serve the interests of Latvian
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people. The Latvians will have jobs and bread!” Likewise, the National Strength Society de-
clared in 2006 that, “the economic power of Latvia must belong to Latvian people. Products
made in Latvia should be given priority in the Latvian market.” This economic nationalism
which promises that coethnics will benefit from state policy is a clear indication that the party
sees itself as championing ethnic interests.
In 2002, the New Era Party proclaimed that, “Latvia is the only country in the world with
the responsibility for preserving the Latvian people and the Latvian language.” While New Era
would ultimately win the largest share of seats in that year’s Parliamentary election, the senti-
ment perfectly captures the feeling of many Latvian ethnic parties. For these parties, history
has shown that the Latvian people are vulnerable. They are a small group, split between the
two much larger political and cultural forces of the Germans and the Slavs. The Latvian people
need the protection of a state of their own, and that state must take special care and grant special
privileges to ethnic Latvian identity, if for no other reason than that no other country is likely
to do so. The National Democratic Party similarly has argued that “God has given Latvia to
the Latvians. Latvia is a nation-state, which must ensure the survival and prosperity of the Lat-
vian people. Latvians have the right to laws and citizenship policies which protect the national
character of the state.”
For many parties, the hallmark of the Latvian identity is the Latvian language. Not only is
it grammatically distinct and mutually unintelligible from other European languages (with the
exception of Lithuanian), it has also long been subjugated and relegated to second-class status
to German, Russian, or—in the post-cold war era—English. It is hard to overstate the impor-
tance of language to ethnic Latvian parties. Neither the Teutonic knights who first Christianized
Latvia nor the communist bureaucrats who administered the Latvian SSR made serious efforts
to learn Latvian in large numbers, and as such the Latvian language is perhaps the most reli-
able marker of Latvian ethnic identity. For many Latvians it is also symbolically important as a
sign of sovereignty, respect, and self-determination on the global stage. Many parties therefore
make the Latvian language central in their outreach efforts to voters. While large numbers of
parties explicitly state that Latvian is the only language that will be spoken in Latvia in some-
what abstract terms, there is some variation in the intensity of the sentiment. Several parties
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simply stated that Latvian is the language of Latvia, and should have official status as the lan-
guage of state. Helsinki-86 stated that its main policy priority was the “defense of Latvian Law,
Language, and Culture,” suggesting not only that those things were important, but also that
they might somehow be related. In this interpretation the survival of the ethnic Latvian people
and the Latvian language is contingent on an ethnically Latvian political authority capable of
protecting them. The Popular Front in the 1995 elections held that the vitality of the Latvian
language should be a policy priority for the state, arguing that, “its most important manifes-
tation is national culture and a fully-vibrant Latvian language.” Zatlers Reform Party, a party
formed in 2011 by a former President, echoed this sentiment by saying, “let’s foster and pro-
mote Latvian culture and the Latvian language as the most important reason for the existence of
the Republic of Latvia.” Others go further arguing that state policies should also encourage the
exclusive use of Latvian in the media or in private. The Samnieks Democratic Party16 stated
that “Latvian will be the only language of state, family, and society.” This position was likely
not well-received in the very large number of families which speak Russian or other languages,
but was popular enough for the party to come in first in the 1995 election.
Other parties offer more than relatively vague statements of valuing the language, but con-
crete policies, meant to defend the Latvian language and ensure its dominance. The most com-
mon of these is in the field of education. Many parties in the post-Soviet period have proposed
that minority-language education should not be allowed, requiring that students not only study
Latvian, but study all subjects in Latvian. Many parties have proposed that education in the
broadest sense should be only in Latvian, while others are more specific. The above-mentioned
National Democratic party argued that all state-provided free education should be only in Lat-
vian, and that university education which is not free should also be subsidized by the state for
the most talented Latvian-speaking students. All for Latvia! proposed that any educational in-
stitution funded by the state should be allowed to speak only in Latvian and admit only Latvian-
speaking students, and that the only foreign languages taught in schools should be those of
16“Samnieks” is hard to translate into English. It traditionally meant “owner” or “landlord,” and was the term
historically used to describe wealthy landowning aristocrats. But it also means “boss,” “manager,” or “supervisor.”
It can also mean “host,” both in the sense of someone who invites and entertains guests, and the biological sense
of an organism off of which a parasite feeds. In this political context, it is likely meant to convey a sense of being
“savas zemes samnieks,” or “lord of your own land.”
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the European Union—a standard which would notably exclude Russian and Ukrainian. Father-
land and Freedom, a far-right nationalist party, has explicitly argued that students in minority-
dominated areas should be required to learn only in Latvian.
Other common policy proposals concern media. The National Alliance promised their sup-
port for policies which would require the use of Latvian as the national language in all public
media, as well as in business and private enterprise. Even Unity—a party frequently portrayed
as a centrist party that does not campaign on ethnic interests—promised their support in 2010
for “cultural space, quality public media, and adequately supported culture in the Latvian lan-
guage,” as well as, “Latvian language protection, a language development program, and civic
education aimed at consolidating society.” Fatherland and Freedom expanded the domain of
language laws to include the administration and civil service, proposing that any state employee
be required to submit to regular language proficiency tests as a way of ensuring linguistic purity
among civil servants. This policy may have been prompted by the fear that ethnic Russians
were becoming proficient in Latvian just long enough to pass the language tests required of the
naturalization process, but still speaking Russian at home, thus contributing to the “corruption”
of the Latvian language.
In some of these proposals there is ambiguity as whether this is necessarily ethnically ex-
clusive. After all, it is entirely possible to be a civic nationalist, but still believe that it is ad-
vantageous for all members of society regardless of ethnicity to be able to communicate with
each other. But many parties make it clear that their intent is to limit opportunities for Russian
speakers. The National Alliance promised to, “recruit workers in the service sector who have no
Russian language skills, as a way of preventing discrimination against Latvian youth in the labor
market.” All for Latvia! also reminded voters in 2011 of its previous achievements in proposing
laws that prevent employers from listing Russian language skills as a job requirement in order to
prevent Russians from having advantages over Latvian job-seekers. It seems unlikely that pre-
ferring workers who speak fewer languages over those who speak more is in anyway an attempt
to increase economic efficiency or competitiveness, and can only be a policy of favoritism for
ethnic Latvians.
Several parties identify their ethnic nature by specifically mentioning a threat to the Latvian
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nation, and promising to respond to it. One of the most prominent examples of this is demo-
graphic crisis. Given the high rates of immigration from Russia and the rest of the Soviet Union,
Latvia became the former Soviet republic where Russians and titular nationals were closest to
parity, making the possibility of Russians becoming an ethnicmajority very real in Latvia. Many
parties explicitly address this demographic crisis, such as the Democratic Party, which in 1998
claimed that, “The Latvian people are in the most critical demographic situation of their sur-
vival, and are losing many of their reasons for living,” and argued that the state must take up
the role of the “patriotic guardian” and “ensure the material equality of the nation through an
assessment of its demographic future.” The Latvian Social Democratic Union has promised to
“stop the extinction of our people,” and the Our Country party went so far in 2002 as to claim,
“Latvia is the home of the Latvians, given to them by God, and it is now impossible to stop their
extinction without extraordinary means.” Some parties explicitly argue that actions should be
taken that would fix the demographic proportions of the population and preserve the ethnic Lat-
vian majority. The Fatherland Union in 2006 argued that, “Economic emigration must be halted,
as it can create an influx of migrant workers to Latvia,” which they felt would jeopardize the
fragile majority of ethnic Latvians. All for Latvia in 2006 argued that ethnic Latvians had pre-
viously been the victims of genocide, and as such special measures should be taken to increase
their numbers.17 In the early post-Soviet period Fatherland and Freedom proposed the creation
of a state fund which would financially reward ethnic Latvian families who had extremely large
families.
Several parties also advance proposals that would limit the rights of non-citizens, as a way of
signaling their intentions to provide benefits to ethnic Latvians at the expense of ethnic outsiders
who had already been deprived of citizenship. Helsinki-86 proposed that only citizens should be
allowed to serve in the Interior Ministry, effectively depriving non-citizens of lucrative employ-
17What, exactly, those measures were remains unclear. However, on a trip to Riga in 2015, an official from a
right-wing ethnic Latvian party informedme that they personally thought outlawing abortionwould be an important
policy goal for Latvian nationalists in the future. This particular official saw very little that was persuasive in the
right-to-life arguments common in the abortion debate in the United States, but instead saw abortion rights entirely
as a demographic issue. In this person’s mind, Latvian women were likely to terminate their pregnancy for the same
economic reasons that ethnic Latvians would emigrate to other countries in the European Union: unemployment,
low wages, and inadequate social services. Both emigration and abortion were causes of demographic decline of
ethnic Latvians which could lead to a Russian majority in the country, and as such they felt it was the role of the
state to seek to stop both of them.
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ment opportunities, but also making it clear that ethnic Latvians would not likely to be subject
to the authority of ethnic outsiders in the security and police services. The party also proposed
legislating that only citizens could receive pensions or unemployment benefits, and be permitted
to own land within Latvia. Other parties also proposed limits on non-citizen property owner-
ship, including A Latvian Latvia, The Latvian Party, The Latvian Recovery Party, Our Land,
the National Democratic Party, and the Anti-Communist Alliance. Proposals to limit property
and asset ownership were especially popular in the mid 1990’s, when Latvia debated how to
privatize many of the state-owned enterprises and assets in the transition from state-controlled
communism to free market liberalism. Limiting ownership to citizens was an effective way to
ensure that many non-ethnic Latvians would be ineligible to gain in the distribution of state
assets, and thus excluded from the most lucrative opportunities of the transition to capitalism.
Many of these parties argued that this denial of property rights was justified in light of their
strong positions on the continuity with the pre-communist Latvian constitution. This narrative
holds that in 1922, ethnic Latvians were rightfully given their own state, which was wrong-
fully and illegally stolen from them by Soviet violence. Ethnic outsiders are therefore mostly
migrants whose presence is only a consequence of that illegal occupation, and depriving those
non-Latvians of their rights is morally and legally justified. In keeping with this trend in a
slightly more subtle way, several parties specifically emphasize the rights of “citizens,” not
“residents.” The Latvian Independence Party in 1995 stressed that it would defend the political
rights of citizens under international law. This should not be interpreted as a defense of the rule
of law, but instead a way of highlighting that the party draws an important distinction between
the rights of citizens and non-citizens. Likewise, Fatherland and Freedom once announced their
intention to provide quality healthcare for all Latvian citizens. Playing on anti-Russian senti-
ment which saw the Soviets as criminals and colonizers who destroyed and exploited Latvia, the
party proposed to fund these generous benefits through confiscated smuggled goods and fines
levied on those who polluted the environment.
Parties also signal to voters their ethnic Latvian affiliation through their position on the
continuity with the state as it existed in 1940. The National Conservative Party, joining with the
far-right nationalist LNNKmentioned in their program in 1995 that not only did they support the
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1922 constitution, but that they believed it specifically established a state exclusively for ethnic
Latvians. Many parties, including the rightist FatherlandCoalition, All for Latvia! andHelsinki-
86 also stressed that they supported the 1922 constitution, mentioning that under international
law the pre-war document should be the basis of citizenship policy and political negotiations
with Russia. Of course, such a document would serve to justify that citizenship laws which were
deeply unpopular with the ethnic Russian and Russophone population in Latvia.
Many parties endorsed the 1922 constitution by referring to the Soviet period as an illegal
occupation while stressing the negative consequences of Soviet rule on the ethnic Latvians. The
Fatherland and Freedom coalition in 2006 promised a repatriation bill that would “eliminate the
consequences of occupation and colonization” in Latvia. Given that in the same document
the party declared its main priority was protecting the interests of Latvians it is hard not to
understand that those “consequences” are likely the hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians
living in Latvia. Other parties also use this promise to restore the constitution of 1922 and to
“decolonize” Latvia to propose policies which clearly privileges the ethnic Latvian community
at the expense of others. Helsinki-86 in 1998 promised to restore Latvian sovereignty partially
through guaranteeing jobs to the victims of the communist regime (i.e., employment for ethnic
Latvians but not Russians), just as the National Power Coalition said that there was no place
in Latvia for “alien and hostile powers that offend the Latvian people’s honor.” This position
was accompanied by a promise to undo the effects of Soviet rule partially by destroying Soviet
monuments and memorials in a bid to restore the true cultural and historical heritage of the
Latvian people. Until 2006, parties were also mentioning Abrene in their party platforms as a
major policy point. In 1946, the eastern part of Abrene county was transferred from the Latvian
SSR to the Russian SFSR. Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Abrene remained part
of the newRussian Federation, but many Latvians argued that since the 1922 constitution should
be the basis of bilateral relations with Russia, Abrene should legally be returned to Latvia to
restore the Latvian territory as it had existed in 1940. In 2007 an agreement was signed between
Latvia and Russia maintaining the status quo without reference to the pre-Soviet borders, but
some parties have used the Abrene issue to show their willingness to challenge Russia in order
to maintain their adherence to the 1922 constitution.
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Many parties representing ethnic Latvians also emphasize their connections to rural com-
munities, and their desire to help rural populations within Latvia. While this in itself is not
inherently representative of any single ethnic group, many ethnic parties seem to associate “Lat-
vianess” with a rural identity. When Latvia First and Latvian Way ran as a united party in 2006,
their platform equated their rural identity with a traditional Latvian culture that was agrarian,
Christian, and socially conservative. That year, the party stated that, “we support using EU
funds for the public interest, especially agriculture, forestry and fisheries. We will promote the
development of new industries in the countryside—especially biofuel production.” The party
then went on to say that they will “invest in the Latvian language, and the values and traditions
of Latvian national culture.” This pattern is repeated in several parties, such as the Zigerist
Party, which promised to maintain and protect Latvia’s existing state forests, as well as turn
Latvia into a “successful farming country” though rural fuel and loan subsidies in 1998. This
was coupled with a position that “The National Policy in Latvia must provide the Latvian people
with opportunities for survival and prosperity in their own homeland. We will prevent the rapid
extinction of the nation. We will respect and defend the Latvian language and the history of our
people. Let the youth regain faith in their country, in the worship of God.” In this way, the party
appeals to an image of the Latvian ethnic group that is both rural and endangered, promising to
develop national policies that will preserve the culture and demographic position of a specific
people. This is far from a unique combination of policies, as other parties which have taken
strong positions on Latvian ethnic, linguistic, and cultural dominance—such as Helsinki-86,
the National Alliance, Fatherland and Freedom, and All for Latvia!—have also proposed rural
development money, agricultural subsidies, and increased funding for rural schools.
This is not to say that all parties that take positions on rural areas are ethnic Latvian. The
Freedom from Fear, Hate, and Anger party went so far as to take an overt anti-urbanization
platform in 2014, proposing that as many Latvians as possible should live in the countryside,
and even produce their own food if feasible. In that same platform it proposed that “Differences
between nationalities and languages are no obstacle to national unity. Latvia was occupied, but
today it is not occupied by occupiers. Everyone born after August 21, 1991 is entitled to Latvian
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citizenship.”18 Harmony has also taken up pro rural-positions in its platforms over the years,
promising development plans for agriculture in peripheral regions outside the capital city. Yet
overall, rural and traditional identities largely remain the purview of Latvian ethnic parties.
Unsurprisingly, there are substantially fewer ethnic Russian parties than ethnic Latvian par-
ties. Russians and Russian speakers are the minority in Latvia, meaning that, by definition, there
are fewer ethnic Russian voters than ethnic Latvian voters. Compounding the problem are the
citizenship laws which almost exclusively disenfranchised ethnic Russians. Nevertheless, po-
litical parties appealing directly to ethnic Russian voters have been present in Latvian politics
ever since independence from the Soviet Union.
The most straightforward way that parties identify their ethnic affiliation to voters is to ex-
plicitly state so. While there can be relatively little doubt about which group the Russian Party
appeals to, the official party platform makes it very clear that, “[t]he Russian Party is the party
of patriotic Russian people living in Latvia. The defining feature of our party is the protection
of the interests of Russian/Slavic citizens and non-citizens in Latvia.... Our purpose is to obtain
rights for the Russian minority.” Separately, the Latvian Russian Union has explicitly stated that
its goals were to “defend the interests of Latvian Russians,” and sought “to ensure the represen-
tation of the Latvian Russian community in parliament.” While the Russian affiliation of For
Human Rights in a United Latvia might not have been immediately obvious from its name, its
program makes it abundantly clear which side it is on. The party states that it is a human rights
organization, precisely because it is a part of the Russian community which is most in need of
human rights protection: “ForHRUL, as the party of the Russian community in Latvia, is the
guarantor of equality and social justice among nationalities.”
In this way, some parties argue that they should be elected to positions of power precisely
because of their ethnic identity. The Latvian Russian Citizen’s party argued that Latvian political
institutions privileged ethnic Latvians and facilitated their election into parliament, and only
voting for ethnic Russians would serve to offset that tendency. In 1995 they took the somewhat
radical position that, “Latvian Russians owe nothing to no one, certainly not for 50 years of
18It should be noted that this rural cosmopolitanism is not popular with voters, and the party should be considered
marginal at best in Latvian politics. The party competed in the 2011 and 2014 elections, but never received more
than 2500 votes, well under the threshold for representation in parliament.
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Soviet rule...” and that the party would “...nominate our own Russian candidates as a means to
promote societal cohesion.” This perspective is still present in Latvian politics decades later;
as recently as 2014, the Latvian Russian Union maintained that its main goal was to, “ensure
representation of the Latvian Russian community in the parliament.” These parties explicitly
argue that ethnic Russians have particular interests separate from those of Latvians, and that
those interests can only be served by electing co-ethnics.
This ethnic identification often remains abstract, an expression of value and principle rather
than policy proposal. However, some parties explicitly identify policy areas where Russians are
disproportionately affected, and as such ethnic Russian representation is necessary in order to
enact policies that can benefit the group. The most common area where this happens is language
policy. Just as ethnic Latvian parties frequently portray the Latvian language as endangered and
vulnerable to extinction given the small size of the Latvian population, ethnic Russian parties
portray Russian as vulnerable to oppression and subjugation due to its minority status. Russian
ethnic parties frequently argue that Russian should be given official status, differing occasionally
in the details of how this should happen. At times parties suggest that the constitution should be
amended to make Latvia a bilingual nation, speaking both Latvian and Russian. Other parties
have suggested that Russian should be an official language of anymunicipalitywhere the Russian
population is greater than twenty percent. Many parties explicitly mention the school system
as an important venue for language rights, arguing that Russian language education should be
available at primary and university levels. For Human Rights in United Latvia also mentions
the courts as a venue where officials should be required to provide services in Russian.
Less often than language, some parties also mention specific policy areas where Russians
may have preferences that diverge from the Latvian majority. For Human Rights in a United
Latvia, for example, argued that providing support for small and medium-sized business was an
important part of ensuring justice for ethnic Russians. Most Russian families had immigrated
to cities and worked disproportionately as shopkeepers and other kinds of entrepreneurs, and
therefore could benefit from subsidies and tax breaks to small business owners. Small business
support is mentioned in platforms across the ethnic divide, with even ethnic Latvian parties like
the National Alliance proposing similar tax incentives and subsidies. Yet for Human Rights in
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a United Latvia specifically makes this an ethnic issue, saying: “Particular attention should be
paid to the needs of small and medium-sized businesses, which are the economic basis of the
Russian-speaking community.” Other policy areas affecting ethnic Russians stem from their sta-
tus as recent migrants. Given that the bulk of the Russian population in Latvia either emigrated
from what is now the Russian federation, or is descended from someone who did, they are far
more likely than ethnic Latvians to have family members who live abroad. On this basis the
Latvian Russian Citizens’ Party argued that visa policy was an ethnic issue, as onerous travel
document requirements would prevent ethnic Russians from visiting loved ones. Some parties
also explicitly announce their support for benefits for non-citizens, arguing that any permanent
resident (including those without citizens’ passports) should be entitled to vote in local elections,
or that exemptions from language examinations should be given to naturalization applicants over
a certain age.
The final way that ethnic Russian parties signal their ethnic affiliation is by emphasizing the
historical contributions of ethnic Russians in Latvia. Given the role that historical commemo-
ration had played in the independence movements, and the way that ethnic Latvian parties rely
on pre-Soviet history to demonstrate their ethnic identities, many Russian parties specifically
use historical references to Russia as a way of mobilizing supporters. For Human Rights in a
United Latvia stated in its program that, “we respect history and Latvia’s heritage of cultural
diversity. We are against neo-Nazism, and the historical revisionism of the Second World War.”
The party went on to demand full benefits for World War II veterans, claiming that, “Veterans
of the Anti-Hitler coalition must be given official status and social entitlements.” In this way,
the party challenged the Latvian nationalist interpretation that the outcome of the war was the
shameful subjugation of the Latvian people by presenting the defeat of fascism as an important
Soviet achievement. This difference of interpretation over the historical significance of World
War II between Russians and Latvians is used by other Russian parties to signal ethnic affiliation
to voters, especially over state support for monuments and commemorations. The Latvian Rus-
sian Citizen’s Party specifically proposed a program called “Cemetery of the Russian Soldiers”
which would be funded to ensure that Soviet gravestones and historical monuments dedicated to
ethnic Russians would be maintained and preserved. The party also proposed that citizens from
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the CIS countries be granted visa-free entry if they intended to visit war graves or memorials.
The Latvian Russian Party similarly announced their intentions to preserve historical monu-
ments in Latvia which had been erected during the Soviet period.
Some parties reject the notion of appealing to a specific ethnic group, and support a notion of
a multicultural and multiethnic Latvia. The Latvian Socialist party in 1995 echoed much of the
Soviet Marxist nationality policy in avowing that, “the main task of cultural policy is to preserve
the cultural heritage of all the peoples of Latvia, and their traditional spiritual environment.”
The Last Party—so named because of its anti-establishment positions against partisanship—
campaigned on a platform of “respect for every Latvian in all our country’s diversity, regardless
of nationality, language, gender, age, sexuality, origin, health, or other characteristics.”19 Unity
echoed this sentiment, stating that its goal was to ensure equality before the law of all Latvians,
“regardless of ethnicity, class, or sexual orientation.” The Progressive Centrist Party likewise
stated that its primary goal was “Creating a socially secure, educated, cultured community and
a strong middle class of its citizens, regardless of nationality, religion and social status.”
Other parties show an embrace of Latvian diversity by drawing attention to the various
historical, regional, and linguistic identities contained within Latvia. While for many ethnic
Latvian parties, the “golden age” of Latvian history was the period of interwar statehood, other
parties note that the Latvian ethnic and national identity itself hardly existed before that time,
when Latvia was composed of separate linguistic groups. The People’s Control Party specifi-
cally endorsed revising the constitution to establish state support for the Latgalian dialect as a
second, legally protected version of the Latvian language. Such a move would effectively make
Latvia a bilingual country, and would have allowed dual-language street signs and governmental
services in Latgale. The Union of Greens and Farmers, as well as For Human Rights in a United
Latvia also supported some form of state sanctions for the Latgalian language, while the Social
Justice Party drew attention to the social and ethnic diversity of Latvian society by announcing
its support for development funds for Latgalian, Livonian, and Roma communities.
Yet the most common way by far that parties avoid ethnic identification is simply never to
mention identity politics at all, as if ethnic divides were not present in Latvia. A large number
19The party never managed to clear more than one percent of the vote, and was never seated in Parliament.
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Figure 6.2: Latvian Mainstream Party Logos
of parties campaign exclusively on economic issues, or good governance and anti-corruption,
which would affect all ethnic groups. In 2014, Unity campaigned on a platform which not once
mentioned issues of language, ethnicity, citizenship, or history. Its platform focused instead on
tax policy, economic growth, European integration, healthcare, and development. When the
party recommended developing cultural institutions in Latvia, they did not specifically mention
which forms of art they would support, listing only “cultural infrastructure,” “cultural educa-
tion,” and “folk art.” The party also listed regional development as a priority, but then explicitly
mentioned all five distinct regions of Latvia, ensuring no group would be excluded. In another
example, the People’s Control party in 2010 campaigned on a platform of returning power to “the
people,” as well as reducing taxes, generous retirement benefits, and direct democracy, never
once mentioning issues of nationality, language, or culture. In an ethnically divided country
with a very recent history of ethnic mobilization and communal grievances, these parties which
choose to make no mention at all of perhaps the most relevant social cleavage in the country are
noticeably conspicuous in their silence.
6.3.3 A Note on Party Logos
Unlike in Bosnia, few parties in Latvia rely on party logos to convey their party affiliation.
Figure 6.2 shows the logos of three of the top vote-getting parties in Latvia. In 6.2a, Harmony
has chosen only a color and a font. The red is most certainly a nod to the social democratic
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platform and its affiliation with other leftist parties throughout Europe, but has avoided any other
distinguishing characteristics, including the fist, the rose, the handshake, the star, or any of the
other graphic logos used by other socialist parties throughout the world. The same could be said
of New Unity, whose logo is seen in 6.2b. The image of the braided cord suggests a coming
together of various political entities but makes no reference to any specific ideology or identity.
Figure 6.2c shows the logo of the Union of Greens and Farmers, whose logo conveys the party’s
origins as an agrarian and ecological party. The fleche shape suggests a wheat spikelet, gold on
one side and green on the other, to convey the union of two separate parties under one rural and
environmentalist platform.20 Typical of most Latvian parties, none of these logos employ any
overt ethnic identifiers.
The problem for Latvian political entrepreneurs is that unlike in the former Yugoslavia, the
most prominent national symbols of the Latvian nation-state are relatively new, and lack long-
standing association with ethnic identities in the minds of voters. The national flag of Latvia
and the Latvian Coat of Arms (Seen in figure 6.3) are both inventions of the interwar period,
and thus reflect a relatively recent political entity, not a long-standing ethnic or cultural history.
The carmine red color of the Latvian flag was chosen to represent the Latvian state based on
apocryphal references in medieval German texts claiming that when Teutonic knights arrived
in the Baltic region, the indigenous people who resisted them carried red banners (BNN 2012).
The Latvian Coat of Arms, created in 1921, reflects the fact that Latvian nationalismwas largely
an attempt to unify peoples and regions who at the time considered themselves separate identity
groups. The red lion on the left is the historic sigil of the Dukes of Kurzeme and Zemgale,
while the silver griffin represents the Duchy of Vidzeme and Latgale. The seal is meant to
represent the disparate political entities coming together in a single political unit (Latvijas Valsts
Prezidenta Ma¯jas Lapa 2017). The flag and the seal were seen as symbols of independent Latvia
statehood—so much so that they banned by Soviet authorities, and the legalization of their
display was an important demand of protesters in the lead-up to independence (Eglitis 2002,
20The shape may also be a nod to the Sign of Laima, the ancient Latvian goddess of destiny and nature. In
traditional Latvian folk art, three downward pointing arrows represents an appeal to Laima for the blessings of
nature, fertility, and luck. To my knowledge, the party has never directly confirmed a link between the two, but
former party leader and current Latvian president Raimonds Ve¯jonis has previously declared publicly that he
considers himself a pagan (France 24 2015), so the link is not implausible.
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Figure 6.3: Latvian State Symbols: Established 1923 & 1921
Chapter 2). But both are more often seen as symbols of the Latvian state as a political entity, not
an ethnic Latvian nation. Neither have particularly strong associations with an ethnic Latvian
nationalism, having been ignored or banned for far longer than they were ever used in any
official capacity. Neither are particularly helpful to political candidates in broadcasting a specific
Latvian identity to potential supporters.
There is, however, one set of exceptions to this in the far-right ethnic Latvian nationalist par-
ties, which employ logos containing ancient Latvian pagan symbols. The most prominent ex-
ample of this is the double diamond logo of the National Alliance in 6.4a. The National Alliance
was formed in 2010 as a merger of two of the most prominent and outspoken Latvian national-
ist parties: “All for Latvia!”, and “For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK”—itself the product of
an early merger of the Fatherland and Freedom Party, and the Latvian National Independence
Movement. To convey the history behind the merger, the National Alliance includes not only
the names of both of its constituent parties in the logo, but also shows an interlocking of both
of the party’s original symbols. The logo bears a striking resemblance to a swastika, yet party
members claim that the logo is not intended to be an endorsement of fascism. The swastika does
have roots in the pagan Latvian religion, where it is usually referred to as the “Fire Cross” or
the “Thunder Cross,” both linked to specific deities in the pre-Christian Latvian pantheon. The
symbol is still a prominent feature in traditional Latvian embroidery and knitwear, sometimes
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Figure 6.4: Ethnic Latvian & Far Right Parties
confusing and offending international observers for whom the swastika pattern has a very dif-
ferent significance (Sheeter 2006). Despite its pre-Nazi origins in Latvia, the swastika remains
most strongly associated with the Third Reich, and is designated a hate symbol by Latvian law.
Along with the Soviet hammer and sickle, the use of a Nazi swastika is illegal in public protests
and demonstrations, but the use of the “Thunder Cross” is not, creating a legal ambiguity that
has often perplexed Latvian courts (Kamenska & Brands-Kehris 2008, p. 30). It hardly seems
plausible, though, that the use of such overt fascist imagery was completely unintentional. Since
no group but ethnic Latvians has ever followed Latvian pagan rites, the use of the Thunder Cross
logo is clearly designed to make a strong statement on ethnic Latvian identification. Moreover,
the very name “Thunder Cross” was also used by the paramilitary fascist organization that tar-
geted Germans, Jews, Slavs, and other non-Latvians in the 1930’s, and which is widely seen
as having collaborated with the Nazis in 1941 (Kasekamp 2006). In addition to courting far-
right and anti-Semitic supporters, the use of the traditional Thunder Cross seems a purposeful
and intentional way of showing dedication to an ethnic interpretation of Latvian nationalism.
Party Leader Raivis Dzintars, himself the subject of controversy over anti-Semitic comments,
has publicly defended the use of the Thunder Cross as a manifestation of indigenous Latvian
traditions and national self-determination. Given the highly provocative and controversial ap-
pearance of the Thunder Cross, as well as the fact that it relies on pagan origins that are not
only pre-Soviet but also pre-German, it is likely intended to convey an ethnic Latvian identity
to voters.
In short, with the noticeable exception of the far-right ethnic Latvian parties, politicians and
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political parties in Latvian elections are far more likely to rely on information conveyed through
party platforms than they are through visual depictions and logos. While party platforms do
not shy away from explicit ethnic rhetoric, logos and visual depictions are for the most part
relatively uninformative in the Latvian context.
6.4 Classifying Latvian Political Parties
In Chapter 4, I argued that political parties in Bosnia could be divided into a three-party typology
based on how they use ethnic divisions in communicatingwith voters for the purpose of electoral
mobilization. In this section, I argue that a similar typology is useful in understanding Latvian
campaignmobilization. I first outline that typology, and then address concerns about classifying
parties as non-ethnic in the Latvian context
6.4.1 A Three-Part Typology
Several parties in Latvia clearly meet the definition of ethnic party. Nationalist parties like the
National Alliance and Latvian Way promise that their policies will benefit the Latvian people
exclusively, and preserve the dominance of the Latvian ethnic group in the state. Parties like the
Russian Party and the Latvian Russian Union are similarly ethnic in their promise to represent
minority Russian interests in the Latvian parliament. But even parties more commonly accepted
to be in the mainstream and the center of the Latvian political spectrum often appeal directly
to coethnics as champions of ethnic interests. When Unity or the Union of Greens and Farmers
promises to protect the power of “the nation,” they often make it clear that that nation is the
ethnic Latvian community, whose language, culture, and communal interests will be protected
at the expense of others. When parties argue that the ethnic community is under attack—either
due to the community’s minority status in the case of Russians, or due to the historical and
geopolitical vulnerability of the group in the case of Latvians—the party is implicitly claiming
to rectify the situation by representing the group’s interests.
Other parties should be seen anti-ethnic. Socialist parties especially often explicitly attack
the “nationalist extremism,” or emphasize the historical diversity of Latvia and the greater Baltic
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area as a multi-national, multi-ethnic region. These parties promise not to represent any sin-
gle group, but instead promise not to divide the country into ethnic groups, which they see as
preventing the state from provide common goods like economic growth, good governance, or
stability.
Finally, a large number of parties meet the category of ethnically ambiguous by simply
ignoring the ethnic divide in the country altogether. These parties promise policy benefits that
theoretically could be appealing to all members of society, but do not explicitly take a position
on the ethnic divide within the country. These parties campaign on issues of class, ideology,
region, or policy preference. These proposals may be supported disproportionately by one group
over another, but the party does not actively claim to represent the interests of the group based
on membership in any ethnic category.
6.4.2 Can a Latvian Party Really be “non-ethnic?”
It may be objected that a typology which sees certain parties as not employing ethnic divides is
not applicable to the Latvian context. After all the ethnic divide is fundamental to many aspects
Latvian politics, and one of the few persistent features of Latvia’s extremely volatile political
party system. As in Bosnia, institutions have formalized ethnic divides into very practical mat-
ters of policy implementation. The citizenship laws hold one ethnic group as the “rightful”
residents of the country, while others are the result of a decades-long criminal occupation. In
such an environment, it is not unreasonable to think that no political act at all can be said to be
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truly “non-ethnic.” Moreover, ethnic divisions have been salient to day-to-day life throughout
Latvia’s entire history. The distinction between Latvian and Russian ethnic identities was at the
core of the Soviet Union’s Russification policy during the twentieth century, and Latvian ethnic
distinctiveness and historical heritage was an important mobilizing force against Soviet rule that
lead to the independence of the state in the 1990’s. In the middle ages, Latvian ethnic identity
came into existence as a result of feudal distinctions that held ethnic Latvians in a rural, agrar-
ian position serving German nobility. It is not unreasonable to think that given the way ethnic
identities have been so deeply embedded in nearly all relevant social distinctions in Latvia, that
it is simply not possible for a party to avoid ethnic issues in any meaningful way.
Such objectionsmay stem fromLatvia’s unique circumstances as a nationalizing state (Smith
1996, Agarin 2011). In this analysis, Latvia’s fundamental political conflict in the post-Soviet
period is resolving the “national question,” in which the relationship between the political and
cultural community is still ill-defined. According to Brubaker (1995), in a nationalizing state
the key to political development and conflict is the so-called “triadic nexus,” between titular
majorities, national minorities, and the external homelands to which the national minorities
belong. The nationalizing question is fundamental to the very nature of the state and of society,
and involves not just the setting of state policies, but the very reformulation of the ethno-national
groups and of the state itself. In this sense, truly democratic politics cannot be discussed in
Latvia because the question of to which group of “the people” the state is accountable has
not yet been fully settled (Rustow 1970, Linz & Stepan 1996). This is a reasonable objection.
Latvian citizenship policy over the past two decades has imposed certain linguistic and cultural
standards as prerequisites to political participation. As a result, it is impossible to ignore the
ethnic divide in the country, since ethnic identities and diversity must be addressed by every
individual prior to political participation. Moreover, Latvia’s nationalizing state policies also
seem to be changing the very nature of the “Russian” identity itself, reforming the way Latvian
Russians see themselves and the relationship between their ethnic identity and the society in
which they live (Laitin 1998).
I do not want to dismiss the importance of these group-level disputes, or downplay the im-
portance of these fundamental issues. But it is also important to realize that Latvia is still
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an electoral democracy. Through its consolidation of electoral institutions, and its entry into
NATO and the European Union, Latvia has committed to governance through electoral means.
Latvia’s nationalizing state should therefore be seen as both an outcome and a context of demo-
cratic competition. Over the long term, it is an outcome: Latvia’s policies relating to citizenship,
language, education, and media are those which have been enacted by democratically-elected
politicians, chosen in free and fair elections by Latvian voters. While it is true that historical
and structural factors may have predisposed Latvia towards nationalizing policies, it cannot be
said that Latvian voters have not had opportunities to revisit these policies. As the discussion
of campaign materials above suggests, maintaining or challenging those nationalizing policies
has been an important point of contestation in nearly every election since independence from
the USSR. These policies are maintained or altered based on the priorities of the leaders who
get elected, which is an interactive product of the leaders who choose when and how to build
political support, and the voters who decide who to put into office. While Latvia’s status as
a nationalizing state may very well be one of the most important factors in understanding its
political system, it is inaccurate to say that this context controls all aspects of its politics—it
is not the case that Latvia is nationalizing and therefore elections nationalists, rather it elects
nationalists, so it stays nationalizing.
Moreover, the question of what exactly it means to be Latvian is not exactly settled in a way
that has been unanimously accepted. As stated above, the Latvian “national” identity is itself
a modern product: a linguistic and cultural amalgamation of what had been distinct regional
identities whose dialects were mutually intelligible and who were all understood to be different
from Russians and Germans. That identity is still somewhat contested today, as seen by the
political entrepreneurs who debate the status of the Latgalian and Livonian languages. Even
within the ethnic Latvian parties who claim to speak for their coethnics and exclude other eth-
nic groups, there is some debate over what traits define the identity. These parties argue over
whether Latvian identity is fundamentally religious or secular, and even beyond that, whether
it is historically Christian, or pagan. They offer competing views of Latvian identity which may
be rural and traditional or urban and cosmopolitan. These questions are partially settled through
electoral contests, and it is clear that candidates adopt a wide variety of positions and arguments
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on this topic. Ignoring this variation as a result of prior assumptions risks missing key insights
into politics not just in Latvia, but in all ethnically diverse societies.
Finally, the framework which allows for the possibility of parties to be non-ethnic more
adequately reflects the actual agency that voters and political elites have in making political
decisions. In the Latvian case especially, where all parties can propose 4,000 characters of
whatever positions and claims that they want to make, leaders and candidates have a lot of
leeway in what they want to say to voters. By looking at the entire range of proposals and
adequately cataloging their diversity, it is possible to observe not only the ultimate outcome of
elections, but the outcomes that were not chosen by voters. Many parties choose not to campaign
on ethnic issues, at times even attacking the nationalizing policies of the state outright. That
in itself is important: it suggests that some leaders believe that those policies are not in the
best interest of the Latvian state—or, at the very least, that attacking those policies could be a
viable path to electoral victory. But acknowledging that those arguments are made also helps
understand the range of options available to voters and understanding why theymake the choices
that maintain ethnic divides as important political cleavages. By separating political decisions
from identity characteristics, we avoid essentializing ethnic identities, and can better understand
the circumstances under which ethnic identities influence voting decisions.
6.5 Conclusion
Unlike in Bosnia, the ethnic diversity in Latvia is a much more recent development, largely the
result of Soviet-era migration patterns. Furthermore, the divide between the two ethnic groups
is also much wider than in the Yugoslav case due to differences in history, language, and culture.
Latvians speak a Baltic language, and have historically been politically dominated by the much
larger powers surrounding them. Russians speak a Slavic language, with a different alphabet and
virtually no intelligibility with Latvian, and are for the most part present in Latvia as a result
of the Russification policies of the Soviet Union. Following democratization and independence
from the USSR in the 1990’s, this ethnic divide become an important political cleavage in voting
behavior. Both ethnic Latvian and ethnic Russian candidates have campaigned for support from
198
coethnics throughout the post-Soviet period, often relying on differences in culture, language,
and differences in the historical heritage between the two groups to signal to voters their ethnic
affiliation. Yet during this period there is also a group of political leaders who do not campaign
on ethnic issues, choosing instead to mobilize voters by advocating for a multi-ethnic civic
nationalism, or by ignoring ethnic and identity divides to focus on economic issues.
Just as in Bosnia, Latvian voters therefore find themselves in an ethnically divided society
with a wide range of parties to choose from, which employ ethnic identities in different ways.
But unlike in Bosnia, there is virtually no institutional protection for ethnic minority groups, as
Latvia has restored its electoral institutions almost exactly as they existed prior to the arrival of
the Russian minority in the twentieth century. In Chapter 2, I argued that majority and minority
group members had divergent incentives to support ethnic parties. In Chapter 5, I showed that
that framework was helpful in identifying voter-level tendencies to split their votes between
ethnic and non-ethnic parties. In the next chapter, I employ a dataset based on the classification
of Latvia campaign rhetoric presented in this chapter to analyze the over-time variation in ethnic
party success in Latvia.
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7Latvian Elections over Time
In the previous chapter, I outlined the characteristics of the ethnic divide in Latvia, how Latvian
political entrepreneurs use ethnic identities in mobilizing voters. I now turn to an analysis of
the success of these mobilization strategies. These proposals are not all equally persuasive to
voters, and identifying which types of parties are most likely to succeed will help to explain the
role of ethnic identities in electoral politics.
In this chapter, I show that ethnic majority Latvians and ethnic minority Russians exhibit
divergent patterns of ethnic voting in the democratic period following the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Since the mid-1990’s, appeals to ethnic Latvian identity have increased. Candidates who
previously campaigned on exclusively non-ethnic platforms show a predisposition to adopt po-
sitions protecting an ethnically-defined Latvian culture, legal protections for Latvian-language
speakers, and a rejection of non-Latvian voters. Explicit Russian identification, on the other
hand, has declined, and candidates who present themselves as champions of Russian interests
show an over-time tendency to abandon explicit ethnic protections. These candidates instead
advocate positions ostensibly acceptable to members of all ethnic groups, such as civic nation-
alism, multiculturalism, economic redistribution and populism. As a result, the ethnic cleavage
in Latvian politics should not be understood as “ethnic Latvian identity versus ethnic Russian
identity”, as it is often presented, but instead “ethnic Latvian identity versus non-ethnic iden-
tity.” In Latvia, ethnic campaigning has become a privilege of the majority group only.
This chapter will show that during Latvia’s period of democratic consolidation, ethnic voting
200
has remained relatively consistent for ethnic Latvian parties as a share of the total vote, but has
declined for ethnic Russian parties. As votes going to ethnic Russian parties have decreased,
the share going to parties espousing multi-culturalism or non-ethnic identities has increased, as
ethnic Russian voters have shifted over time from supporting ethnic parties to supporting non-
ethnic parties. This trend is largely the result of political entrepreneurs changing the platforms
on which they campaign. As Latvian democracy consolidates, candidates who had previously
espoused an ethnic Russian platform aremore likely to change their positions from ethnic to non-
ethnic. Candidates who had previously campaigned on a non-ethnic platform are more likely
to change to an ethnic Latvian one, but very few candidates adopt a Russian ethnic platform
after having previously taken a non-ethnic position. Both ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians
have reasons to support ethnic group representation, since both groups are large enough to be
potentially lucrative targets of expropriation by the other group. But as ethnic Latvians are an
absolute majority of the country, and ethnic Russians are not, the likelihood of winning elections
and wielding power is much higher for the Latvians than the Russians.
This chapter proceeds as follows: in the next section, I discuss why analyzing over-time
variation in Latvian party politics is an appropriate way to test a theory predicting divergent
incentives between majority and minority group voters. I then describe the data set—derived
from the observations of the previous chapter—which I use to classify ethnic appeals to voters in
Latvia and measure their relative success in attracting voter support. In section three, I present
a quantitative analysis of the success of these appeals over time, and measure the likelihood of
candidates making each type of appeal. In the fourth section, I show what those patterns look
like in actual Latvian candidates and give examples of the way that candidates rebrand and sort
themselves in to ethnic and non-ethnic parties over time. The final section concludes.
7.1 Over-Time Variation in Latvia
This chapter primarily looks at variation in Latvian electoral outcomes over time. This is based
on the premise that parties, candidates, and voters are likely to function differently in Latvia im-
mediately after independence than they are after several years of democratic governance. The
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years immediately following democratization are often the most chaotic and unstable in any
country. Institutions are still weak, and politicians often lack the experience and institutional
resources that political actors possess in long-established democracies. But through a processes
of political learning and Darwinian competition, political actors adjust their strategies. Can-
didates who are unable to attract voter support or adapt to more efficient electoral strategies
lose or drop out, and with time the party system consolidates around those parties and actors
which are most electorally viable. The argument of this dissertation is that ethnic voting is a
reliable strategy only for groups that have high benefits of ethnic representation, and relative
ease of winning office by making ethnic appeals to voters. In the case of Latvia, this theory sug-
gests that ethnic majority Latvian appeals are more likely to be successful than appeals to ethnic
minority Russians. Over time, these divergent incentives shape the characteristics of winning
candidates during the period of democratic consolidation.
Several scholars have noted the importance of time as an explanatory variable immediately
following democratization in shaping political party systems. In a cross-national survey of party
system development, Peter Mair observed that “while cleavage structures act to stabilize elec-
torates, they tend to do so slowly, with the result that almost regardless of region or timing,
the early years of party systems, and the early years of newly democratized electorates, tend to
prove the most unstable (Mair 1998, p.182).” This instability and rapid change is especially pro-
nounced in the post-communist world. As opposed to first-wave countries in Western Europe,
post-communist countries like Latvia democratized in an environment where civil society orga-
nizations had been actively suppressed by the state, and in many areas largely eradicated. While
the Latvian independence movement was led by the few civil society organizations that existed
in Latvia at the time (e.g., environmental organizations, cultural preservation societies, and the
Popular Front), these groups hardly had the mass-membership or all-encompassing support as
the trade unions or churches which were key actors in first- and second-wave democratizations.
Political parties in Latvia for the most part had to be formed or revived from non-existence,
and the link between social identities and political identities was relatively weak. In this some-
what tumultuous and uncertain environment, the choices made in the day-to-day business of
governance may ultimately shape the resulting regime, serving to consolidate both democ-
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racy as a regime type, and the political party system which structures future electoral contests
(Morlino 1998). In the absence of pre-existing and well-established party institutions, political
actors are forced to legislate, campaign, and interact with voters in a way that responds directly
to the immediate practical challenges of governance and reelection. Here, where new actors
emerge with relative ease and the balance between existing actors has been completely upset,
outcomes are likely to be less stable. Until actors learn what constitutes a “good” decision—or
at least are voted out of office for making “bad” ones— the range of viable political players and
possible policy outcomes is likely to be much wider than in more institutionalized long-standing
states.
This temporary instability has been documented empirically among elites and voters. One of
the clearest signs is the tendency of recently democratized countries to see an explosion of new
political parties immediately following democratization, only to taper off after successive rounds
of political contestation. In the absence of strong civil society organizations or political parties
with established rules for succession of leadership, there is a high degree of uncertainty over
who constitutes a viable candidate, or which ideology is popular. This uncertainty is often not
resolved until actual elections provide new information on which positions are viable, and which
are not (Rose & Munro 2003). Further complicating things is the fact that the most pressing
political issues facing the country—and therefore those issues which are likely to be the most
important for soliciting voters support—are likely to change over time as the country transitions
from a command economy to a market economy. Kitschelt (1992) argues that in the immediate
post-communist period, foundational questions about regime type and economic transition are
likely to dominate elections, which may favor one set of actors or policies over another. Once
those issues are settled, other policies and social cleavages are likely to become more relevant,
causing a change over time in the strategies elites use to build linkages with voters. How the
deposed communist party and its candidates transitions from the only legal political entity to
one of several electoral competitors can also have drastic impact on not only its own electoral
fortunes, but also the strategies of its competitors (Sakwa 1998, Grzymala-Busse 2002).
Voters also go through a period of political learning immediately following democratization.
Evans & Whitefield (1998) finds that post-Soviet voters readjust of their own ideology follow-
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ing the introduction of free elections, which they attributes to the reconfiguration of political
competition following the collapse of communism. Official Soviet ideology had held that the
“left” was the existing regime, while the “right” consisted of reactionary anti-communists. Fol-
lowing the demise of the Soviet Union, liberalizing, pro-reformist parties branded themselves
as the left, while supporters of the Soviet regime were considered to be on the right, suggesting
that the borders of the policy space were being reformed by political entrepreneurs as a result
of the transition. Brader & Tucker (2001) note that what could be considered partisanship takes
several years to develop in any meaningful sense in post-communist Russia. This, they argue
is because partisan and ideological labels only take hold if they show consistent usefulness in
line with a voter’s personal experience. These are time-dependent processes, and as such strong
partisan or ideological identities can emerge only years after the democratic regime has been
installed. These observations are consistent with expectations from the literature on partisan-
ship in more longstanding democracies, which suggest that political identities are established
over the long term, reinforced by socialization, and personal experience (Converse 1969).
Unlike Bosnia, Latvia is a unitary system. There are no autonomous local governing en-
tities, and there are no explicit protections for ethnic minorities. As there is only one level of
government that sets the most relevant policies, Latvian citizens are either always a majority or
always a minority. Although ethnic Latvians do constitute a majority of the country, the size
of the ethnic Russian community is very large. Policies which protect the interests of ethnic
Latvians only would therefore exclude a very large number of people. Redistributing resources
away from ethnic Russians to ethnic Latvians is potentially an extremely lucrative opportunity,
since the two groups are near parity in size. Moreover, the argument that ethnic Latvians could
be oppressed by minority Russians does not likely seem implausible to Latvian voters, as many
are old enough to remember the Soviet period when such oppression was quite real. Latvians
therefore have strong incentives to desire ethnic representation. Likewise, ethnic Russians also
have strong reasons to desire group representation in parliament. As a minority group in a na-
tionalizing state, they are the most likely to see their language diminish in importance. Given
the centralized nature of the Latvian state, and the importance of historical commemoration to
the independence movement, educational curricula are likely to focus on ethnic Latvian inter-
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pretations of history that may be insensitive or offensive to ethnic Russians.
The two groups diverge, though, in the likelihood of actually obtaining power on the basis
of ethnic mobilization. By campaigning to represent the interests of ethnic Latvians over other
ethnicities, a party limits its appeal to roughly 60% of the voting population. By appealing
to Russian speakers, a party limits itself to 40% of the vote. This means that ethnic Russian
candidates pay a steeper price when appealing to coethnics, and impose a greater limit on their
support than an ethnic Latvian candidate does pursuing the same strategy. In other words, under
perfect ethnic census voting—where all Latvians voted for one party and all Russians voted for
another—ethnic Russians would be permanently excluded from power. Because ethnic Latvians
constitute an absolute majority of voters, ethnic mobilization ultimately benefits Latvians more
than Russians.
Both groups have strong reasons to want the benefits that could come from ethnic represen-
tation in policy making. But the ethnic Latvian community has a much higher ease of access
to actually winning power than the ethnic Russians do. Since ethnic Latvians are high on both
dimensions, while the Russians are high only on one of them, ethnic voting is most likely among
Latvians not Russians. Over time, the process of political learning should favor Latvian candi-
dates who make ethnic appeals, but not Russians, setting the two sides on different trajectories.
Ethnic Latvian candidates who appeal to voters on the basis of ethnicity have an advantage over
those that don’t, whereas ethnic Russian candidates who don’t appeal to voters on the basis of
ethnicity have an advantage over candidates who do. Through the process of political learn-
ing during democratic consolidation, Latvian candidates should therefore “learn” to continue
or increase their ethnic messaging, whereas Russian candidates should “learn” to avoid it.
This produces several testable hypotheses of Latvian party system consolidation. Successful
ethnic appeals made by candidate to ethnic Latvians should increase or remain high over time,
since those voters have both much to gain through ethnic representation, and a great likelihood
of winning. Ethnic appeals to Russians, on the other hand, should decrease or remain low over
time, since Russians are less likely to be able ultimately to enact policies. Since a candidate
who makes appeals to ethnic Latvians is likely to find those appeals rewarded at the polls, those
candidates are likely to continue to follow that strategy. Candidates who make appeals to ethnic
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퐻7.1 Ethnic appeals to Latvians should increase or remain high over time.
퐻7.2 Ethnic appeals to Russians should decrease or remain low over time.
퐻7.3 Candidates who make appeals to ethnic Latvians will continue to do so.
퐻7.4
Candidates who make appeals to ethnic Russians will change their ap-
peals.
퐻7.5
Candidates who make non-ethnic appeals will be more likely to change
to ethnic Latvian appeals than ethnic Russian appeals.
Table 7.1: Hypotheses
Latvians will therefore continue to do so over time. A candidate who makes appeals to ethnic
Russians, however, is likely to find those appeals ultimately futile, so those candidates will likely
change strategies to make non-ethnic appeals. Any candidate who starts by making non-ethnic
appeals has no incentive to change to supporting an ethnicminority position, butmay see reasons
to support the ethnic majority group. Those candidates will therefore be more likely to change
to ethnic Latvian appeals than ethnic Russian appeals. A list of these hypotheses is presented
in Table 7.1
7.2 The Data Set
One of the greatest challenges to measuring over-time variation in ethnic mobilization in new
democracies is finding valid and reliable measures. “How ethnic” a party should be considered
is an extremely difficult concept to measure, given that ethnic identification is often commu-
nicated subtly. Existing measurement strategies are especially ill-suited to capturing over-time
variation, largely because they rely on indicators which change extremely slowly, or do notmatch
the information available to voters at the time they made their voting decision. Expert surveys,
one of the most commonmethods of measuring a party’s ethnic positioning, rely on a subjective
assessment of a party’s positions which show little variation in the short-term. Consciously and
subconsciously, experts make their assessments on a rolling basis, synthesizing observations
over the medium-and long-term into a single estimation of the party’s identity. Such measure-
ment is ill-suited to assess the moment that a party stopped or started “being ethnic.” Likewise,
roll-call vote tallies—another system used to measure a party’s positioning—suffer from prob-
lems in measuring over-time variation. This study seeks to address ethnic identification and
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electoral success, and as such must rely on information available to voters at the time of the
election in which they voted. Roll-call votes measured after an election would therfore not be
appropriate, since there is no guarantee that these votes were indicative of the way the party
campaigned before they were elected.
These problems are especially severe in the Latvian context. As discussed in the previous
chapter, Latvia has an extremely volatile party system. Latvian political parties frequently form
de novo, or consolidate as the merger of multiple parties to create a new party. Sometimes
these are relatively straight forward, such as when the “Fatherland and Freedom” party merged
with the “Latvian National Independence Movement” to become the “Alliance of Fatherland
and Freedom and Latvian National Independence Movement.” Others are less obvious, such as
when the “Latvian Popular Front” changed its name to the “Christian People’s Party.” The name
change suggests a rebranding from a nationalist party to a religious one, yet the party’s leader-
ship remained mostly the same. In fact, of the 118 parties in this study, 90 of them contested
only a single election. Measuring parties’ identities and positions over time presents a serious
practical challenge. Since candidates frequently change affiliation as parties reform, merge, and
dissolve, the standards for assessing continuity are unclear.
To resolve this issue, I return to the Latvian pre-electoral party programs. As discussed in
the previous chapter, every political candidate in Latvia is required to appear on a party list,
and every party list must be submitted with a party program. Since no candidate can appear on
a ballot without signing her name to a platform, it is possible to assign a specific platform to
literally every candidate who has ever run for national office in post-Soviet Latvia. This includes
both winning candidates and losing candidates, resulting in no data loss from candidates deemed
“insignificant” by other measurement strategies.
I first obtained party platforms from all elections since 1995 directly from the Latvian Elec-
tion Commission in Riga. I then hand-coded a total of 118 programs over all electoral cycles
from 1995 to 2014 according to pre-determined coding criteria. The standard imposed is that
outline in Chapter 2, and used in Chapter 5 to code Bosnian political parties: to be considered
ethnic, the party must clearly identify as representing a specific ethnic group. It must also ex-
clude other ethnic groups from their agenda, so that the voter can infer which groups the party
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with not seek to support once in office. In short, if a reasonably intelligent voter would identify
which ethnic group a party claimed to support using the information in the party program, I
code it as ethnic. In practice, this means that those parties which were inductively described
as anti-ethnic or ethnically ambiguous in the previous chapter are collapsed into the same cate-
gory. These data were then mapped to the full candidate lists and vote totals for all candidates
registered to contest national-level parliamentary elections. Unfortunately, candidate lists from
the 1995 election are not publicly available, and so while party programs from that election are
coded, candidate-level data from that election is not included in the dataset. Nevertheless, the
resulting data set does include 8, 767 observations listing every candidate who contested elec-
tions in the period surveyed, and whether or not they explicitly identified with a specific ethnic
group in each electoral contest.
The standard does result in some potentially surprising coding decisions the most contro-
versial of which is the classification of Harmony in some years as a non-ethnic party. In several
of the elections under study, Harmony completely ignores issues of ethnicity in its party plat-
forms, choosing instead to campaign on economic issues. It is therefore classified as non-ethnic
in those years. But Harmony is supported overwhelmingly by the Russian population in Latvia.
Many of its candidates are themselves ethnic Russians, and many journalistic sources describe
it as a “Russian party.” It is not inaccurate to describe Harmony as a Russian party, but it is in-
appropriate for the purposes of this study. Ethnic Russians cannot choose to stop being Russian.
However, when Russians run for office they can choose whether or not to make their identities
central to their political brand. When Russians vote, they can also choose whether to support a
party that claims to represent their group interests. These decisions are the subject of this study.
In order to understand the influence of ethnic identities in political decision-making, it is crucial
to have measures of those decisions that are not based on assumptions about the relationship
to identity. Classifying Harmony is a Russian party because most of its voters and candidates
are Russian is therefore inappropriate. Moreover, the measurement is consistent with the way
Harmony chooses to present itself to the world. Harmony’s leadership goes out of its way to
distance itself from its Russian origins. It has conscientiously recruited ethnic Latvians to join
its candidate lists, so much so that leadership of the party now has only one ethnic Russian
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(Khlakovskiy 2018). The party has also publicly renounced its ties to United Russia, Putin’s
governing party in the Russian Federation, choosing instead to join the Party of European So-
cialists which is composed of western left-of center parties like the British Labour Party, the
French Socialist Party, and the German Social Democratic Party (Bershidsky 2018). This non-
ethnic determination is also consistent with the comments made by party leadership in the past
which seem to seem to antagonize the party’s ethnic Russian base, such as when Nils Ušakovs,
the former mayor of Riga and Harmony’s leader, declared that, “it’s better to take the citizen-
ship exam than to sit around and complain.” Ušakovs noted that he, himself, was a non-citizen
in the 1990’s, and that naturalization is not overly difficult because, “it’s not a very hard test
(DELFI.LV 2012).”
It may be of concern that party platforms are little more than empty talk. Parties can say
whatever theywant in the program, and accordingly these documentsmay not be good indicators
of reality. In some cases, that is almost certainly true. Several parties submitted platforms that
strain credibility with promises to guarantee enormous social benefits miraculously financed by
eliminating all taxes. Yet in this study, these platforms are not taken as an indication of what
a party will actually do if elected. Rather, they are meant to indicate how a party wishes to
present itself to voters. If a party uses some of its valuable 4,000 character allotment to declare
that it will lower taxes and raise incomes, we cannot infer that it will actually be able to do
(or that it even really intends to do) any of this, as actual policy outcomes will depend on the
party’s true intentions, post-election coalition bargaining, and the mathematical constraints of
public finance. What we can infer is that this party wants to appeal to everyone who pays taxes
and relies on income. This type of inference is especially useful if a party explicitly identifies
itself as a representative of a specific ethnic group, a champion of a particular ethnic interests,
or hostile towards a set of ethnic outsiders. From these statements, we can infer that the party
wants to be perceived as belonging to a specific ethnic group. In this way, the measurement
strategy captures the variation most relevant to the research question.
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7.3 The General Trajectory of Latvian Party Consolidation
Over time, voter support for ethnic Latvian parties has remained relatively constant, while the
support for ethnic Russian parties and multi-ethnic parties has varied. Over time, fewer and
fewer voters support candidates making overt appeals to Russian ethnic identities, while more
and more voters are supporting candidates making multi-ethnic appeals or ignoring identity all
together. Moreover, candidates themselves respond to incentives to adopt or abandon ethnic
messaging based on majority or minority status.
I show this by producing a series of estimated probabilities of a variety of candidate out-
comes and behaviors derived frommultinomial logit models. Specifically, in this section I show
that over time the candidates who make Russian ethnic appeals are less likely to win elections
at all, while candidates who make non-ethnic appeals or ethnic Latvian appeals increase their
relative likelihood of victory. I also show that the type of appeal made to voters has substan-
tial impact on the likelihood of changing the nature of one’s platform between electoral cycles.
Candidates who changed the nature of their ethnic affiliation between electoral cycles—either
by revising their party platform or by changing parties—are far more likely to adopt either a
non-ethnic identity, or an ethnic Latvian identity. Virtually no candidate ever abandons a non-
ethnic platform to adopt a Russian one. These trends are further evident with new candidates.
Candidates who contest elections for the first time over the period of study are far more likely to
espouse an ethnic Latvian platform or a multiethnic platform than an ethnic Russian platform.
In the end, ethnic Russian interests are more likely to be subsumed into a universalist policy
of multiculturalism or multi-ethnic populism, while ethnic Latvian interests can be much more
explicitly used as a tool by politicians to win elections.
7.3.1 Party Vote Share over Time
In Figure 7.1, I show the percentage of the vote going to parties that make each of three types
of appeals: ethnic Latvian, ethnic Russian, and non-ethnic. Appeals to ethnic Latvians remain
relatively constant over the entire period. With the one notable exception of the election in
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Figure 7.1: Vote Share by Electoral Appeals in Latvia: 1995-2014
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of the votes in all Latvian elections. The drop in 2002 may be the result of Latvia’s referendum
to join the EU in 2003. Many parties that support the EU campaigned that year by describing
themselves as internationalists or European integrationists, rather than in ethnic terms. Some of
those that were against Latvia joining the EU did so by describing themselves as committed to
national sovereignty and the independence of the Latvian state, which technically they defended
on non-ethnically defined terms. Many of the rightist and Latvian nationalist parties therefore,
for this election only, did not make explicitly ethnically defined appeals.1 However, the general
pattern returned in 2006, providing strong support for 퐻7.1.
Consistent with 퐻7.2, ethnic Russian appeals follow a different trajectory. Parties that make
explicit appeals to Russian ethnic interests never reach the level of ethnic Latvian appeals. This
most likely reflects the natural ceiling imposed on ethnic Russian appeals by demographics.
Since ethnic Russians make up less than 40% of the population of Latvia, it is extremely unlikely
that ethnic Russian parties would ever amass more than 40% of the vote. The highest value this
ever reaches is 22.7% in 2006. Yet the over-time variation is quite remarkable. The gradual
increase of each election cycle is readily apparent, but drops off suddenly following the 2006
election. While the gradual increase in the first four elections is most likely explainable by the
increasing number of Russian voters gaining citizenship throughout this period, citizenship laws
fail to account for the sudden drop off in 2010. Ironically, the greatest number of naturalizations
happened in the mid-2000’s (see Figure 6.1), and by 2010 the number of ethnic Russians eligible
to vote in Parliamentary elections was almost certainly higher than it was in 2006, yet the explicit
Russian ethnic identification plays a relatively minor role in the Latvian party system beyond
this point. Instead, Russians voters tend to support parties not campaigning on specific ethnic
identification, but rather on issues that appeal to ethnic minority voters on non-ethnic grounds.
This is reflected in the corresponding increase in the support for non-ethnic parties.
Figure 7.1 depicts a party system-level overview of Latvian politics. The figure suggests
that parties which campaign on explicit Russian ethnic identification wane in importance over
1See Mikkel & Pridham (2004), Ikstens (2007), and Schulze (2018). Euroscepticism was much lower in Latvia
in comparison to other Baltic states, possibly because it was presented in terms that comported with nationalist
ideology and ethnic Latvian interests. Both pro- and anti-European Union candidates defended their position with
relation to Latvian “sovereignty,” seeing threats to Latvian independence coming from Russia or the EU respec-
tively. However, in the platforms, many of these parties defend these positions with relation to the Latvian state,
not the ethnically-defined Latvian nation.
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time, as a smaller and smaller segment of Latvian voters support them. Parties which make
ethnic Latvian appeals, though, do not diminish in the same way, maintaining constant support.
These observations are focused on voting outcomes, and combine two separate processes: the
politicians proposing positions, and then voters choosing what to support. I now turn to ex-
amine these dynamics from the actors’ perspectives through a separate quantitative analyses of
candidates.
7.3.2 Candidate-Level Analysis
The analyses that follow use the candidate-year as the unit of analysis, which allows for an
individual to appear in the data set multiple times. If, for example, a candidate appeared on a
party list at every election between 1998 and 2014, then that candidate appears in the dataset six
separate times. Indexing by year has the benefit that candidates are not assumed to be consistent
in their ethnic messaging. A candidate can campaign on ethnic appeals in one election, but not
in the next, (or vice-versa) and that variation will be captured in this measurement strategy. This
approach produces a very large data set with a high level of statistical power. Over six electoral
cycles, a total of 8, 767 observations are recorded, produced by 4, 508 unique individuals.2
Of those 4, 508, a total of 1, 041 individuals contested multiple elections, creating a complete
picture of the Latvian political class and all possible legislators of the country. These large
numbers facilitate analyses using even relatively demanding statistical models requiring large-
푛 data sets.
The use of candidate-years also takes full advantage of the Latvian legal environment with
regards to party campaign messaging. Every candidate who has ever run for parliament in
Latvia has been required to appear on a party list, and to sign their name to an official party
platform which is distributed free of charge to voters. Every electoral cycle, all candidates must
publicly declare their policy positions, and must revise those positions for every election. It
is therefore possible not only to compare every candidate to every other candidate, but also
every candidate’s current positions to her previous positions. Since the classification outlined
in the previous chapter rests on an exhaustive and mutually exclusive typology drawing from
2The 4, 508 figure and the analyses which follow are based on the assumption that individuals who have the
same name, spelled the same way are the same person.
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party platforms, and because every candidate has signed her name to a party platform at every
election she has contested, the data set contains 100% coverage of every candidate for parliament
in every election under study.
Nevertheless, the linking of candidate-years to party platforms in order to provide measure-
ments on candidate ethnic positioning is not without some controversy. The biggest concern
is that because party lists consist of large number of candidates, the number of candidates is
much larger than the number of party platforms. The project thus uses 99 party documents to
code 8, 767 individuals. It may be argued that since party platforms are generated collectively
by multiple candidates and party members, that a candidate-level analysis is inappropriate, and
that a party-level analysis would be more suitable.
This concerns has some validity, but should be taken as cause to limit the appropriate con-
clusions that can be drawn from the analyses that follow, not to reject them entirely. It is true
that since the candidate coding schemes are drawn from sources which do not produce variation
within parties, the analyses cannot provide any information on which candidate within a party
list is most likely to eventually be seated in parliament. This is unfortunate, given how signifi-
cant intra-party competition is in Latvia. But the most important variation for this study—the
difference between candidates who make ethnic appeals and those that do not—exists at the
party level not the individual level. This variation is captured by the coding of party platforms,
and therefore the measurement strategy is still valid for the research question.
Moreover, the use of candidate-years is the easiest way to avoid difficult, almost existential
questions about what constitutes a “political party” in Latviawhich could undermine any attempt
at systematic study. Given the extremely high volatility, and the frequent occurrence of schisms,
mergers, and new party foundations, over-time analyses of parties positioning are extremely
difficult. If a party has a completely new name, new logo, and new platform, but almost all of its
candidates had previously been members of the same party, is it a new party? Given that parties
are frequently formed and registered as combinations of multiple loosely-organized factions,
factional shifting can create big difficulties for defining party continuity. It is not uncommon for
a party to fold and one portion of its candidates go into one party, while the rest go into another.
Party-level measurement ignores those dynamics, and require potentially controversial a priori
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decisions about which parties are continuations of previous parties, and which are new.
Using the candidate-year as the unit of analysis, I conduct a regression analysis using a logit
model with the dependent variable as a dichotomous indicator of whether the candidate won a
seat in parliament, and the independent variable a vector of dummy variables indicating whether
the candidate explicitly identified as either a champion of ethnic Latvian interests, ethnic Russian
interests, or neither. In order to avoid collinearity, the coding scheme treats non-ethnic appeals
as a residual category. The strength of the logit analysis here is that it is fundamentally proba-
bilistic. The theory does not presume a deterministic relationship between ethnic campaigning
and electoral appeals: it merely predicts that there should be differences in the success rates of
ethnic appeals between majority and minority group. I therefore use the estimates produced by
the analysis to generate predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for each type of
appeal at each electoral cycle, which I present in Figure 7.2. The 푥 axis on this chart represents
the elections, while the 푦 axis represents the estimated probability that a candidate would win
that election after making either an ethnic appeal to Latvians, an ethnic appeal to Russians, or
no ethnic appeal at all. In 1998, for example, an estimated 6.1% of candidates who made ethnic
appeals to Latvians won election to the national parliament, while an estimated 21% of candi-
dates who made ethnic appeals to Russians won, and 2.9% of candidates who campaigned on
non-ethnic platforms won.
The predictions are somewhat noisy. This is not particularly surprising, as the measurement
strategy puts a large amount of variation into the error term. The classification system measures
variation only on ethnic positioning, but no party in this data set takes positions only on ethnic
identification. Most platforms which explicitly declare for either ethnic Latvians or Russians
also articulate positions on foreign policy, taxes, social spending, etc., which these data do not
address. Those positions are nevertheless likely highly relevant in the decision-making process
of Latvian voters. Many of themost salient issues in electoral politics, such as incumbents versus
opposition and retrospective and prospective assessments of candidates, are ignored here. The
“bouncing” pattern seen in some of the estimates is likely the result of government turnover, as
voters support for specific parties ebbs and flows over time. However, there is a clear divergence


















































Figure 7.2: Probability of Election in Latvia by Appeal Type over Time
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in contrast to ethnic Russian appeals. Consistent with 퐻7.3 and 퐻7.5, the success of both ethnic
Latvian appeals and non-ethnic appeals increases in the period under study; while there is some
variation year-to-year, there is a distinct upward trajectory for both. Russian appeal success,
however, drops off, eventually reaching zero. This suggests that a candidate today making an
appeal to ethnic Latvians has a higher chance of winning office as a result of that appeal than
she did in 1998, and is consistent with 퐻7.4. The same is true of a candidate making non-ethnic
appeals, or ignoring the issue entirely. But the exact opposite is true for a candidate making an
ethnic appeal to Russian voters. Whereas in 1998 a Russian ethnic appeal was associated with a
comparatively high chance of winning office, in 2014 that chance is, statistically speaking, zero.
This trajectory is the opposite of what might be expected given the citizenship politics in
Latvia during this period. As the greatest number of naturalizations happened in themid-2000’s,
by 2010 the number of ethnic Russians eligible to vote in Parliamentary elections was drastically
higher than it was in 2006. This would suggest that the natural constituency for ethnic Russian
appeals was growing, even as the likelihood of candidates winning office by campaigning on a
platform of Russian ethnic appeals was shrinking. It also suggests that even though some voters
are still supporting parties which campaign as ethnic Russian champions—as seen in Figure
7.1—those parties which do so are relegated to the fringes of Latvian politics; those appeals are
not able to actually elect anyone to office. This is in stark contrast to the general upward trend of
electoral victory for Latvian ethnic parties and parties which do not explicitly identify as ethnic.
The theory predicts that over time, candidates should have incentives to adjust their strat-
egy depending on how they started. Electoral experience should demonstrate that non-ethnic
and ethnic majority appeals are easier paths to electoral victory than ethnic minority Russian
appeals. These patterns are evident in the data. To test these predictions outlined in 퐻7.3, 퐻7.4,
and 퐻7.5, I look specifically at those candidates who ran in multiple elections. Pooling all this
data allows for an estimation of the over-time trajectories of candidate strategies and outcomes.
The data suggest that revising one’s position on ethnic appeals is quite common among Lat-
vian parliamentary candidates. Of the 1,047 individuals who appeared on party lists in more
than one consecutive election in the period under study, 435 of them have changed their posi-

































Candidates Changing Ethnic Appeals
Figure 7.3: Likelihood of Candidate Changing Ethnic Appeal in Latvia 1998-2014
switches parties—moving from a non-ethnic party to an ethnic party, for example—or when a
candidate stays within a party which changes its position on ethnic representation. To identify
patterns in these switches, I regress whether or not a candidate changed her ethnic identification
between elections 푡 and 푡−1 on the indicators of the type of appeal made at election 푡. The pre-
dicted probabilities, plotted in Figure 7.3, are estimates of the average likelihood of a candidate
making a specific type of appeal during an election after havingmade a different type of approval
in the contest before. In other words, the predicted probabilities indicate the likelihood that a
candidates will abandon a previous position in order to adopt either an ethnic Russian position,
an ethnic Latvian position, or a non-ethnic position. Overall, an estimated 11.21% of candidates
making appeals to Russians changed their party platforms in order to appeal directly to ethnic
Russians. This is a much lower figure than the estimated 27% of candidates making Latvian
appeals, who had switched their position in order to represent ethnic Latvians. The highest rate
of change is in those making non-ethnic appeals. Pooling over all the electoral contests under
study, the model estimates that 42.95% of the candidates changed their platform to non-ethnic
from something else.
These findings may be more intuitively understood by looking at the absolute number of
candidates changing their political messaging between elections. I show these in Table 7.4.
The columns show the type of appeal made at election 푡, while the rows show the appeal made
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at 푡 − 1 for all candidates who contested more than one consecutive election. The absolute
numbers should not be compared directly, as the total number of candidates in each group is not
even distributed. There are fewer ethnic Russians than ethnic Latvians in the country, and as a
result the overwhelmingmajority of candidates in Latvia are those whichmake ethnic Latvian or
non-ethnic proposals to the electorate. Nevertheless, the bulk of the candidates are concentrated
along the diagonal. This suggests that the majority of candidates stay consistent in their ethnic
messaging between elections. Looking at candidates who advocated an explicitly ethnic Russian
platform, 20 out of a total of 223 candidates, or 9.0% had previously advocated a multi-ethnic
platform. However, among ethnic Latvian candidates, this number is 196 out of 736, or 26.6%.
This comports with the general findings of the predicted probabilities derived from the logit
model—in fact, both these absolute numbers are within the confidence intervals of the predicted
probabilities. It suggests that candidates change to ethnic Latvian identification at amuch greater
rate than they do to ethnic Russian identification. Perhaps the most surprising finding is the non-
zero number of candidates who switched between the two types of ethnic communities. These
are the 10 candidates that started campaigning on platforms representing ethnic Russians and
then changed to represent ethnic Latvians, and the 5 candidates who started representing ethnic
Latvians only to switch to Russians—a complete about-face of ethnic campaigning. There are
a few possible explanations for this apparent contradiction. The first is that these shifts may
be driven by tokenism. Ethnic candidates of one group may be convinced to join the ballot
of parties advocating for the other group’s communal interests to lend credibility to claims of
moderation and fairness.3 The ethnic switching could also be the result of candidate desperation
or strategic miscalculation.
The findings above are constrained to the 1,047 candidates who contested more than one
3In interviews with Latvian political observers, voters, and elected officials, multiple people told me that to-
kenism was definitely present in Latvian politics. I was told multiple times that ethnic outsider candidates could
possibly arrange for lucrative careers in the party if they were willing to put themselves on the ballot to indicate
the party’s “enlightened” position, both to voters, and to European Union observers concerned about ethnic dis-
crimination. It is also possible that some ethnic Russian candidates and voters may actually desire assimilation
into an ethnonationalist Latvian state. One ethnically Russian Latvian candidate from an otherwise mostly ethnic
Latvian political party told me during an interview that they were fine with members of their party arguing that
ethnic Russians needed no linguistic, cultural, or employment protections from the state. In their view, Latvia was
a state for the Latvian nation, and ethnic Russians should either assimilate, accept their status as “guests,” or leave.
Such a view is hardly typical, and never once did I encounter an ethnic Latvian candidate willing to make similar
arguments about the state protecting ethnic Russian interests, but these rare sentiments may help account for this
negligible, but nevertheless present, rate of switching between ethnic parties of two different groups.
219







−1 Russian 198 10 37
Latvian 5 530 265
Non-ethnic 20 196 401
Figure 7.4: Count of Candidates who Changed Ethnic Identification between Elections in Latvia
1998-2014
election in a row. While these repeat contenders are the career politicians who make up the
Latvian political class, most candidates do not fall into this category. There are 3,760 candidates
who contested only a single election in the period under study. In a party list system like Latvia’s,
parties may believe it is in their best interest to fill out the entire list of open slots, to maximize
their ability to take as many seats as possible. No party has ever won an outright majority in
Latvia, and in an electoral system with 100 seats and as many as 20 parties contesting elections,
it is extremely unlikely for a single party to need a full 100 candidates on the ballot. Many parties
put 100 candidates on their ballot so that it is mathematically possible, albeit highly unlikely
for the party to sweep all seats in Parliament. Some parties even put more than 100 candidates
on the ballot, suggesting that candidates may be seeking to give voters choices on the open-list
ballot. While the majority of Latvia’s parliamentary seats are won by repeat candidates, one-
time candidates represent a significant portion of Latvian elected officials. A full 30.33% of the
parliamentary seats were won by candidates who had never contested elections before. While
many elected officials are first-time candidates, most first-time candidates do not win election:
only 5.1% of these candidates actually won a seat. Most of these candidates are placed extremely
low on the party list, and likely enter with the full knowledge that will never be seated in the
parliament.4
4In interviews, one mid-level party official expressed embarrassment at the quality of the lower tier of their







First Time Candidates by Appeal Type
Figure 7.5: New Candidate Entry in Latvia by Appeal Type 1998-2014
The data indicate that new candidates contesting elections follow the same trends with re-
gards to ethnic campaigning as those candidates which switch their affiliation, only amplified.
The pie chart in figure 7.5 indicates the proportion of new candidates who joined parties making
each type of appeal. Candidatesmaking appeals to ethnic Russians constitute 9.22% of first-time
candidates, while candidates making appeals to ethnic Latvians constitute 42.05% of the new
candidates. This is hardly proportionate to the ratio of Latvians to Russians in the population.
There are 2.41 ethnic Latvians for every Russian in Latvia, but a new candidate is 4.55 times
more likely to espouse an ethnic Latvian agenda than an ethnic Russian agenda. The ratio is
similar for first time candidates espousing non-ethnic party platforms, who comprised 48.72%
of all new candidates in the data set.5
Altogether the data show divergent trends between the various types of appeals. Support for
ethnic Russian parties diminishes until it is statistically zero, while the proportion of winning
candidates making ethnic Latvian and non-ethnic parties increases. Candidates joining parties
and contesting elections for the first time are more likely to join non-ethnic parties or Latvian
to the party platform, but wouldn’t embarrass the party with their lack of qualifications.
5Descriptive statistics are presented here because a logit analysis is not possible. The dependent variable in
logit model to measure new candidate entry would be whether or not a candidate decided to contest an election
in a given year. However, this is impossible to observe, since that would require us to identify all the “potential”
candidates who chose not to seek election. Since we observe only those candidates who did enter the party lists, it
is only possible to describe the relative frequency with which they attach their names to the three types of platforms
described here.
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parties than they are Russian parties. Candidates contesting elections repeatedly are more likely
to abandon Russian platforms for non-ethnic platforms, and abandon non-ethnic platforms for
Latvian ones. Over time, the party system converges on an ethnic cleavage that should really be
understood as “ethnic Latvian versus non-ethnic,” rather than “Latvian versus Russian.”
7.4 Ethnic Position Change in Practice
The story of how ethnic appeals to Russians became relatively marginal in Latvia is largely
the story of Harmony. Harmony is a political party which today has the support of most of
the country’s ethnic Russian community. Ostensibly a multi-ethnic social democratic party, it
has leveraged its near-monopoly of Russian-speaking voter support to become the largest single
party in Latvia. It has done this partially by absorbing many of the smaller, more disparate
parties which campaigned as ethnic Russian parties into a single organization. Harmony in its
current form was founded in 2005, as an electoral alliance of factions consisting of the Peoples’
Harmony Party, the Latvian Socialist Party, theNewCentre, the Social Democratic Party and the
Daugavpils City Party (European Election Database 2018). Not all of these had been national-
level parties, nor did they all campaign on ethnic issues. The Daugavpils City Party, especially,
had only contested local elections in the city of Daugavpils, the country’s second-largest and the
regional capital of Latgale, where a large population of Russian-speakers live. The Centre Party
and the Social Democrats had large bases of support in Russian-speaking regions of Latvia, but
campaigned on non-ethnic economic platforms. Much of their support from ethnic Russians
may have come from nostalgia for Soviet-era stability, but the parties ostensibly were multi-
ethnic and did not target only Russian supporters. The Latvian Socialist Party was a communist
successor to the Latvian Communist Party which had been the only legal party under Soviet rule.
That party did campaign explicitly to Russians, mentioning language rights and minority issues
in previous platforms in terms which echoed the positions and propaganda of the Interfront in
the 1980’s and 1990’s. The Peoples’ Harmony Party had also been previously connected with
a political coalition that positioned itself as a group of minority rights advocates campaigning
on legal and political protections for Russians in Latvia.
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At its first election in 2006, the new party campaigned on a very moderate platform of Rus-
sian rights. In its platform, the party explicitly stated its positions to protect non-citizen Slavic
compatriots, and to foster better relations with the Russian Federation. The party’s appeal was
directed mostly to Russians and Russian speakers, as is evident by the disproportionately high
number of ethnic Russians appearing on the candidate list. Nevertheless, Harmony’s platform
was more moderate than other parties appealing to ethnic Russian voters. In the same election,
For Human Rights in a United Latvia campaigned not only on a platform of universal citizenship
rights for all Latvian inhabitants, but also proposed that Russian be granted official language
status, and that visa regimes should be liberalized to allow visa-free travel for Russians to visit
family members in Estonia, Russia, and Belarus.
In 2010, the divide between the two main Russian parties grew, as Harmony adopted an
even more moderate platform while ForHRUL stayed consistent in its demands for communal
rights for Russians. ForHRUL continued to espouse official status for Russian as its defining
policy position, and argued that government bureaucrats and judges should be compelled to
provide government and legal services to ethnic Russians in their native tongue. Harmony,
meanwhile, eliminated all reference to non-citizens in its 2010 platform, and even included some
nods to positions popular in the Latvian ethnic community. It proposed policies that encouraged
the Latvian diaspora to return to Latvia proper (a position frequently espoused by right-wing
politicians in Latvia as a way to ensure demographic dominance of the titular group but could
nevertheless also apply to ethnic Russians who had left the country). It also stated that it was
the responsibility of all Latvian inhabitants regardless of ethnicity to become proficient in the
Latvian language, even while it stated the importance of recognizing the value of all who were
“born or settled” in Latvia as an important part of a shared Latvian cultural history.
Harmony adopted an even more moderate position for the early elections called in 2011.
The party’s 2011 platform made only one mention of ethnic issues at all, arguing instead that
economic crises were the most serious problems facing Latvia and that the party’s competitors
would rather distract voters from those issues: “... political forces who represent both ethnic
Latvian interests and the interests of minority peoples continue to emphasize national and his-
torical issues and avoid social and economic problems.” ForHRUL, on the other hand, embraced
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their ethnic identity, declaring, “as the party of the Latvian Russian Community, ForHRUL will
guarantee equality of peoples and social justice.” By 2014, Harmony had abandoned entirely all
mentions of ethnicity, nationality, or history from its platform. It no longer specifically claimed
to be a multiethnic party or a champion of inter-ethnic competition, focused entirely on eco-
nomic issues. It described itself exclusively as a social democratic party, and dedicated all of
its 4,000 characters to economic growth, efficiency, and redistribution. ForHRUL, however, ef-
fectively disbanded and regrouped as a more extreme faction under the leadership of Tatjana
Ždanoka calling itself the Russian Union of Latvia (RUL). The RUL platform in 2014 included
not only an explicit declaration of protecting Russian interests and advocacy of official status
for the Russian language in Latvia, but also a specific denunciation of fascism and Nazism,
reminding voters of Soviet veterans’ contribution to the defeat of Hitler in World War II.
During this period when the two parties diverged in terms of ideology, the clear winner at
the polls was Harmony. At its first election in 2005, Harmony took 17 seats in parliament, to
ForHRUL’s 6. This was a serious loss for ForHRUL, which had been the second largest party
in Parliament going into the election, having won 25 seats in 2002. In 2010, the gap widened
even more, with ForHRUL winning no seats to Harmony’s 29. The gap widened even further
in 2011, when Harmony won 31 seats, yet ForHRUL’s again was unable to enter parliament. In
2014, Harmony remained the largest single party in the Latvian parliament, despite its loss of
seven seats for a total of 24, but RUL failed to clear the threshold to win a seat.6 Despite the
fact that both parties are often considered “Russian” by political observers both within Latvian
and abroad, the more moderate stance of Harmony has undeniably had greater electoral success
than ForHRUL’s more aggressive stance.
While Harmony’s increased moderation and abandonment of ethnic claims was met with
electoral success, ethnic Latvian parties’ route to victory often follow the opposite trajectory.
One example is the Democratic Party “Saimnieks” (“DPS”), named after a merger between two
other political organizations. The party took eighteen seats in the elections of 1995. In the tu-
multuous and fragmented environment of the early post-Soviet period, this made the party the
6While beyond the scope of this dissertation, the most recent Latvian elections in 2018 saw this trend continue.
Harmony lost a single seat in 2018 to win only 23 seats, but again remained the largest single party in parliament,
while the RUL again failed to meet the electoral threshold.
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largest in parliament, and they formed a coalition government with six other parties. Given the
complexity of government formation with so many parties, the DPS supported Andris Šk, e¯le
for Prime Minister, a political independent running Latvia’s office of privatization, as an in-
dependent alternative to their own party leader. In that election, the party ran on an entirely
non-ethnic platform. It presented to voters a classically liberal agenda, with respect for private
property, advocacy of free markets, and support for entrepreneurship as a vehicle for economic
development and job creation. The DPS platform made only two references to issues that could
be remotely interpreted to reflect communal ethnic interest or national identities. The first,
claiming that “whether they go east or west, there are no ‘good’ or ‘bad’ markets for Latvian
exports.” The line seems to suggest that the party puts business above identity politics, arguing
that Latvia could look to Europe and Russia equally as long as the decision was guided by eco-
nomic interests. The party also mentions an important role for the Latvian language, stating,
“[t]he opportunity to acquire knowledge must be guaranteed to everyone. The Latvian language
will unite the population of the country into a family and a society.” While this does not imply
the primacy of the Latvian language over Russian, it is tempered with language that suggests
that the language policy is not necessarily intended to advantage ethnic Latvians, but instead to
facilitate a more cohesive society.
Despite its strong showing in 1995, the DPS did not do well in the elections of 1998, falling
from the largest party in parliament to below the electoral threshold in a single electoral cy-
cle. The big winner in 1998 was the People’s Party (“TP”) party created by Šk, e¯le himself
while Prime Minister. Šk, e¯le’s new party leaned heavily on Latvian ethnonationalism in order
to gain a plurality of seats in the Saiema. The party claimed that, “[t]he future of Latvia rests on
healthy and happy children who speak the Latvian language properly, and are not ashamed to
call themselves citizens of this country.” It goes on to state, that the family is the most important
institution in Latvian society because it is the family that “guarantees the existence of Latvian
traditions and Latvian culture.” The TP was able to build on its success in 1998, and remained a
strong contender in the 2002 elections, as well, holding on to 20 of the 24 seats in had won pre-
viously. But during that time, many former DPS officials and candidates left their party to join
the TP. This included Andris Ameriks, who had been the head of the Democratic Party half of
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the DPS and remained a leader after the merger with Saimnieks. The TP would continue to be a
major player in Latvian elections and eventually merged with Latvian Way. At every election it
maintained its support for ethnic Latvian interests and campaigning as an ethnic Latvian party.
This example shows how moderate leaders can take on more extreme positions through the in-
teractive process of elections and party reformation. The leaders of the largest electoral party
in 1995 had by 2002 joined a newer party which was not only more successful over a longer
period of time, but also took a more extreme position on the representation of ethnic Latvian
interests.
Other DPS party leaders took similar paths after DPS ceased to be electorally viable albeit
by joining other parties. Ilma¯rs Bišers, for example, who had worked closely with Ameriks in
the DPS, joined the Centrs Party following the DPS collapse. The name “Centrs” may convey
a moderate, centrist political ideology, but the party nevertheless used some relatively extreme
language with regards to ethnic issues in the 2002 campaign. Its platform that year portrayed the
party as a force protecting the Latvian people, and one which would help protect ethnic Latvian
culture and traditions. It assured voters that if elected it would radically alter negotiating strategy
with the EU, convincing the leadership in Brussels that Latvia’s unique historical context (i.e.,
occupation by the Soviet Union) was a special circumstance that did not subject Latvia to EU
laws on human rights and political participation of minorities. It also argued that it would spend
money to preserve traditional Latvian culture, and pass laws that prevented non-citizens and
foreigners from owning property. These typical examples show that even when parties like the
DPS fold after electoral failure, party members and leadership can find ways to stay in Latvian
politics by joining parties with more extreme positions than they held before.
As another example, consider the Latvian Unity Party. In 1995, the party won eight seats
in the parliament. This was not an inconsequential victory: in the extremely fragmented envi-
ronment of the early post-communist elections, the largest party in parliament only had 18 seats
total. The party that year presented a left-of-center platform that promised to end Soviet-style
economic dirigisme, crackdown on corruption, increase education and healthcare spending, and
protect human rights. The platform struck a conciliatory note with the Russian minority, en-
suring that all minorities living within Latvia would enjoy “internationally recognized human
226
rights” and “the preservation of their own national identity.” The party advocated a strong, inde-
pendent, and sovereign Latvian state, combined with a neutral foreign policy, which they argued
would best allow Latvia to take advantage of its geopolitical strengths as a port between east and
west. The party leader was Alberts Kauls, a prominent former Soviet official who had directed
a series of state-owned agricultural concerns in Latvia during the Soviet period. Many other
candidates in the party at this time were also former Soviet officials, leading Bugajski (2002)
to classify it as a reformed communist party. The party’s relatively conciliatory tone towards
ethnic interests may reflect this Soviet legacy and communist sympathy.
Although the party was successful enough to be represented in the Šk, e¯le government, co-
hesion broke down while in government, and many deputies left the party before the 1998
elections. The drain caused the party to win no seats in parliament that year. Many of the
party’s candidates andmembers, however, left to join the Latvian Farmers’ Union (LZS) (Smith-
Sivertsen 2004). The common link shared between these two parties was the LZS’s focus on
agrarian politics: many of the Soviet officials in the LVP had been in linked to Latvian agri-
cultural production during the Soviet era, and had a natural constituency in the rural areas far
from Riga. In 1998, the LZS platform echoed much of the conciliatory tone its members had
voiced in the LVP. It mainly reflected the interests of those that lived outside the capital: a strong
emphasis was placed on rural development and farming, as well as fishing, shipbuilding, and
forestry. The party advocated for the gradual integration of non-ethnic Latvians into society “on
the basis of volunteerism and loyalty.” The platform stated not that Latvian should be the official
language, but also said that funds should be set aside for free Latvian language education for all
those who did not speak the language.
This moderate position changed in 2002, though, when the LZS—now campaigning as the
Union of Greens and Farmers (ZZS)—moved to the right. The party argued that “only the
Latvian people have the right to determine the future of Latvia,” and stated their goal to create a
country with “the Latvian language as the only language, and the Latvian culture as dominant.”
This advocacy of ethnic Latvian interests continued in 2006, when the party argued that it would
reform the education system to foster a “patriotic” education. Positions like these were present
in every ZZS platform onward, such as 2010, when the party said that traditional Latvian values
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where the only “ethical and aesthetic basis" for the country; in 2011, when it argued that Latvian
traditions were the most solid work ethic, and in 2014, when it stated that rural and traditional
Latvian culture should be preserved with state funding and legal protection.
This is not to argue that the ZZS is an extreme party, or even an overtly nationalist one.
Given the party’s pre-communist origins, it could be considered comparable to other twentieth
century agrarian parties of Northern Europe, such as Denmark’s Farmers’ Party, or Sweden’s
Farmers’ League. Auers (2012) considers the party a curious deviation from the more com-
monly observed pattern of the modern Green movement in Western Europe—an ecological
party financed by an oil oligarch appealing to traditional values and Euroscepticism. In Latvia,
the ZZS is often described as a centrist party. This may explain why half of the post-Soviet Pres-
idents of Latvia have come from the ZZS. But in its relationship to ethnic appeals and communal
interests, the ZZS shows a trajectory of incorporating more appeals to the ethnic majority group
over time. Despite the fact that much of its leadership was associated with the Soviet Russian-
dominated regime, and the fact that the party initially advocatedmulticulturalism for the Latvian
state, the party ultimately adopted a harsher tone against ethnic and linguistic minorities, and
has maintained that stance ever since.
7.5 Conclusion
Following the pattern of other recently democratized countries, Latvia has seen its political
party system evolve as democratic institutions consolidate. Both elites and voters demonstrate
forms of political learning, and parties have adapted the policies they propose to voters. But
the way parties use ethnic cues to communicate has not been the same between ethnic groups.
Ethnic appeals to the majority group have become a more common way to win elections over
time, with a greater percentage of winning candidates making appeals today than they did in
the 1990’s. Ethnic appeals to the minority group, however, have essentially vanished from the
Latvian political system. While ethnic appeals to Russians and Russian-speaking Slavs were
common in the immediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, such appeals today are relegated to
the fringes, essentially abandoned by mainstream politicians.
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These results should not be taken as a sign that only ethnic Latvians care about ethnic issues.
Quite the contrary: ethnicity remains one of the most salient social divisions in Latvia today,
and ethnic distinctions have a significant impact on day-to-day life in Latvia. Nor is it fair to
say that ethnic divisions are not relevant for party attachments. Harmony obtains the support
of most of Latvia’s ethnic Russians, leading many international observers to refer to it as a
“Russian Party.” But when it comes to making political decisions about how to employ ethnicity
to mobilize voters, the two sides have different incentives to appeal directly to coethnics. For
ethnic Russians, the costs of making ethnic appeals to voters simply outweigh the benefits. Over
the past several decades, politicians have learned that appealing directly to Russians may help
mobilize Russian support, but exacts a heavy cost in excluding the majority group. Appealing
to ethnic majority Latvians, however, has a much less serious impact on politicians’ electoral
prospects. In this sense, it is fair to say that the ethnic divide in Latvia is asymmetric: ethnic
majority Latvians are much freer to use ethnic appeals when campaigning and building ties to
voters than Russians are. As a result, it is not really fair to say that the primary divide in Latvia
is not really between ethnic Latvians and ethnic Russians, but rather between majority Latvian
ethnic nationalists and non-ethnic civic nationalists.
These results should also be put into context, given the scope conditions imposed by Latvia’s
institutional environment. Latvia has no guaranteed representation for ethnic minority groups,
nor local autonomy, nor majority-minority electoral laws. The only control ethnic minorities
have over policies is their ability to vote in free and fair elections. In this sense, Latvia is the
polar opposite of consociational countries like Bosnia. The results suggest that absent explicit
institutional protections, ethnic minority groups are likely to be represented by non-ethnic, civic
nationalist groups which campaign on issues that may ostensibly appeal to voters of all groups.
The results from the Bosnian analyses in Chapter 5 suggest the possibility of an unobserved
counterfactual: if Latvia had adopted a consociational structure which granted minority’s some
degree of self-rule and guaranteed representation rather than restoring the inter-war constitution
in the early 1990’s, it is quite likely that ethnic Russian voters would today be represented by




In a democracy, elections are the mechanisms which translate citizen preferences to political
leadership. To understand how democracy functions in an ethnically divided society, it is im-
portant to know how voters and candidates behave during elections in diverse environments.
The politicization of ethnicity—wherein candidates get elected by appealing to coethnics to
represent communal ethnic interests in government—is ultimately the result of choices made
by political actors in pursuit of concrete goals. Whether or not ethnic mobilization is a viable
and rewarding strategy is the result of institutional and demographic variables which may not
affect all groups equally.
This argument rejects the primordialist notion that ethnicity is a “given” of human exis-
tence.1 I do not argue that ethnicity is unimportant or inconsequential—in fact, it is vitally
important to much of political life. But to understand the relationship between ethnicity and
democracy, we need to appreciate the ways in which ethnic identities can help political actors
achieve practical ends. “Ethnic politics” is just as political as it is ethnic, and even those iden-
tities most fundamental to an individual’s sense of self may very well be ignored if it is not
helpful in achieving desired goals. We absolutely should examine the way that identities are
formed and the significance that people attach to them, but we should also closely examine how
those identities become politically relevant through the decisions of self-interested individuals.
A strong personal identity is not a sufficient condition for political organization. If that were
the case, the parliaments of the world would most likely be dominated by parties representing
1For details, see Geertz (1963), Hale (2004), Chandra (2012a), and Goode & Stroup (2015).
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mothers and fathers, not workers and owners. The key to understanding when an ethnic identity
becomes politicized is in appreciating the way it divides people into insiders and outsiders, and
when such divisions are useful. Because ethnic labels are slow to change and defined by charac-
teristics beyond an individual’s ability to alter, they can produce social dividing lines that are not
easily manipulated for short-term gain. Even if those divisions are completely arbitrary—and in
many contexts ethnic identities do seem to be based on relatively minor distinctions—they can
still be instrumentally useful in organizing political life. When Bosnian voters vote for ethnic
parties and non-ethnic parties in the same election, or when Latvian voters become more or
less ethnic in the span of just a few years, we should not infer that those voters have radically
changed the way they perceive themselves and their place in the world. Rather, what is changing
is their relationship to their ethnic identities and their political goals.
To understand that process, I have sought to disentangle identity and action. I start from the
position that people do not have control over where they were born, who their parents are, what
part of the world they come from, or what language is spoken in their community. But they do
have control over how they integrate those background circumstances into their political lives.
When they run for office, they can choose what they say to convince voters to support them.
They can choose who they court for votes, and who they antagonize. And when they vote, they
can choose who to support. These decisions may not change the nature of their ethnic identities
in the short-term, but they do ultimately determine which identities become political relevant
and which do not. I have shown in this dissertation that substantial variation exists in these
decisions, and that such variation is systematic. When ethnic identities separate people into
groups that are able to win office and likely to deliver benefits to their supporters, political actors
take observable steps to politicize ethnicity. Candidates emphasize their own ethnic identities
over individual characteristics, and voters elect them to office. When ethnic identities are not
likely to result in useful political organizations, then candidates win by campaigning on other,
non-ethnic identities. The outcomes I have documented in this dissertation are the result of
individual choices, but they are heavily influenced by background situation. Institutional and
demographic context structure the relationship between ethnic groups, and create the incentives
facing political actors who make these decisions.
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This approach contributes to the literature on ethnic politics and democracy in diverse soci-
eties, partly by drawing attention to our understanding of the subject of “ethnic politics” itself.
Because ethnic mobilization is not equally effective for all groups, the democratic processes
which translate societal diversity into political representation do not function the same way for
everybody. To understand politics in ethnically divided societies, we need to understand that
outcomes are the result of the relationship between groups, and ethnic representation may be
qualitatively different in different environments. One important conclusion is that approaches
which examine ethnic minority political issues as independent frommajority group politics may
ultimately ignore the underlying factors which provide opportunities for competition and coop-
eration between the groups. The two cases in this dissertation show how outcomes of ethnic
tension may be produced by very different underlying causes. Bosnia and Latvia both have sub-
stantial social tension related tominority group representation. In Bosnia, majority-group ethnic
Bosniaks and themuch smaller ethnic Croat population group vote for separate parties, with very
little cross-ethnic voting taking place. Likewise, majority group ethnic Latvians very rarely vote
for the same parties as minority-group ethnic Russians. Once might conclude that both coun-
tries are similar and represent similar dynamics of ethnic mobilization. But the choices made by
the actors that lead to that outcome are drastically different. Croats vote for ethnic Croat parties
in Bosnia, choosing explicitly ethnic parties at a higher rate than ethnic Bosniaks do. Croats
have a choice between ethnic and non-ethnic parties and largely choose to vote for the ethnic
parties, producing an observable ethnic divide in the party system. Russians in Latvia, on the
other hand, vote overwhelmingly for a party which claims a civic identity and rejects ethnic mo-
bilization. The ethnic divide which separates Russians from ethnic Latvians is largely the result
of ethnic mobilization in the majority group, which increasingly uses exclusionary rhetoric and
policies of ethnic favoritism to exclude minority group voters. Both outcomes could accurately
be described as “ethnic politics,” but the two are radically different. In Bosnia, the divide is
produced by the choices of the minority group; in Latvia it is the majority group.
This not just important for scholarly understandings of the relationship between ethnicity
and politics, but also for practical issues of fairness, representation, and democratic account-
ability. One of the greatest concerns in ethnically divided democracies is that minority groups
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face permanent exclusion from power. Ensuring minority group representation and inclusion is
therefore a pressing policy issue directly related to the quality of life for large numbers of people
around the world. But ethnic minority representation cannot be understood while ignoring the
choices made by the majority group. This dissertation suggests that in most contexts, politi-
cizing ethnicity ultimately benefits the majority group. Democracy is at its core a majoritarian
system, where big groups win and small groups lose. Many institutions which empower minor-
ity groups and facilitate their election do so by converting them in some small way to majority
groups, usually by changing the borders of the electorate or the level of governance. But doing
so also changes the relationship between minority groups and majority groups by altering both
group’s incentives to politicize ethnicity. This dissertation calls for a greater understanding of
the incentives faced by both types of groups and how changes in one group’s calculations can
affect the other group.
In this concluding chapter, I reflect on the broader implications of this dissertation. I first
discuss how the findings should be put into context of other studies of ethnic politics and de-
mocratizing countries, including the applicability of the results to other cases. I also discuss
how a research design that relies on within-country variation and takes advantages of idiosyn-
cratic cases may nevertheless further our understanding of ethnic politics in divided societies
more broadly. I the closing section, I use the findings of this dissertation to discuss the outlook
for ethnic voting and majority-group political mobilization in the world today, with particular
attention to the increase in anti-minority rhetoric and majority group mobilization in the United
States.
8.1 Implications for Future Studies
In this study, I have employed original data sets which coded political parties and candidates ap-
peals to voters on ethnic grounds. These indicators reflect whether or not voters would interpret
the party as representing voters from a specific ethnic group to the exclusion of others. It should
be noted that in the two cases surveyed here, it is not unusual for candidates to employ explicit
ethnic rhetoric in campaigning. Parties and politicians in both of these countries sometimes
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view ethnic identities as so central to their political brand that the name of the ethnic group is
used in the name of the party. But this is not the case everywhere. In some countries, appeal-
ing directly to a specific ethnic group is considered taboo, and is relatively rare. Exclusionary
ethnic positions are often present in these places even if coded. The United States especially is
notorious for “dog-whistle” politics, or candidates making proposals and statements intended to
appeal to those who harbor racial or ethnically exclusionary political preferences while appear-
ing innocuous to those who do not. By definition, these statements are intended to be interpreted
in two different ways, intentionally obfuscating politicians’ true beliefs (Albertson 2015, Haney-
López 2015). Applying this study’s methodological approach in these environments could be
especially difficult, since whether a party is ethnic or not is intentionally disguised. Moreover,
some scholars have also noted that in contexts where ethnic inequality is deeply entrenched, and
societal institutions favor one group over another, simply supporting the status quo can effec-
tively be taking a position on ethnic issues. Given certain contexts and reputational resources,
some candidates are capable of making ethnic appeals using a language of equality that is much
less straightforward and easily identified than those cases in this dissertation (Mendelberg 2001).
Further complicating the prospects of exporting this approach to other regions or cases is that
many countries have placed legal bans on ethnic parties (Bogaards, Basedau &Hartmann 2010).
In these situations, parties which are founded explicitly to represent a specific ethnic group are
illegal. It would be very difficult to observe an ethnic party in these contexts. Yet in many of
these countries parties which represent the interests of ethnic minority groups do exist and often
win elections by mobilizing coethnics. Many scholars treat these parties as no different from
ethnic parties in other countries where the ban does not exist.2 The measurement approach
used in this dissertation would not be appropriate. In order to avoid being banned, these parties
must avoid ethnic rhetoric which would clearly establish their position as representing only a
single ethnic group. All parties would therefore be deemed to be non-ethnic using the standards
employed here.
These situations illustrate the necessity of local contextual knowledge to the study of ethnic
politics. The design employed here relies heavily on ethnographic explorations of the history
2See, e.g., Alonso & Ruiz-Rufino (2007).
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and the political language of the countries and the ethnic communities under study. Thismakes it
possible to document how candidates make ethnic appeals and how voters are likely to interpret
them. This local knowledge is necessary to identifying and classifying the types of strategies
parties use to mobilize supporters. Local context is vitally important, and blindly applying
the standards of one country to another will inevitably be inappropriate and misleading. In
Bosnia, a fleur-de-lys is a polarizing ethnic symbol. It is not in France, but it can be in Canada.
Building a statue to commemorate veterans of World War II is likewise a polarizing ethnic
demonstration in Latvia. It is most often a message of multi-ethnic unity in the United States,
but an ethnic provocation in Japan. The difference in each of these cases is how the groups
perceive them and how historical factors have shaped the ethnic identities over the long-term.
If two groups have the same relationship to a given statement, idea, or symbol, then its use in a
political campaign does not signal anything about the candidate’s allegiance to one group or the
other. Since the mechanism theorized in this dissertation works through individual motivations
and understandings contingent on social environment, context matters. While dog whistles and
ethnic party bans make the work of measuring ethnic appeals much more complicated, they do
not make it impossible. They do, however, require greater attention to be paid to identifying
how candidates employ ethnic identities in the process of winning elections.
The guiding principle behind the data collection of this dissertation was sensitivity to local
context and within-country variation. Nevertheless, the findings and the explanatory mecha-
nisms can be seen to apply to other cases outside this dissertation. The clearest extension of this
study is to other recently democratized countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Latvian
case discussed in Chapters 6 and 7, for example, can shed light on differences observed in the
party systems today in the other post-Soviet Baltic states. In Estonia, for example, a very simi-
lar demographic and institutional context has produced a very similar result. Estonia is 68.7%
ethnic Estonian, and 29.6% Russian-speaking, very close to Latvia’s 62.07% majority (Central
Intelligence Agency 2017). Like their Latvian neighbors, Estonia is also a highly centralized
state using a proportional representation electoral system. As in Latvia, Russian-speaking Es-
tonians are largely represented by a non-ethnic party. Following the Soviet collapse, the Centre
Party—founded by the half-Estonian, half-Russian Soviet official Edgar Savisaar—has come to
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enjoy the overwhelming majority of Russian-speaking Estonians’ votes. This party, a direct suc-
cessor to the Estonian Popular Front which led the movement for independence from the Soviet
Union, defines itself as a centrist populist organization, and also has attracted a not insignificant
number of ethnic Estonian supporters. Throughout the post-Soviet period, the party’s moderate
stance has defeated more explicitly ethnic parties, including the Party of Russians in Estonia, in
order to win the support of most ethnic Russians within the country. Following the 2016 elec-
tion, the Centre Party entered into government and took the position of Prime Minister, largely
due to the steps taken by party leadership to distance themselves from the party’s ethnic Rus-
sian identity. The party removed Savisaar from his position as party leader, and “froze” their
agreement with Putin’s United Russia (Martyn-Hemphill 2016a, Vanajuur 2019). Meanwhile,
some leaders among the ethnic Estonian majority have enacted policies designed to entrench
the rights of ethnic Estonians. Like Latvia, Estonia passed citizenship policies in the 1990’s
which legally determined that many ethnic Russians were invaders, not citizens, and enacted
laws throughout the 1990’s and 2000’s to legally control the Russian language and prohibit its
public use (Hughes 2005). Estonian ethnic identity plays a prominent role in the ideology of sev-
eral major Estonian political parties, including the Conservative People’s Party of Estonia and
Pro Patria (Bennich-Björkman& Johansson 2012, Nakai 2014). There are important differences
between Latvia and Estonia, and the similarity of the two cases should not be overemphasized.
Nevertheless, in both cases there is a very similar pattern of ethnic mobilization taking place
in the ethnic majority group, while minority group members rally behind ostensibly non-ethnic
parties.
Lithuania, on the other hand, shows a different outcome. The ethnic Lithuanian majority is
much more solid, and has been since even during the Soviet period. At independence, ethnic
Russians comprised only 9.2% of the population. Because of Lithuania’s history as part of the
Polish-Lithuanian commonwealth, ethnic Poles presented an ethnic minority nearly as large as
the Russian community, accounting for 7.0%. Both these groups founded their own political
parties in the mid-1990’s in the early post-Soviet period: Lithuanian Polish Electoral Action,
and the Lithuanian Russian Union (Novagrockiene˙ 2001). But the Lithuanian electoral system
is quite different from the other Baltic states: Lithuania uses a mixed system where half of the
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seats are elected through PR, and the other half elected by SMDP. Moreover, the differences
in the size of the minority communities in Lithuania created drastically lower incentives for
the ethnic majority group to pursue ethnically exclusive strategies. These key institutional and
demographic differences produce very different outcomes in Lithuania. Among the majority
group, ethnic rhetoric is much more sedate in Lithuania than its Baltic neighbors. Lithuania
granted citizenship to all residents at the time of independence from the Soviet Union regardless
of ethnicity or family origin, and punitive policies towards non-ethnic Lithuanians has been
relegated to the fringes of Lithuanian political discourse. Because the ethnic Lithuanianmajority
was so much more secure in Lithuania than it was in other Baltic states, and the benefits of EU
and NATO membership were always so high, nationalists largely abandoned the incendiary
ethnic rhetoric seen elsewhere in favor of support for minority rights and western integration
(Clark 2006).
Ethnic minorities in Lithuania also act differently thanminorities in other states. The Lithua-
nian Russian Union, while existing as a formal organization, has hardly ever run as its own party.
In almost every election since independence, it has formed a pre-electoral coalition with larger
parties of non-Russians, usually either Socialists, or the ethnic Polish minority. When doing so,
it usually downplays its ethnic nature, running on a joint platform stressing universal issues of
human rights and regional development (when in coalition with the Poles), or economic fairness
(when runningwith the Socialists) (Fre˙jute˙-Rakauskiene˙ 2011). Lithuanian Polish Electoral Ac-
tion, on the other hand has maintained its independence, and explicitly campaigns directly on
Polish identity more frequently. Its signature issues in many elections have been repealing the
legally-mandated Lithuanian spelling of Polish names,3 and the return of territory taken from
Poland at various points in history and given to Lithuania (Sabanovic N.d.). The difference be-
tween the Russian and Lithuanian political parties may be partially attributable to the interaction
of demographics and institutions. Poles make up a majority of the population in several munic-
ipalities in Lithuania along the southeast border of the country. Their geographic concentration
3For example, the common Polish name “Wiśniewski” cannot be legally listed on a Lithuanian passport. The
letter “W” does not exist in the Lithuanian alphabet, nor is “-ski” a grammatically correct adjectival ending in
Lithuanian. Ethnically Polish Lithuanians must use the Lithuanian form “Vyšniauskas” as their legal name. Latvia
has a similar policy (the legal spelling would be “Višn, evskis”) yet the naming issue among ethnic Russian parties
in Latvia is very rarely taken up in party platforms.
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gives them an advantage in the SMDP seat elections, such as in 2000 when they failed to clear
the threshold for representation in the PR seats, but took two seats in the single-member con-
stituencies. In this sense, the Poles in Lithuania may in many places be like the Croats in Bosnia:
a minority in the country as a whole, but a majority within their electoral districts, and therefore
have increased incentives to support ethnic parties. Russians, however, are more geographically
dispersed, and must de-emphasize their ethnic rhetoric and seek non-ethnic coalition partners.
The findings of this dissertation may also help understand the varieties of ethnic politics
beyond the immediate region. In Latin America, for instance, scholars have noted that when in-
digenous populations are mobilized by activists into democratic politics for the first time, they
often do not translate their social movements into ethnically exclusive political parties. This
surprising tendency goes against the expectations of the literature on social cleavages and party
systems, as well as the experience of many first-wave European democracies. Instead, indige-
nous politicians in places like Bolivia and Ecuador are more likely to adopt multi-ethnic pop-
ulism even as they rely on indigenous voters for electoral support (Van Cott 2005, Madrid 2012).
The findings of this dissertation suggest that this phenomenon may be a result of the way that
electoral institutions and demographics encourage indigenous leaders to moderate their ethnic
positions to win votes from across the ethnic divide. Latin American countries often utilize
majoritarian electoral systems which disadvantage smaller parties while disproportionately re-
warding parties which obtain a plurality of votes. Evo Morales, the first indigenous president
of Bolivia, has made his own ethnic Aymara identity an important part of his political brand,
but not more so than his non-ethnic leftist policy positions. His campaign and subsequent pres-
idential administrations have prioritized a socialist, anti-neoliberal, and anti-colonial agenda in
addition to appeals to the country’s indigenous groups. This “soft” ethnic populismmakes sense
in the Bolivian context. Bolivia uses a two-round electoral system to elect the president, so a
candidate must win a majority (or near to one) in order to take office. Morales’s Aymara ethnic
group comprises roughly 10% of the Bolivian population—hardly enough to win an election
which ultimately requires a majority. Given the fragmentation of the country’s indigenous pop-
ulation, a far more viable strategy is to build non-ethnic coalitions based on class and economic
populism. These positions are likely to appeal to indigenous peoples of other groups while also
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attracting support from lower-class mestizo voters. It is important not to overgeneralize with
regards to other cases outside the region. Since the research design in this dissertation relies
heavily on local context, further research into the electoral strategies and the decisions of the
electorate is obviously required. Nevertheless, the findings do suggest a framework to approach
the variation in elite incentives imposed by democratic institutions around the world. They
suggest a mechanism that could produce both ethnically divided party systems like Trinidad
and Tobago and Fiji, where leaders attract ethnic bases of support but nevertheless moderate
their positions on ethnic representation (Wilson 2012, Fraenkel & Grofman 2006); and Turkey
and Sri Lanka, where ethnic parties take antagonistic and even violent positions against ethnic
outsiders (DeVotta 2004, Kirisci & Winrow 2013).
Perhaps the most important implication of the findings in this dissertation is that research
designs which rest on country-level variation may miss some important dynamics of ethnic con-
flict and the representation of ethnic groups. Much of the literature is built around dichotomous
questions explained by country-level variables: Does PR encourage ethnic voting (Huber 2012)?
Do ethnic party systems encourage ethnic outbidding (Mitchell, Evans & O’Leary 2009)? Does
federalism encourage separatism (Brancati 2006)? Do ethnic quotas enhance representation
(Dunning & Nilekani 2013)? These are important questions and these studies have produced
important insights. This dissertation suggests that we may advance this line of study by appreci-
ating that majority and minority groups react differently to different institutional changes. Eth-
nic conflict and representation are ultimately about the relationship between groups: outcomes
are shaped by the independent decisions of majority and minority group and the incentives to
which they respond. Changing from a majoritarian system to a proportional system, or creating
a special district or reserved parliamentary seats for a specific minority group may enhance a
group’s capacity for representation, but it may also remove any incentive the majority group has
to court support from ethnic outsiders. These asymmetrical effects may explain why attempts
to mitigate ethnic conflict through institutional engineering are so often frustrated in practice:
changes intended to alter outcomes for one group produce unintended changes in incentives for
another. Even within the same country the incentives for political actors may vary across groups
in systematic ways. This effect should also inform studies which examine when minority groups
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are most likely to be included in the political process.4 In addition to divergent effects between
groups, this study suggests that groups can be represented in qualitatively different ways, which
may produce different substantive outcomes. This study suggests that increasing the political
participation of excluded ethnic groups can take a variety of forms, with different implications
for party systems and elections. Increased minority political participation could increase the
power of groups which seek to de-politicize ethnic identities and foster broader, multi-ethnic
political alliances in parliament. It could also deepen ethnic divisions by enabling new ethnic
parties to mobilize voters along ethnic lines while reinforcing ethnic cleavages. These are quali-
tatively different phenomenon, and cannot be explained by research designed that conceptualize
ethnic political activity in dichotomous ways.
8.2 The Fate of Diverse Democracies
This dissertation also speaks to concerns of ethnic outbidding, polarization, and political ex-
tremism in ethnically divided societies. While this study does not propose a deterministic ac-
count of when ethnic parties will succeed, or when they will adopt extreme positions, it does
suggest that incentives for ethnic political organization are not equal across groups. One im-
portant implication suggested by the findings in this dissertation is the asymmetric ability of
one group to moderate the positions of the other. This dissertation finds that moderate positions
and non-ethnic mobilization among the majority group is most likely when ethnic voting is not
likely to deliver any practical benefits to group members. This would be the case when the ma-
jority is secure in its position, and does not face any serious threats to its dominance by minority
groups. Minority groups, on the other hand, may be in a vulnerable position, but still unable
to win elections by adopting extreme ethnic positions. The minority group faces a much more
punitive backlash for ethnic mobilization than the majority group. As a result, the majority can
force moderation on the minority, but the minority can only force extremism on the majority.
The practical implication of this ethnic asymmetry is that the instinct to guarantee minor-
ity political involvement by mobilizing ethnic minorities using ethnic policy proposals may
4See, for example, Cameron, Epstein & O’Halloran (1996), Pande (2003), Givens & Maxwell (2012),
Sobolewska (2013), and Dancygier (2017).
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be counter-productive. By way of example, consider the Black Lives Matter movement in the
United States. A 2017 survey found that 56% of the American public—and 57% of whites—
believed that police officers in the United States were too quick to resort to force when engaging
with suspects. The same survey found that the Black LivesMatter movement, originally founded
in response to police violence against African Americans, was viewed favorably by only 43%
of the public. This figure is the result of polarized attitudes along racial lines: 83% of black
respondents supported BLM, while only 35% of whites did (Easley 2017). The survey suggests
that use of racial cues in advocating for changes in policing may be counterproductive, and that
white Americans may be put off from policy changes they would otherwise support by a fram-
ing linked to ethnic minority populations. While “All Lives Matter” is a logical superset of the
claim “Black Lives Matter,” the statement has become a common way to criticize the goals of
BLM on social media. The opponents of BLM rarely question the fact that police violence is
far more common against people of color; instead, they criticize the movement’s goals as racist,
advocating for special rights for black citizens at the expense of other ethnic groups.
“All Lives Matter” is often little more than a disingenuous rhetorical device to dismiss the
valid concerns of African-American activists.5 But the example of Black Lives Matters shows
why exclusive minority ethnic mobilization may ultimately be a losing battle in a democracy.
The devastating impact of police killings in the United States has overwhelmingly fallen on non-
white communities. It is therefore unpleasant, to say the least, to respondwith a political strategy
which places the concerns of white voters first and foremost. But surveys show that white and
non-white respondents in the United States often agree in their distaste for police actions which
fall disproportionately on minority citizens, such as racial profiling, excessive force, and civil
asset forfeiture (Eakins 2016). Finding the policy positions supported by majority group voters
and presenting them as non-ethnic issues may therefore ultimately be a more viable short-term
strategy for implementing policy change. This should not be construed as support for the “color-
blind” politics which often erases the experiences and valid concerns of minority communities,
and has often entrenched racial disparities in the United States (Bonilla-Silva 2006). Rather, it
is a plea to understand the nuanced ways that ethnic appeals ultimately benefit majority groups.
5See Carney (2016) for discussion.
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From the perspective of this dissertation, racial inequality in the United States is partially sus-
tained through the successful ethnic appeals of candidates to the white ethnic majority. In this
light, ethnic appeals to a minority are doomed to failure, and the better strategy is to counter
ethnic appeals with non-ethnic appeals. In a diverse society, the ethnic majority groups has
the luxury of excluding ethnic outsiders from their political coalitions and still winning office.
Simply by virtue of their demographic status, minorities must build coalitions that cross ethnic
lines, or limit their influence only to areas where they themselves are a local majority.
That majorities may have an easier time winning by making ethnic appeals may also help
explain recent trends towards ethnic voting in developed democracies. It is clear that majority
group ethnic voting is in resurgence at the moment in many parts of the western world, and
a backlash against globalization has seen an increase in ethno-nationalism in many countries.
Brexit in the United Kingdom passed in 2016, with support heavily divided between majority
and minority ethnic groups. The “leave” vote was heavily concentrated in England in ethnically
homogeneous areas, while the “remain” vote concentrated in ethnically diverse cities, and ethnic
minority enclaves Scotland and Northern Ireland. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz has won
an overwhelmingly large parliamentary majority on appeals to protect Hungarians from ethnic
outsiders, especially Arab refugees and European bureaucrats. Lega gained a plurality of seats
in the Italian parliamentary elections of 2018 on an anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant platform,
while France’s far-right Rassemblement National and Germany’s Alternative für Deutschland
have shown increasing support among voters. In the United States, Donald Trump won the
presidency in 2016 on a platform that broke long-standing American taboos against overt ethnic
campaigning.
This dissertation offers a tentative explanation of why majority-group ethnic campaigning
is becoming more successful as the western world diversifies. I have argued that a growing
ethnic minority population increases the benefits of ethnic redistribution to the majority group,
without really threatening their ability to win elections through ethnic mobilization. New immi-
grants, refugees, or growing ethnic minority populations can increase labor market competition,
in which case discriminatory policies against minority communities may help increase wages
for majority group members. Imposing taxes on minority group members while structuring
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programs to provide benefits only to majority group members may also be a way to increase
services to constituents for politicians seeking reelection. At the same time, as long as the in-
crease in minority populations is small enough not to threaten the ethnic majority’s hold on
political power, it is virtually impossible for ethnic minorities to elect their own leaders to pre-
vent such exploitative policies from being enacted. In this way, it is not surprising that the
increased diversity of Western Europe brought on by the expansion of the European Union and
the recent refugee crisis has empowered majority group ethnic politicians.
Examine, for instance, the institutional and demographic environment of the United States.
It is a presidential system, where the legislative and executive branch are elected through sepa-
rate elections. It is also a federal system, where states and even cities often have a high degree of
independence. At virtually every level of election, it employs a first-past-the-post system with
two dominant political parties. In the US electoral system, geographical boundaries are crucial.
Each state receives a number of electoral votes to choose the president relative to its population,
and the upper house of the legislature is decided on the basis of territory, not population. De-
mographically, the US has a clear majority ethnic group, with whites comprising 60.4% of the
population (US Census Bureau 2018). Birthrate disparities and increased immigration suggest
that the white majority in the United States is diminishing, and will likely last only until the
mid-2040’s. However, the geographic dispersal of white people in the United States is hardly
uniform. Thirty-seven of the fifty US states are proportionately whiter than the population of
the US as a whole, and forty-five of them are majority white. Nearly one-third of all non-white
people in the United States live in just two states: Texas and California.6
Many observers concluded that the future of American politics would see less of an em-
phasis on ethnic identity politics as the United States diversified. Following the defeat of Mitt
Romney to Barack Obama in the 2012 election, the US Republican party released its famous
“Autopsy”—officially known as the RNC “Growth and Opportunities Project” report. It con-
cluded that the party’s reliance on white voters to the exclusion of other ethnic communities
was dooming the party to irrelevance and perpetual defeat. The authors argued that the party
“...need[s] to campaign among Hispanic, black, Asian, and gay Americans and demonstrate we
6My own calculations taken from US Census Bureau (2018).
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care about them, too. We must recruit more candidates who come from minority communi-
ties. (Barbour, Bradshaw, Fleischer & Fonalledas 2013, p. 6)” The project also concluded that
it needed to appeal to ethnic Hispanic voters by using non-ethnic rhetoric and policies, noting
that, “...among the steps Republicans take in the Hispanic community and beyond, we must
embrace and champion comprehensive immigration reform. If we do not, our Party’s appeal
will continue to shrink to its core constituencies only. We also believe that comprehensive im-
migration reform is consistent with Republican economic policies that promote job growth and
opportunity for all. (Barbour et al. 2013, p. 6)”
Many members of the political establishment were therefore shocked by the victory of Don-
ald Trump, who announced his candidacy by calling Mexican immigrants rapists.7 For a cam-
paign known for a historically unprecedented lack of ideological consistency, Trump stayed
remarkably constant in his anti-immigration rhetoric, rarely deviating from a strategy of court-
ing white voters at the expense of all other racial and ethnic groups. Even on his signature issue
of restrictions to immigration—the one issue which has defined the Trump political agenda
more than any other—Trump has shown a willingness to compromise on the basis of ethnic-
ity, famously declaring that he would welcome immigrants from white European countries like
Norway, preferring them to those that come from “shithole countries” in Africa, Latin America,
and the Caribbean (Dawsey 2018).
Trump’s propensity to antagonize an enormous segment of voters to court an overwhelm-
ingly white base has shocked and dismayed not only academic observers, but members of
Trump’s own party. His willingness to emphasize ethnic distinctions during his campaign even
when doing so would compromise the working of the federal government was especially trou-
bling. Trump famously attacked the independence of the judiciary by questioning the creden-
tials of an Indiana-born federal judge for being “Mexican” (Kendall 2016), and undermined
the armed forces tradition of veneration for fallen service members by attacking the surviving
7While the oft-quoted line from that speech is, “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists. And some, I assume, are good people,” that part of the speech actually began with, “When Mexico sends
its people, they’re not sending their best—they’re not sending you. They’re not sending you. (Burns 2015)” That the
quote is racially divisive should not distract from the fact that the speech is also based on establishing distinctions
between in-groups and out-groups. Trump makes it clear that the group of voters he is courting contains “you,” not
“Mexicans,” making a very clear declaration of who he plans to exclude while in office. This is the very definition
of an ethnic appeal used in this dissertation.
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family of a Pakistani-American soldier who died in a car bombing in Iraq (Turnham 2016). The
independence of the judiciary is enshrined in the US constitution and is considered an important
institution in the workings of the American legal system. Likewise, respect for fallen soldiers is
an important element in the way the US armed forces recruits soldiers and maintains military
discipline. That Trump was willing to disregard these vitally important elements of American
political life in order to make ethnically divisive appeals to voters was seen by many in both
of America’s two major parties as an indication of being unfit for office. Moreover, many in
Trump’s own Republican Party questioned it as a viable campaign strategy. Some in the party
believed that Trump’s reliance on incendiary ethnic rhetoric even when it challenged respected
American traditions would not only exclude the possibility of any non-white electoral support,
but also alienate white moderate voters in crucial swing states. With less than a month before
the general election, more than three dozen elected Republicans had called on Trump to stand
aside and hand the presidential nomination to someone else, believing that with Trump at the
top of the ballot the party was doomed to failure (Blake 2016).
Clearly, this was not the case. While Trump failed to win a majority (or even a plurality)
of votes, he nevertheless won the presidency. More than one commentator concluded that the
election had finally dispelled the comforting but erroneous notion that in the United States,
racism was disqualifying for office (Harris-Perry 2016). This dissertation suggests a framework
to understand why the consistent appeals to white voters and the brazen dismissal of non-white
votes may be in a winning strategy in the US today. By emphasizing his willingness to violate
norms on ethnocentric rhetoric, Trump signals to voters that he will favor white voters at the
expense of non-white ethnic outsiders. In this way, Trump’s divisive speeches are the American
translation of the ethnic appeals used in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.
Trump describes Spanish-speaking immigrants as invaders using illegitimate chain migration
to claim legal rights, the same way that far-right Latvian ethnic parties attack ethnic Russians
for benefiting from an illegitimate Soviet occupation. Trump’s increasing public support for
monuments dedicated to white supremacists like Robert E. Lee despite the extreme unpopularity
of such figures in non-white communities8 is not dissimilar from the way Croat parties in Bosnia
8See How Donald Trump learned to love Confederate monuments (2017).
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adopt the names of nineteenth-century radical nationalists to signal their appeal to one group
at the expense of another. Just as Latvian ethnic parties portray ethnically Russian citizens as
a threat to the sovereignty of an ethnically Latvian nation state, Trump publicly tells non-white
legislators to “go back” to countries of which they are not citizens (Rascoe 2019). The language
may be different, but the message is the same: a clear division between rightful and deserving
insiders and threatening undeserving outsiders defined in ethnic terms. As the United States
becomes more diverse, but nevertheless retains its white majority, the attractiveness of such a
position may be increasing to white voters. The success of Trump’s divisive politics may not be
an aberration, but the result of long-term trends.
Trump’s rhetoric is an attempt to transition the Republican Party from an ideological party
reflecting free-market liberalism and traditional conservative social values to an ethnic party
benefiting whites. In an environment where whites makeup roughly 60% of the country, the
benefits of a white ethnic party are extremely high to white voters. The prospect that non-whites
could be excluded from receiving social services will not be provided to non-whites could be
extremely lucrative to white voters. Such a policy would make 40% of the country pay taxes
to subsidize the white majority while receiving none of the benefits. The Trump administra-
tion has already taken limited steps in this direction. Low-income predominately white areas
in Appalachian coal country and the agricultural Midwest are the “forgotten” people that the
administration promises to help with federal subsidies. Low-income predominately non-white
areas like the late Elijah Cummings’s district in Baltimore are “rodent-infested” and “failed,”
where federal funds would be wasted (Rascoe 2019). In this way, the federal government can
effectively act as an inter-ethnic redistribution mechanism, taxing both black and white, but
designing subsidies and budgets the disproportionately benefit an ethnic political base.
While the benefits from ethnic redistribution are increasing as the US diversifies, American
institutions ensure that the likelihood of white electoral victory changes very little. Non-white
voters are disproportionately concentrated within specific states, and as such their ability to
prevent a white ethnic party from getting elected is limited. Only in Nevada, Texas, NewMexico,
California and Hawaii are non-Hispanic white voters a minority.9 Consider a hypothetical ethnic
9This is also true of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands,
the US Virgin Islands, and Guam, but these territories have no voting congressional representation.
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census election, where ethnicity perfectly corresponds to voting behavior. In this election, a
non-white ethnic party which could mobilize all non-white voters facing off against a white
ethnic party mobilizing all white voters would secure only 10 senate seats, to the 90 won by the
white party. In the Electoral College for the presidency, the race is closer, with the white ethnic
party winning 430 Electoral College votes to the 108 votes won by the non-white rival. In this
stylized example, white voters have extremely high benefits to electing ethnic representatives—
in fact, the population breakdown of the US between whites and non-white is very close to the
breakdown between Latvians and non-Latvians in Latvia. But the geographic nature of the US
electoral system and the dispersal of the population eliminates any serious barriers to winning
office for white ethnic parties. This lopsided balance is likely to get worse before it gets better
in the United States. As the white majority diminishes, the benefits of ethnic representation for
white voters will only increase. But unless the non-white population relocates into mostly white
states, political parties and candidates will mostly face no new consequences for campaigning
on platforms of coethnic favoritism towards whites. In this way, an increasingly diverse United
States could actually see an increase in overtly racial campaigning.
For those who are concerned by the increase in divisive ethnic and racial rhetoric, the find-
ings here suggest long-term and short-term courses of action. In the long term, the US must
make it a priority to end the gerrymandering and the institutional imbalance created by the ter-
ritorial allocation of political power which in no way corresponds to the distribution of ethnic
groups. Eliminating the Electoral College, for instance, would change the results of a pure ethnic
census voting from an 80% to 20% contest in favor of ethnic whites to a 60% 40% contest. This
would drastically reduce the incentives to campaign to white coethnics for the majority group,
while in no way encouraging minority groups to campaign on ethnic grounds. Somewhat coun-
terintuitively, the US should also rethink the extremely common practice of minority-majority
districting. This ethnic gerrymandering is often intended to make it possible for voters from
non-white groups to elect coethnic representatives despite being a minority of their state or local
area. But the findings in this dissertation suggests that minority-majority districting encourages
ethnic voting in both majority and minority groups, widening the gap between the two. Group-
ing minority voters into their own district does eliminate their barriers to entry, making ethnic
247
voting more likely, but it also solidifies the majority advantage in other neighboring districts. It
eliminates the possibility that minority voters could be pivotal swing voters and decreases the
incentives of majority-group candidates to campaign to anyone other than their own coethnic
supporters.
In the short-term, it suggests that the way to compete against majority group ethnic parties is
not by countering with minority group ethnic parties. Instead, broadly universal appeals which
promise benefits to all voters regardless of ethnicity are most likely to appeal both to ethnic mi-
nority groups voters who have strong reasons to disapprove of ethnic parties from the majority
group, and voters of the majority groups who may ultimately be unpersuaded by ethnic appeals
from candidates in their own group. Given the numerical advantage that majority groups have
by definition, they can only be defeated by multi-ethnic coalitions, and non-ethnic platforms and
mobilization efforts are the most likely to be successful in that vein. The results also suggest
that for those trying to defeat ethnic parties and candidates running on ethnic platforms which
appeal to majority groups, the inclusion of ethnic minorities is vitally important. Ethnic mi-
nority voters and leaders are those with the strongest interests in preventing the politicization
of ethnic identities, and given the non-viability of their own ethnic party a non-ethnic party is
likely their best option. Many of the most successful ethnic minority political entrepreneurs
are those who cannily adopted this strategy of building multi-ethnic movements based on uni-
versal values. Martin Luther King Jr. spoke consistently of justice, equality, and faith, and in
doing so attracted support from white students and middle-class voters who may have been put
off by more extreme black nationalism movements. César Chávez began his career by mobi-
lizing Latino laborers, but ultimately founded an organization that represented all agricultural
workers by recruiting Filipino, black, East Asian, and white blue-collar workers into the United
Farm Workers labor union. Leaders such as these are rightly hailed as important people who
won important social and political changes for minority groups, but it should not be forgotten
that they also were leaders in building coalitions of interest with those outside their own ethnic
community.
Democracy may very well be the best regime type available for the protection of individual
civil liberties. But it should not be forgotten that it is ultimately a system of majority rule, and
248
can, under certain conditions, support the arbitrary division of people and the exploitation of one
group over another. Ethnic mobilization can undercut the democratic ideals of representation
and accountability. By drawing attention to the fundamentally different ways in which minority
and majority group members are represented by democratic institutions, it is my hope that this
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